This is a provocative, behind-the-scenes introduction to the vital and complex role science plays in United States politics. It includes the first formal statement from former President Clinton's former Science Advisor, John H. Gibbons; a fresh retrospective from D. Allan Bromley on science advice in the George H. W. Bush Administration; and a unique viewpoint from John McTague about his brief tenure under President Reagan. Among the twenty-four contributors are former members of the President's Science Advisory Committee, distinguished scholars, and industrialists.

How do science and technology issues become important to a particular presidency? Which issues gain priority? How? Why? What is the role of the presidency in the adoption of national policies affecting science and technology? In their implementation? How does the presidency try to curtail certain programs? Eliminate others? Or rescue programs Congress might seek to terminate? How does implementation vary between a president's own program and one that is inherited? Such are the questions raised in this book, one of the first to address the relationship between scientists, few of whom have political backgrounds, and presidents, few of whom are knowledgeable in matters of science and technology. Drawing on extensive research performed at the Lyndon B. Johnson Library in Austin, Texas, and the National Archives in Washington, as well as on secondary sources and interviews, W. Henry Lambright describes, discusses, and analyzes this relationship and shows how one presidency set its agenda, adopted, implemented, and curtailed or eliminated science and technology programs. Twenty-four case studies of specific decision processes occurring in the era of Lyndon Johnson anchor the book in the world of real events. Some programs adopted under Johnson are now all but forgotten, such as the Manned Orbiting Laboratory, nuclear desalting, and electronic barrier. The effects of many more, initiated, maintained, or enlarged under LBJ, lasted far beyond his administration. These include environmental pollution control, Project Apollo, and the application of Agent Orange in Vietnam. Finally, there are those that were redirected, placed on hold, or terminated under Johnson, such as the supersonic transport, antiballistic missile, and Project Mohole. In this important book, Lambright has provided a framework for analyzing how the presidency as an institution deals with such issues, and he has established a strong foundation on which all future students of presidential policy management can build.

This book is a history of the complex relations between scientific advisors, primarily physicists, and U.S. presidents in their role as decision makers about nuclear weapons and military strategy. The story, unsurprisingly, is one of considerable tension between the "experts" and the politicians, as scientists seek to influence policy and presidents alternate between accepting their advice and resisting or even ignoring it. First published in 1992, the book has been brought up to date to include the experiences of science advisors to President Clinton. In addition, the texts of eleven crucial documents, from the Einstein-Szilard letter to President Roosevelt (1939) to the announcement of the Strategic Defense Initiative by President Reagan (1983), have been added as appendixes.

Congress established the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) through the National Science and Technology Policy, Organization & Priorities Act of 1976. The act states that "the primary function of the OSTP Director is to provide, within the Executive Office of the President (EOP), advice on the scientific, engineering and technological aspects of issues that require attention at the highest level of Government. Scientific and technical knowledge and guidance influences not just policy related to science and technology, but also many of today's public policies as policymakers seek knowledge to enhance the quality of their decisions. This book examines the several organisations which, when requested by the federal government or Congress, provide formal science and technology policy advice. In addition, this book provides a basic understanding of science and technology policy including the nature of S&T policy, how scientific and technical knowledge is useful for public policy decision-making, and an overview of the key stakeholders in science and technology policy. This book consists of public documents which have been located, gathered, combined, reformatted, and enhanced with a subject index, selectively edited and bound to provide easy access.

The United States must make better use of its scientific and technical information (STI) resources, if it wishes to be competitive in world markets and maintain its leadership. STI is an essential ingredient of the innovation process from education and research to product development and manufacturing. It is a major product of the $65 billion per year the U.S. Government spends on research and development (R & D); researchers need ready access to STI if they are to stay at the cutting edge. Many issues of our time-health, energy, transportation, and climate change-require STI to understand the nature and complexities of the problem and to identify and assess possible solutions. STI is important not only to scientists and engineers but to political, business, and other leaders who must make decisions related to science and technology, and to the citizens who must live with the consequences of these decisions.

Abstracts of dissertations available on microfilm or as xerographic reproductions.

In 1954 the U.S. Air Force launched an ambitious program known as WS-117L to develop the world's first reconnaissance satellite. The goal was to take photographic images from space and relay them back to Earth via radio. Because of technical issues and bureaucratic resistance, however, WS-117L was seriously behind schedule by the time Sputnik orbited Earth in 1957 and was eventually cancelled. The air force began concentrating instead on new programs that eventually launched the first successful U.S. spy satellites. Eyeing the Red Storm examines the birth of space-based reconnaissance not from the perspective of CORONA (the first photo reconnaissance satellite to fly) but rather from that of the WS-117L. Robert M. Dienesch's revised assessment places WS-117L within the larger context of Dwight D. Eisenhower's presidency, focusing on the dynamic between military and civilian leadership. Dienesch demonstrates how WS-117L promised Eisenhower not merely military intelligence but also the capacity to manage national security against the Soviet threat. As a fiscal conservative, Eisenhower believed a strong economy was the key to surviving the Cold War and saw satellite reconnaissance as a means to understand the Soviet military challenge more clearly and thus keep American defense spending under control. Although WS-117L never flew, it provided the foundation for all subsequent satellites, breaking theoretical barriers and helping to overcome major technical hurdles, which ensured the success of America's first working reconnaissance satellites and their photographic missions during the Cold War.