Public Law 110-28 requires a report to Congress by Sept. 1, 2007, on whether or not the gov¿t. of Iraq has met 18 benchmarks contained in the Act, & the status of the achievement of these benchmarks. The benchmarks stem from commitments first articulated by the Iraqi gov¿t. in June 2006. In comparison, the Act requires the admin. to report in July & Sept. 2007 on whether satisfactory progress is being made toward meeting the benchmarks, not whether the benchmarks have been met. The author reviewed gov¿t. documents & interviewed officials from U.S. agencies, the U.N.; & the gov¿t. of Iraq. He also made multiple visits to Iraq during 2006 & 2007. This analyses was enhanced by 100 Iraq-related audits that have been completed since May `03.

Product Description: The billions of dollars expended in Iraq constitute the largest relief and reconstruction exercise in American history. SIGIR's lessons learned capping report characterizes this effort in four phases (pre-war to ORHA, CPA, post-CPA/Negroponte era, and Khalilzad, Crocker, and the Surge). From this history, SIGIR forwards a series of conclusions and recommendations for Congress to consider when organizing for the next post-conflict reconstruction situation. Over the past five years, the United States has provided nearly fifty billion dollars for the relief and reconstruction of Iraq. This unprecedented rebuilding program, implemented after the March 2003 invasion, was developed to restore Iraq's essential services, build Iraq's security forces, create a market-based economy, and establish a democratic government--all in pursuit of U.S. interests in a stable and free Iraq. Did the U.S. rebuilding program achieve its objectives? Was the money provided well-spent or wasted? What lessons have we learned from the experience? Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience, a report from the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), answers these and other important questions by presenting a comprehensive history of the U.S. program, chiefly derived from SIGIR's body of extensive oversight work in Iraq, hundreds of interviews with key figures involved with the reconstruction program, and thousands of documents evidencing the reconstruction work that was - or was not - done. The report examines the limited pre-war planning for reconstruction, the shift from a large infrastructure program to a more community-based one, and the success of the Surge in 2007 and beyond. Hard Lessons concludes that the U.S. government did not have the structure or resources in place to execute the mammoth relief and reconstruction plan it took on in 2003. The lessons learned from this experience create a basis for reviewing and reforming the U.S. approach to contingency relief and reconstruction operations.

Contents: (1) A responsible drawdown in Iraq will need to balance the timetable established in the security agree., military doctrine that calls for the delineation of conditions that must exist before military operations can end, and the wishes of the Iraqi gov¿t. (2) The DoD will need to remove about 140,000 troops by the end of 2011. The redeployment of these forces and the removal of their equipment and material will be a massive and expensive effort. (3) The U.S. will need to consider how to transition from a predominantly military presence to a civilian one as U.S. forces draw down. (4) Iraq will need to develop the capacity to spend its resources, particularly on investment that will further economic dev¿t. and deliver essential services to its people. Illustrations.

A combination of poor planning, weak oversight and greed cheated U.S. taxpayers and undermined American forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. U.S. taxpayers have paid nearly $51 billion for projects in Iraq, including training the Iraqi army and police and rebuilding Iraq's oil, electric, justice, health and transportation sectors. Many of the projects did not succeed, partly because of violence in Iraq and friction between U.S. officials in Washington and Iraqi officials in Baghdad. The U.S. gov¿t. "was neither prepared for nor able to respond quickly to the ever-changing demands" of stabilizing Iraq and then rebuilding it. This report reviews the problems in the war effort, which the Bush admin. claimed would cost $2.4 billion. Charts and tables.

In Nov. 2005, the the Nat. Strategy for Victory in Iraq was issued to clarify the Pres. strategy for achieving U.S. political, security, & economic goals in Iraq. The strategy articulated the desired end-state for U.S. operations in Iraq: a peaceful, united, stable, & secure Iraq, integrated into the internat. community, & a partner in the war on terrorism. To achieve this, the U.S. is, among other things, developing Iraqi military & police forces. The U.S. goal is to transfer security respon. from the Multinational Force-Iraq to Iraqi security forces & the Iraqi gov¿t. as their capability & the security situation improve. This testimony discusses the results of U.S. efforts to develop Iraqi security forces, & factors that affect the development of effective Iraqi forces. Charts & tables.