In recent years, choice no-fault has emerged as a popular but controversial proposal for addressing the problem of high automobile insurance rates. Choice plans offer consumers the option of a lower-cost insurance policy with restrictions on filing lawsuits or a higher-cost policy with full tort rights. Some American states have implemented choice programs, and major federal choice legislation is now pending in the United States Congress. Choice no-fault has caught the attention of policy makers, the insurance industry, and academics. Until now, however, no single book has pulled together the available research on the topic. The Economics and Politics of Choice No-Fault Insurance fills that gap. Edited by scholars from different disciplines, each of whom has written extensively on automobile insurance issues, the book includes some of the best work in the area. Former Massachusetts Governor and presidential candidate Michael S. Dukakis wrote the foreword. Contributors include University of Virginia Law Professor Jeffrey O'Connell, widely considered the `father of no-fault,' as well as authors of the influential RAND study of the potential effects of choice no-fault on insurance rates. The book chapters, most of which were written especially for this volume, cover topics ranging from the impact of choice no-fault on accidents and driving behavior, to the effects of choice on medical care usage, to alternative approaches for resolving accidents involving both `no-fault' and `tort' electors, to the political feasibility of choice legislative proposals. Emphasis on the potential advantages of choice no-fault is balanced by consideration of possible ill effects.

Includes history of bills and resolutions.

In this new volume, two lawyers debate which kind of automobile insurance is the best, no-fault or tort liability. This book presents in one place all the legal, political, historical, and financial arguments about the two types of auto insurance. Under the fault system currently used by thirty-seven states, tort law provides that the party at fault in the accident pays the full damages of accident victims. Jerry J. Phillips favors this system, arguing that it allows for fair compensation to the injured and deters drivers from dangerous behavior on the road. Stephen Chippendale counters this claim with the argument that tort-law based insurance combines high cost and low benefits, and that those who truly profit from it are the lawyers representing injured clients, while their claims clog up the court system. A better solution, he proposes, would be "Auto Choice," a plan under which consumers would choose whether or not they wished to be eligible for damages from pain and suffering. With civility and respect, these two legal scholars present thoughtful and thorough arguments on both sides of the debate, giving readers a balanced view of an issue that affects nearly every American. It will be of particular value to those in the fields of law, policy, and insurance.

This book is a broad and deep inquiry into how contingency fees distort our civil justice system, influence our political system and endanger democratic governance. Contingency fees are the way personal injury lawyers finance access to the courts for those wrongfully injured. Although the public senses that lawyers manipulate the justice system to serve their own ends, few are aware of the high costs that come with contingency fees. This book sets out to change that, providing a window into the seamy underworld of contingency fees that the bar and the courts not only tolerate but even protect and nurture. Contrary to a broad academic consensus, the book argues that the financial incentives for lawyers to litigate are so inordinately high that they perversely impact our civil justice system and impose other unconscionable costs. It thus presents the intellectual architecture that underpins all tort reform efforts.