The legal foundation of the contemporary European security order is the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE). Negotiated by NATO and the Warsaw Pact states as the Cold War was ending and implemented as the new Europe took shape, the CFE Treaty imposes strict limits on the armed forces of all the major European states. This book takes a detailed look at the origins and evolution of the CFE negotiations and the impact of the CFE Treaty on European Security. It draws extensively on interviews with participants in the CFE negotiations and offers a careful reconstruction of a process that contributed to the transformation of Cold War Europe, a critical assessment of the treaty's contribution to security in post-Cold War Europe, and an evaluation of the lessons of CFE for future conventional arms control initiatives. CSIA Studies in International Security, No. 6

This work examines the CFE Treaty as a factor in Russia’s foreign and security policy. Moscow showed amazing persistence in their relationship with the "cornerstone of European security." Their approach to the treaty was a genuine attempt to shape the security environment in Europe and the former USSR. The treaty also enabled the dismantling of large conventional forces as they returned from Eastern Europe and transitioned into the armies of the newly independent states of the former USSR. The CFE Treaty, though, proved ineffective at constraining the enlargement of NATO. Simultaneously, Moscow’s foreign and security policy evolved from one that focused on the domestic development of the country to that of a more confident state reasserting itself as a great power. Drawing extensively on primary sources and analyses by Russian authors, this book employs two historical narratives, case studies, and a conceptual framework to show that while Moscow remained engaged with the CFE Treaty, undesired effects on Russia’s national interests gradually accrued at the expense of desired ones, leading Vladimir Putin to withdraw Russia from the treaty as an act of de-coupling from the "collective West." This book is relevant to scholars and policymakers who want to understand Russia’s approach to arms control as an element of military security.

This title was first published in 2000: The aim of this text is to explore conventional arms control in Europe. The early chapters provide a primarily historical perspective, looking at the context, foundations, main provisions and institutional structure of the main agreements. The later chapters explore the continuing and likely future roles of the OSCE and NATO in the arms control process. The final chapters examine more contemporary developments by looking at the Adapted CFE Treaty and Vienna Documents agreed at the OSCE Istanbul Summit in November 1998 and the challenges posed to existing arrangements by the changing and emergent security threats that potentially face Europe.

Does the spread of democracy really contribute to international peace? Successive U. S. administrations have justified various policies intended to promote democracy not only by arguing that democracy is intrinsically good but by pointing to a wide range of research concluding that democracies rarely, if ever, go to war with one another. To promote democracy, the United States has provided economic assistance, political support, and technical advice to emerging democracies in Eastern and Central Europe, and it has attempted to remove undemocratic regimes through political pressure, economic sanctions, and military force. In Electing to Fight, Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder challenge the widely accepted basis of these policies by arguing that states in the early phases of transitions to democracy are more likely than other states to become involved in war. Drawing on both qualitative and quantitative analysis, Mansfield and Snyder show that emerging democracies with weak political institutions are especially likely to go to war. Leaders of these countries attempt to rally support by invoking external threats and resorting to belligerent, nationalist rhetoric. Mansfield and Snyder point to this pattern in cases ranging from revolutionary France to contemporary Russia. Because the risk of a state's being involved in violent conflict is high until democracy is fully consolidated, Mansfield and Snyder argue, the best way to promote democracy is to begin by building the institutions that democracy requires—such as the rule of law—and only then encouraging mass political participation and elections. Readers will find this argument particularly relevant to prevailing concerns about the transitional government in Iraq. Electing to Fight also calls into question the wisdom of urging early elections elsewhere in the Islamic world and in China.

When China and Russia established a strategic partnership in 1996, both nations declared that they would further develop military cooperation in various fields. Tsai examines the course of this military cooperation to reveal the nature of the military ties with the hopes of determining whether these two traditional adversaries have put aside historical legacies and mutual mistrust to create a full-fledged military partnership. After analyzing the motives and concerns of both powers, Tsai concludes that, while progress has been made in reducing military tensions in border regions, the level of trust has not increased substantially. The nature of these ties remains extremely fragile. Among Western analysts, there has been concern that a closer partnership might adversely affect U.S. interests in the region. China and Russia have developed cooperation in certain areas, such as arms transfers and military-technical cooperation, and these achievements have successfully reduced political tension. However, reciprocal threats against each other's territories and China's increasing ambitions and capacity to act as a great military power in the region could eventually become a major source of friction. Based on research in both Chinese and Russian, this study offers a comprehensive analysis on the development of and limits to this military cooperation.

Thirty years after the Soviet Union’s collapse, this book reveals how tensions between America, NATO, and Russia transformed geopolitics in the decade after the fall of the Berlin Wall “The most engaging and carefully documented account of this period in East-West diplomacy currently available.”—Andrew Moravscik, Foreign Affairs Not one inch. With these words, Secretary of State James Baker proposed a hypothetical bargain to Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev after the fall of the Berlin Wall: if you let your part of Germany go, we will move NATO not one inch eastward. Controversy erupted almost immediately over this 1990 exchange—but more important was the decade to come, when the words took on new meaning. Gorbachev let his Germany go, but Washington rethought the bargain, not least after the Soviet Union’s own collapse in December 1991. Washington realized it could not just win big but win bigger. Not one inch of territory needed to be off limits to NATO. On the thirtieth anniversary of the Soviet collapse, this book uses new evidence and interviews to show how, in the decade that culminated in Vladimir Putin’s rise to power, the United States and Russia undermined a potentially lasting partnership. Prize-winning historian M. E. Sarotte shows what went wrong.

Throughout the Cold War, people worldwide feared that the U.S. and Soviet governments could not prevent a nuclear showdown. Citizens from both East-bloc and Western countries, among them prominent scientists and physicians, formed networks to promote ideas and policies that would lessen this danger. Two of their organizations—the Pugwash movement and the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War—won Nobel Peace Prizes. Still, many observers believe that their influence was negligible and that the Reagan administration deserves sole credit for ending the Cold War. The first book to explore the impact these activists had on the Soviet side of the Iron Curtain, Unarmed Forces demonstrates the importance of their efforts on behalf of arms control and disarmament.Matthew Evangelista examines the work of transnational peace movements throughout the Khrushchev, Brezhnev, and Gorbachev eras and into the first years of Boris Yeltsin's leadership. Drawing on extensive research in Russian archives and on interviews with Russian and Western activists and policymakers, he investigates the sources of Soviet policy on nuclear testing, strategic defense, and conventional forces. Evangelista concludes that transnational actors at times played a crucial role in influencing Soviet policy—specifically in encouraging moderate as opposed to hard-line responses—for they supplied both information and ideas to that closed society. Evangelista's findings challenge widely accepted views about the peaceful resolution of the Cold War. By revealing the connection between a state's domestic structure and its susceptibility to the influence of transnational groups, Unarmed Forces will also stimulate thinking about the broader issue of how government policy is shaped.

Why the future of great power politics is likely to resemble its dismal past Can great powers be confident that their peers have benign intentions? States that trust each other can live at peace; those that mistrust each other are doomed to compete for arms and allies and may even go to war. Sebastian Rosato explains that states routinely lack the kind of information they need to be convinced that their rivals mean them no harm. Even in cases that supposedly involved mutual trust--Germany and Russia in the Bismarck era; Britain and the United States during the great rapprochement; France and Germany, and Japan and the United States in the early interwar period; and the Soviet Union and United States at the end of the Cold War--the protagonists mistrusted each other and struggled for advantage. Rosato argues that the ramifications of his argument for U.S.-China relations are profound: the future of great power politics is likely to resemble its dismal past.

Focusing on the principal challenges facing the Euro-Mediterranean partnership since the signing of the Barcelona Declaration in November 1995, this study assesses past European policies towards the region.