This monograph begins with a short discussion of contemporary insurgency. It makes the argument that, in studying terror war, guerrilla war, or any other common term for insurgency war, we find these expressions mischaracterize the activities of armed groups that are attempting to gain political control of a nation-state. The fact is that these organizations are engaged in a highly complex political-psychological war. Three key harbinger cases from which the first contemporary lessons of modern insurgency should have been learned provide the basis for the argument--Peru (1962 to date), Italy (1968-82), and Argentina (1969-79). Given that these kinds of conflict--or mutations--are likely to continue to challenge U.S. and other global leadership over the next several years, it is important to understand them. In this connection, it is also important to understand that the final results of insurgency or counterinsurgency are never determined by arms alone. Rather, a successful counterinsurgency depends on a holistic process that relies on civilian and military agencies and contingents working together in an integrated fashion to achieve a mutually agreed political-strategic end game.

Guerrilla insurgencies continue to rage across the globe, fueled by ethnic and religious conflict and the easy availability of weapons. At the same time, urban population centers in both industrialized and developing nations attract ever-increasing numbers of people, outstripping rural growth rates worldwide. As a consequence of this population shift from the countryside to the cities, guerrilla conflict in urban areas, similar to the violent response to U.S. occupation in Iraq, will become more frequent. Urban Guerrilla Warfare traces the diverse origins of urban conflicts and identifies similarities and differences in the methods of counterinsurgent forces. In this wide-ranging and richly detailed comparative analysis, Anthony James Joes examines eight key examples of urban guerrilla conflict spanning half a century and four continents: Warsaw in 1944, Budapest in 1956, Algiers in 1957, Montevideo and São Paulo in the 1960s, Saigon in 1968, Northern Ireland from 1970 to 1998, and Grozny from 1994 to 1996. Joes demonstrates that urban insurgents violate certain fundamental principles of guerrilla warfare as set forth by renowned military strategists such as Carl von Clausewitz and Mao Tse-tung. Urban guerrillas operate in finite areas, leaving themselves vulnerable to encirclement and ultimate defeat. They also tend to abandon the goal of establishing a secure base or a cross-border sanctuary, making precarious combat even riskier. Typically, urban guerrillas do not solely target soldiers and police; they often attack civilians in an effort to frighten and disorient the local population and discredit the regime. Thus urban guerrilla warfare becomes difficult to distinguish from simple terrorism. Joes argues persuasively against committing U.S. troops in urban counterinsurgencies, but also offers cogent recommendations for the successful conduct of such operations where they must be undertaken.

Despite the scope of the threat they pose to Mexico’s security, violent drug-trafficking organizations are not well understood, and optimal strategies to combat them have not been identified. While there is no perfectly analogous case to Mexico’s current security situation, historical case studies may offer lessons for policymakers as they cope with challenges related to violence and corruption in that country.

United States has engaged in counterinsurgency around the globe for more than a century. But insurgencies have rarely been defeated by outside powers. Rather, the afflicted nation itself must win the war politically and militarily, and the best way to help is to offer advice, training, and equipment. Air power, and the U.S. Air Force, can play an important role in such efforts, which suggests making them an institutional priority.

The Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI), which began on July 24, 2003, has been a remarkable success, in part because of the consistency of its message, the strength of its leadership, and its uncommon support for, rather than overt control of, the Solomon Islands government and policing capability. This study reviews RAMSI operations through the lens of a broader application to current and future counterinsurgency efforts.

The Nature and command of the available forces; inter-organizational coordination; coherence between politics, strategy, operations and tactics; and finally, time. Wellington, Spínola and Petraeus led the effort of vast civilian and military teams that, at different periods of history and in distinct geographical settings, had the opportunity to apply a holistic command using, to varying degrees, the above four dimensions. What they achieved from the experiences they led, and the doctrines they used, from what the reality on the ground showed to them and from the concurrent political decisions that were imposed on them, limiting their own political and strategic action, is all an important part of this comprehensive study. By studying the applicability in the situations of Wellington, Spínola and Petraeus, it was possible to extrapolate a general theory about the holistic command of war. One that is masterfully presented for discussion in this work.

The Greek Civil War (1946-1949) was one of the few instances in the post-World War II era of a clear-cut and permanent victory by right-wing government forces over an insurgent communist movement. Spyridon Plakoudas here explores the factors which ultimately caused the downfall of the communist insurgency in Greece which had, at some points, seemed undefeatable. He questions whether the guerrilla movement fell victim to the feud between Stalin and Tito or whether the significant British and, above all, American aid in fact rescued the Greek monarchist regime from collapse. Plakoudas explores the strategies adopted by government forces in order to counter the communist insurgency, how external and internal actors influenced these policies and when, how and why these policies achieved success. Featuring previously unseen sources and documents, this book reveals the strategy and tactics of the monarchist regime.

The Handbook of Latin American and Caribbean Intelligence Cultures explores the contemporary efforts of Latin American and Caribbean nations to develop an intelligence culture. Specifically, it analyzes these countries’ efforts to democratize their intelligence agencies (i.e. to develop intelligence services that are both transparent and effective) to convert the former military regimes’ repressive security apparatuses into democratic intelligence communities—a rather paradoxical task, considering that democracy calls for political neutrality, transparency, and accountability, while effective intelligence services must operate in secrecy. Indeed, even the most successful democracies face this conundrum of democracy and intelligence; Latin America and the Caribbean region is not alone in facing this challenge. The legacy of the repressive military regimes or brutal civil wars—which have inspired in the public a general disdain toward intelligence services due to the grave human rights abuses—coupled with politicians’ persistent lack of interest or expertise in intelligence matters complicate the region’s quest for a proper balance between the competing demands of democracy and intelligence. This volume details the attempts of the region’s countries to overcome these obstacles and pursue democratic intelligence institution building—transforming the legal basis for intelligence; establishing democratic control and oversight mechanisms; and fostering intelligence openness, transparency, and outreach.