As the U.S. Navy enters the twenty-first century, many of the ships, aircraft, weapons, and tactics it employed so successfully during the Cold War will no longer be cost-effective or even effective. Future battlefields will shift the locus of naval action from the high seas into littoral waters, demanding sustained operations in relatively narrow, shallow waters. Naval forces in the twenty-first century must not only meet the traditional requirements of command of the sea—ships, planes, troops, and bases—carrying out forward presence, crisis response, strategic deterrence, and sealift. They must now put these together to obtain the four key operational capabilities of littoral warfare: command, control, intelligence and surveillance, and communication; battlespace dominance; power projection; and force sustainment. The core of the new U.S. strategic concept is power projection, and it envisions naval forces directly leading Army and Air Force elements to influence events ashore, most probably in the Third World. And this navy must be cost effective.

At the beginning of the 21st century much has remained the same in naval terms but much has changed. Geoffrey Till's study is an exploration of how change will impact upon the world's navies.

This book offers an assessment of the naval policies of emerging naval powers, and the implications for maritime security relations and the global maritime order. Since the end of the Cold War, China, Japan, India and Russia have begun to challenge the status quo with the acquisition of advanced naval capabilities. The emergence of rising naval powers is a cause for concern, as the potential for great power instability is exacerbated by the multiple maritime territorial disputes among new and established naval powers. This work explores the underlying sources of maritime ambition through an analysis of various historical cases of naval expansionism. It analyses both the sources and dynamics of international naval competition, and looks at the ways in which maritime stability and the widespread benefits of international commerce and maritime resource extraction can be sustained through the twenty-first century. This book will be of much interest to students of naval power, Asian security and politics, strategic studies, security studies and IR in general.

Maritime power has been a key defining parameter of economic vitality and geostrategic power of nations. This book explores how the first decade of the 21st century has witnessed the rise of China and India as confident economic powers pivoting on high growth rates, exponential expansion of science, technology and industrial growth.

This is the first academic study of India's emerging maritime strategy, and offers a systematic analysis of the interplay between Western military thought and Indian maritime traditions. By a quirk of historical fate, Europe embarked on its Age of Discovery just as the main Asian powers were renouncing the sea, ushering in centuries of Western dominance. In the 21st century, however, Asian states are once again resuming a naval focus, with both China and India dedicating some of their new-found wealth to building powerful navies and coast guards, and drawing up maritime strategies to govern the use of these forces. The United States, like the British Empire before it, is attempting to manage these rising sea powers while preserving its maritime primacy. This book probes how India looks at the sea, what kind of strategy and seagoing forces New Delhi may craft in the coming years, and how Indian leaders may use these forces. It examines the material dimension, but its major premise is that navies represent a physical expression of a society's history, philosophical traditions, and culture. This book, then, ventures a comprehensive appraisal of Indian maritime strategy. This book will be of interest to students of sea power, strategic studies, Indian politics and Asian Studies in general. James R. Holmes is an Associate Professor of Strategy at the U.S. Naval War College and a former U.S. Navy surface warfare officer. Toshi Yoshihara is an Associate Professor in the Strategy and Policy Department at the Naval War College. Andrew C. Winner is Professor in the Strategic Research Department at the U.S. Naval War College.

The end of the Cold War has affected debates about maritime strategy, doctrine, operations and technology. What has emerged is an intellectual reconsideration of the theory and practise of maritime power. This volume addresses these themes in a systematic and over-arching way, and brings together contributions from internationally renowned scholars. It focuses on the implications for western navies of shifts in strategic thinking, maritime doctrine, technology and naval roles.

This reference book looks at the modern day use of maritime power for achieving a range of political objectives.

The gold standard in college-level American naval history texts, edited by the foremost scholar in the field In the newly revised second edition of America, Sea Power and the World, a team of distinguished researchers delivers an extensive and authoritative survey of American naval history, the place of the United States in world affairs, and the role of that country’s naval forces during peacetime and wartime. Each chapter contains a comprehensive analysis of its subject as well as brief sidebars describing a key weapon or technological development of the era and a short biographical sketch of an influential leader or representative of the navy from that era. The book offers extensive illustration and maps and a throughgoing emphasis on naval policy, strategy, roles, and missions, with careful attention paid to naval operations. These factors given greater focus than the descriptions of battle tactics found in other texts. Readers will also find: A thorough introduction to sea power and the modern state system, as well as the American War for Independence at sea Comprehensive explorations of the genesis of the United States Navy from 1785 to 1806 Practical discussions of the Naval War of 1812 and the Confirmation of Independence from 1807 to 1815 and the Squadron Navy as an agent of the commercial empire until 1890 Fulsome treatments of the Second World War in the Atlantic, Mediterranean, and the Pacific, including defensive actions in the Pacific from 1937 to 1943 and offensive actions from 1943 to 1944. New chapters exclusive to the 2nd edition focused on the history of African Americans and women in the US Navy, the development of joint operations and unified command, and the naval history of the last two decades. Perfect for undergraduate students taking courses on the naval history of the United States, America, Sea Power and the World, Second Edition will also earn a place in the libraries of members of the general public interested in naval and military history.

Military intervention always has been and always will be an important part of foreign policy, a tool to further national interests and influence world events. Many scholars have tried to explain the intervention behavior of states in crises, conflicts, and wars. When and why do states intervene, and what are reasons for nonintervention? What conflicts and crises are more likely to call for intervention, and why? When is intervention successful? The explanations are manifold and include political, military, economic, social, environmental, domestic, and humanitarian factors. The theoretical literature covers a gamut of realist intentions, ranging from security, power, and national interests, as guides to state action; to emphasis on international trade and economics; and to domestic politics. Some argue for explanations based on idealistic aspirations, such as democracy and human rights. Many studies focus on a mix of different reasons. From this vast field, the author has selected international crises involving any form of U.S. activity in the years 1946-2006. Within these U.S. activities, the author distinguishes between crisis response with and without naval forces, as this study intends to advance the knowledge of the use of U.S. naval forces as a response to international crises and to contribute to a better understanding of when and how the U.S. Navy is deployed.