A reappraisal of Sir Anthony Eden's conduct of foreign relations during the Suez crisis of 1956. This book challenges previous assumptions and demonstrates that Eden was not as bellicose as has been alleged. It traces his conduct of crisis management, from July until his decision to use force on 14 October, focusing on the Prime Minister's personality and influences. It details the confusion and failed attempts at negotiation that eventually culminated in the reluctant gamble.

This book traces the activities of the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS/MI6) and the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) during the Suez Crisis, one of the most infamous episodes of British foreign policy. In doing so it identifies broader lessons not only about the events of 1956, but about the place of intelligence in strategy itself. It provides both an exploration of the relationship between intelligence and strategy at the conceptual level, and also a historical account, and strategic analysis of, the performance of the Joint Intelligence Committee and the Secret Intelligence Service during this time. Focusing on the period immediately before, during, and after the crisis, Danny Steed brings together a complete picture of intelligence story in Britain that has so far eluded comprehensive treatment in the Suez historiography. Through extensive consultation of declassified archival sources, a re-examination of often referred to sources, and the employment of oral history, this study identifies the most significant lessons about the use of intelligence revealed by the Suez Crisis.

Mountbatten, Cold War and Empire 1945-79 focuses upon Admiral Lord Mountbatten as a commanding – if controversial – figure in the history of Britain and its empire, from Churchill's wartime coalition through to the Labour governments of the 1960s, and forms a sequel to Mountbatten: Apprentice War Lord. Written in three parts, focusing on the premierships of Churchill and Attlee; Eden, Macmillan, Douglas-Home; and Wilson, this book examines the debates over Mountbatten's record in Southern Asia in 1943-6 and 1947-8. Additional chapters focus on Mountbatten's position at the heart of the British state and his pivotal role at key moments in the immediate post-war era, most notably the partition of India, the Suez Crisis and the renewal of an ostensibly independent nuclear deterrent. This book also considers Mountbatten's relationship with Anthony Eden, both during and following the Suez Crisis, as well as detailing Mountbatten's achievements as First Sea Lord and Chief of the Defence Staff under Harold Macmillan and his immediate successors. Smith acknowledges Mountbatten's centrality to the history of Britain and its empire in the immediate post-war era and, in doing so, presents a fascinating picture of one of the most prominent figures of the 20th-century. Smith's scrupulous examination of primary sources, including those available in the Broadlands Archives, results in a thorough examination of a controversial figure: by eschewing often baseless speculation about Mountbatten's personal life Smith creates the first comprehensive overview of Admiral Lord Mountbatten's career from 1943 to the mid-sixties.

In the spring of 1954, after eight years of bitter fighting, the war in Vietnam between the French and the communist-led Vietminh came to a head. With French forces reeling, the United States planned to intervene militarily to shore-up the anti-communist position. Turning to its allies for support, first and foremost Great Britain, the US administration of Dwight D. Eisenhower sought to create what Secretary of State John Foster Dulles called a “united action” coalition. In the event, Winston Churchill's Conservative government refused to back the plan. Fearing that US-led intervention could trigger a wider war in which the United Kingdom would be the first target for Soviet nuclear attack, the British Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, was determined to act as Indochina peacemaker – even at the cost of damage to the Anglo-American “special relationship”. In this important study, Kevin Ruane and Matthew Jones revisit a Cold War episode in which British diplomacy played a vital role in settling a crucial question of international war and peace. Eden's diplomatic triumph at the 1954 Geneva Conference on Indochina is often overshadowed by the 1956 Suez Crisis which led to his political downfall. This book, however, recalls an earlier Eden: a skilled and experienced international diplomatist at the height of his powers who may well have prevented a localised Cold War crisis escalating into a general Third World War.

Although much has been written on the nationalization of the Suez Canal, and the subsequent military action, this study provides fresh perspectives by reflecting the latest research from leading international authorities on the crisis. Drawing on recently released documents, including previously neglected aspects of Suez, and by reassessing its more familiar ones, the volume makes a key contribution to furthering research on, and understanding of, events in Egypt in 1956.

The importance of the Prime Minister in British foreign policy decision-making has long been noted by historians. However, while much attention has been given to high-level contacts between leaders and to the roles played by the premiers themselves, much less is known about the people advising and influencing them. In providing day-to-day assistance to the Prime Minister, a Private Secretary could wield significant influence on policy outcomes. This book examines the activities of those who advised prime ministers from Winston Churchill (1951–55) to Margaret Thatcher during her first administration (1979–83). Each chapter considers British foreign policy and assesses the influence of the specific advisers. For each office holder, particular attention is paid to a number of key themes. Firstly, their relationship with the Prime Minister is considered. A strong personal relationship of trust and respect could lead to an official wielding much greater influence. This could be especially relevant when an adviser served under two different leaders, often from different political parties. It also helps to shed light on the conduct of foreign policy by each premier. Secondly, the attitudes towards the adviser from the Foreign Office are examined. The Foreign Office traditionally enjoyed great autonomy in the making of British foreign policy and was sensitive to encroachments by Downing Street. Finally, each chapter explores the role of the adviser in the key foreign policy events and discussions of the day. Covering a fascinating 30-year period in post-war British political history, this collection broadens our understanding of the subject, and underlines the different ways influence could be brought to bear on government policy.

This radically new work provides an innovative approach to the question of why the Suez Crisis erupted. Bertjan Verbeek here applies foreign policy analysis framework to British decision making during the crisis, providing the first full foreign policy analysis of this important event. Moreover, the book offers a new interpretation on British decision-making during the crisis. Many existing studies of Suez emphasise the role of the Prime Minister, Sir Anthony Eden, and often focus on the matter of collusion with Israel. This study demonstrates that small group dynamics in the institutional context of cabinet decision-making in the British political system are much more important. This study offers the possibility of determining more precisely the interrelationship between systemic constraints on states' behaviour and the actual behaviour of states under such constraints.

A comprehensive five-volume reference on the defining conflict of the second half of the 20th century, covering all aspects of the Cold War as it influenced events around the world. The conflict that dominated world events for nearly five decades is now captured in a multivolume work of unprecedented magnitude—from a publisher widely acclaimed for its authoritative military and historical references. Under the direction of internationally known military historian Spencer Tucker, ABC-CLIO's The Encyclopedia of the Cold War: A Political, Social, and Military History offers the most current and comprehensive treatment ever published of the ideological conflict that not so long ago enveloped the globe. From the Second World War to the collapse of the Soviet Union, The Encyclopedia of the Cold War provides authoritative information on all military conflicts, battlefield and surveillance technologies, diplomatic initiatives, important individuals and organizations, national histories, economic developments, societal and cultural events, and more. The nearly 1,300 entries, plus topical essays and an extraordinarily rich documents volume, draw heavily on recently opened Russian, Eastern European, and Chinese archives. The work is a definitive cornerstone reference on one of the most important historical topics of our time.

The personal correspondence between President Dwight D. Eisenhower and Prime Minister Anthony Eden during the time they were simultaneously in office tells the dramatic story of a relationship that began with great promise but ended in division and estrangement. Many of the letters have only recently been declassified, making it possible for the first time to publish this unique historic collection in its entirety. Peter G. Boyle's introduction, annotations, and conclusion provide context for the letters--details about the personalities and careers of Eden and Eisenhower and major issues that influenced the Anglo-American relationship up to 1955, such as relations with the Soviet Union, nuclear concerns, colonialism, the Middle and Far East, economic issues, and intelligence matters. The letters themselves offer an intimate look into the special connection between Britain and the United States through the often eloquent words of their leaders. They offer particular insight into the Suez Crisis of 1956, when Eden's and Eisenhower's views greatly diverged over the use of force to resolve the situation. Their personal relationship cooled from that point on and ended with Eden's resignation in January 1957.