Uncertainty is critical to economic theory, mainly because it either supports, or undermines, many significant debates within economic theory. Despite the significance of uncertainty, this book represents the first attempt to comprehensively trace the genealogy of uncertainty, which is a procedure that Nietzsche used in relation to morality; one of the subjects that become logically redundant in the absence of uncertainty. On the one hand, this logical redundancy is problematic when considered in isolation, given the practical importance of morality. On the other hand, this logical redundancy becomes even more problematic, given that, at one time, uncertainty was widely accepted as an important part of the philosophical system. Here uncertainty played a pivotal role, in terms of explaining practical decision-making. Such an appreciation of uncertainty has recently been set aside by modern philosophy, which argues quantities of human labour provide virtually all economic value. Such an explanation of economic value excludes uncertainty, the many qualitative contributions of nature, and morality, even when one acknowledged the contribution to the understanding of uncertainty, as proposed by Frank Knight, in 1921. However, in contrast to Knight, who looked toward recent philosophy so as to support the existence of uncertainty, this genealogy looks to support the significance of uncertainty by understanding the philosophy that supported the idea of uncertainty for thousands of years, before the philosophy of John Locke. Specifically, Locke excludes uncertainty from the analysis of practical decision-making in general, and from economic decision-making in particular. Accordingly, it can be anticipated that the enclosed genealogy will assist economists to more adequately develop the idea of uncertainty within economic theory.

Late in his life, the author came to realize that there was much in his world that was uncertain. How should he deal with that? In this book, he explores how some scientists have tolerated uncertainty and goes on to consider uncertainty in relation to our morals. The subjugation of women has been a major moral problem through history, characterized by certainty. In his view, this has fostered many other immoralities (e.g. slavery). He then reviews the world's main religions. To what extent have they accepted uncertainty, and how have they dealt with sex and women? How do individuals cope with religious uncertainty? By the end of the book, he makes the clear distinction between unknowability (reflecting the limitations of our comprehension, which we should respect) and uncertainty (which is more relevant to our day-to-day experiences, which we need to cope with and tolerate). For this purpose, he proposes models of reality that we could use, assessing the extent that they have been helpful and modifying them as necessary. He sees this modelism as having general significance, and to illustrate this, he proposes a radical model for incorporating both women and men into our society: a two-team approach. Tolerance of uncertainty is of fundamental importance to us all. Certainty is often problematic and should be viewed with caution.

Douglas Geyer's illuminating analysis of Mark 4:35-6:56 explains why the Gospel ends as it does in the earliest manuscripts-abruptly, at 16:8, with the words, "for they were afraid." This ending, with women fleeing the empty tomb in "trembling and astonishment," has long been considered "problematic," and, in the several attempts to rewrite it, Mark 16 has become a source of unending mischief. Geyer's work draws on a vast literature of fear, anomaly, terror, and dread in the ancient world to demonstrate that this ending is a consistent, overriding theme of Mark's Gospel. In Mark we see and hear the story of Jesus through the eyes and ears of the Roman world. Geyer brings to bear the literature of that world in a way that helps his readers to understand what Mark is doing and how the story that Mark tells continues to touch his readers and hearers ancient and modern (and "postmodern"). Geyer guides the reader through a vast and uncharted primary literature, demonstrating its relevance for New Testament study. In so doing he clearly proposes a fresh and original understanding of Mark that cuts across many of the critical controversies and renews its purpose and usefulness as "good news"-Gospel-for the terrors and uncertainties of our own time.

Sources of English Legal History: Public Law to 1750 is the definitive source book on the foundations of English public law. A companion to Baker and Milsom's Sources of English Legal History: Private Law to 1750 2e (OUP, 2010), this new volume offers an extensive collection of illustrative original materials, many of which are previously unpublished. It contains significant new material on the history of habeas corpus, mandamus, and certiorari, as well as well-known constitutional landmarks from the earliest times to 1750. Writing on the history of public law has tended to focus solely on the texts of statutes and formal records. In contrast, the present book concentrates on the forensic arguments and judicial decisions that led to the emergence of legal principles in the field of public law, including criminal law and the regulation of jurisdictions. It illuminates the growth of public law during the medieval and early modern periods, addressing the state's legislative and judicial organs, its coercive functions, and more broadly, the respective powers of the crown and parliament. The first work of its kind, this book is an essential resource for anyone interested in legal and constitutional history.