Civil-military relations is a critical topic in understanding the domestic and foreign policy trajectories of the Russian state. The papers here do not deny that civilian control exists. But they both highlight how highly undemocratic, and even dangerous, is the absence of those democratic controls over the military and the police forces in Russia which, taken together, comprise multiple militaries. These papers present differing U.S. and European assessments of the problems connected with civilian and democratic controls over the possessors of force in the Russian state.

This book has relevance for those interested in understanding Russia's course in international relations under the leadership of Vladimir Putin. This book will inform the reader and is especially relevant in light of the events of 2008 in the Caucasus and the war in Georgia, in particular. The author explains the ideology of Neo-Eurasianism, which in turn inspires the policy-thinking of the Kremlin. Also studied is Putin's origins in the KGB, from the previous posts of Secretary of the Security Council and Director of the FSB, and his rise to power in the crucial year of 1999, when he became Russian Prime Minister. The author highlights the continuing trend of appointing high-ranking officers of the Russian intelligence community to senior positions in the government, studying this in the context of Russian civil-military-intelligence relations. The author reached the conclusion, back in 2003, that the members of Russian intelligence hold the reins of power above the civilian and military elements of the Russian government. The author returns to the Kosovo Crisis of 1999, discussing also the motives that led the Kremlin and Putin to invaded Chechnya for a second time in a decade. Parallels can be drawn to the 2008 Russian invasion of Georgia and the roots of the Neo-Eurasianist ideology that is behind the two invasions are examined. This book will help the reader understand Russia's current and future distribution of power in the Caucasus, the Balkans and the world at large, Moscow's search for a multipolar world, and its opposition to U.S. hegemony.

From the author of Rumsfeld’s Wars, “an important addition to the bookshelf of any analyst of post-Soviet security affairs” (Slavic Review). Dale Herspring analyzes three key periods of change in civil-military relations in the Soviet Union and postcommunist Russia: the Bolshevik construction of the communist Red Army in the 1920s; the era of perestroika, when Mikhail Gorbachev attempted to implement a more benign military doctrine and force posture; and the Yeltsin era, when a new civilian and military leadership set out to restructure civil-military relations. The book concludes with a timely discussion of the relationship of the military to the current political struggle in Russia. “The history is both fascinating and timely.” —European Security “When military reform returns to its deservedly prominent place in the Russian political agenda, Herspring’s book will offer invaluable guidance.” —Mark von Hagen, American military historian

Putin's style of leadership has transitioned into another era but there is much still inherited from the past. In the often anarchic environment of the 1990s, the nascent Russian Federation experienced misunderstandings and mis-steps in civil-military relations. Under Boris Yeltsin it has been questioned whether the military obeyed orders from civilian authorities or merely gave lip service to those it served to protect while implementing its own policies and courses of action. Robert Brannon sets forth the circumstances under which the military instrument of Russia's power and influence could be called upon to exert force. Deriving in part from its Soviet past, the author examines how Russia's military doctrine represents more than just a road map of how to fight the nation's wars; it also specifies threats to national interests, in this case the United States, NATO and international terrorism. Against this background of politics and power, the military's influence may reveal as much about politics as it does the military.

The best recent scholarship on Russian civil-military relations explicitly addresses this issue's importance for both domestic and external security. Thomas Gomart has written that, Through the civil-military relationship the nature of a state's politico-strategic project can be assessed, that is, what is its understanding of the world; what resources does it have available, what is its willingness to modify its international environment. Studying the civil-military relationship also makes clear current modes of power, the sharing of responsibility in security matters, and in certain cases the will to act.

This book examines how civil-military relations have been transformed in Russia, Poland, Hungary and Ukraine since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact in 1991. It shows how these countries have worked to reform their obsolete armed forces, and bring them into line with the new economic and strategic realities of the post-Cold War world, with new bureaucratic structures in which civilians play the key policy-making roles, and with strengthened democratic political institutions which have the right to oversee the armed forces.

From open civil war in Bosnia and Georgia to the Russian president’s use of military units against an uncooperative parliament, civil-military conflicts in the former USSR and Yugoslavia are increasingly attracting world-wide attention and concern. This volume brings together fourteen essays that explore the roles of the armed forces in the ongoing struggles for control over the processes of state formation and government in these newly independent countries. Twelve chapters focus on the experiences of particular countries in the region; and introductory and concluding chapters draw out commonalities and differences among the cases, comparing them with one another as well as with post-authoritarian regimes elsewhere in the world.

Military coups have plagued many countries around the world, but Russia, despite its tumultuous history, has not experienced a successful military coup in over two centuries. In a series of detailed case studies, Brian Taylor explains the political role of the Russian military. Drawing on a wealth of new material, including archives and interviews, Taylor discusses every case of actual or potential military intervention in Russian politics from Peter the Great to Vladimir Putin. Taylor analyzes in particular detail the army's behavior during the political revolutions that marked the beginning and end of the twentieth century, two periods when the military was, uncharacteristically, heavily involved in domestic politics. He argues that a common thread unites the late-Imperial, Soviet, and post-Soviet Russian army: an organizational culture that believes that intervention against the country's political leadership - whether tsar, general secretary, or president - is fundamentally illegitimate.