Almost all the great religious thinkers of the past have developed a social as well as theological doctrine, but their sociology was as a rule merely implicit in their work or at best half formulated so that careful study and analysis is needed to bring it out. This is the task which Dr. Stark has set himself in the present essays. He has searched the writings of St. Augustine, Paschal, Newman and Kierkegaard for the sociological ideas they contain and shows that their social philosophies were varied, profound, fascinating and surprisingly definite. Dr. Stark seeks the theological conceptions present in, and basic to, the teachings of some outstanding secular sociologists, economists and philosophers, such as Adam Smith, Kant, Hegel, Marx, the Darwinians, Bergson Scheler and Meinecke and proves that their systems were built around a religious centre even though they themselves were at times unaware of it.

The concept of industrial society plays a dominant role in the social sciences. The ‘Great Divide’ between pre-industrial and industrial societies is commonly assumed to be the main bridge separating modern societies from the past, and distinguishing ‘developed’ from ‘undeveloped’ states in the present era. In history, economics, politics and sociology the concept of industrial society underlies a wide variety of discussions, particularly those relating to economic development and social progress. Outside academic writing, too, the concept exerts a great deal of influence. In the developing world, there is a widespread concern to ‘industrialise’, whilst in the developed world there is growing uneasiness as to whether ‘industrialisation’ is beneficial or not, but still the concept is central. This book examines critically the concept of industrial society, its pervasiveness and influence. It reviews all the major theories of industrial society and the research into the changing character of post-industrial societies. It argues that the decision to use the concept severely restricts the social imagination, and that the concept becomes increasingly less useful as criticism of the equating of industrialisation with social progress grows.

How has reason, believed since the Enlightenment to be the ally of freedom in the search for a better, more humanly satisfying world, been reduced to a technical rationality that has actually impoverished the bases of human freedom? What might be the options and obligations for sociologists who wish to restore reason to its proper status? Working within the tradition of C. Wright Mills and Jurgen Habermas, Frank Hearn sets out to answer these questions. He surveys the treatment of the relation between reason and freedom in both the classical tradition (especially the writings of Saint-Simon, Comte, Durkheim, Marx, Weber, and Freud) and an increasingly significant segment of social thought and criticism (and, for example, in the contrasting visions of Daniel Bell and Christopher Lasch.) He then analyses both the concrete social and historical forms of expression taken by what Mills calls 'rationality without reason' and their impact on individual autonomy and the freedoms associated with democratic politics. Finally, he develops Mills's and Habermas's claims that the cultivation of democratic publics and a critical social theory committed to a vibrant public life are indispensable to the protection and revitalization of the values of reason and freedom and of the practices they entail. This book updates and enriches Mills's influential argument by demonstrating its affinity with critical theory, by showing its contributions to a critical understanding of the classical tradition, and by showing its implications for contemporary social, political, and economic developments.

In their efforts to emulate the methodology which had proved so successful in the natural sciences, the social sciences – including sociology – have not yet faced the question as to what constitutes understanding in their area with sufficient seriousness. This book asks again: what does understanding denote in an area where man tries to understand man, where self-understanding is involved, where new understanding immediately becomes part of that which is to be understood? What can we know and what is the use and limitation of knowledge in sociology? When are we conscious that we know and understand? Werner Pelz argues for a thorough reorientation in our approach to sociological thinking, and suggests that scientistic preconceptions have often precluded possibly fruitful approaches to humane understanding. He investigates the relations between various kinds of knowing, and examines the new possibilities of understanding made available, for example, by psychoanalytical and phenomenological insights, as well as by those of poets, artists, mystics. He shows that in the social and humanistic sciences, creative or constitutive contributions illuminate rather than demonstrate, and that, for this reason, sociology has not yet found an appropriate method for conveying them without serious distortions.

The studies which comprise this book are essentially organized around a critical encounter with European social theory in its 'classical period' – i.e. from the middle years of the nineteenth century until the First World War – and have the aim of working out some of the implications of that encounter for the position and prospects of the social sciences today. The issues involved relate to the following series of problems: method and epistemology; social development and transformation; the origins of 'sociology' in nineteenth-century social theory; and the status of social science as critique. In each of these areas, Giddens develops views that challenge existing orthodoxies, and connects these ideas to a reconstruction of social theory in the contemporary era.

In this sequel to their acclaimed The Dominant Ideology Thesis, the authors develop their analysis of the social and cultural underpinnings of modern capitalism. They confront a central assumption of western culture: namely, that the individual is sovereign, and that capitalism above all other economic forms depends on individualism. These ideas have an unbroken history from Alexis de Tocqueville to Milton Friedman. The paradox of the modern world is that the moral emphasis on the individual is contradicted by the actual organization of economy and society. The authors suggest that individualism and capitalism have no enduring or necessary relationship. Their linkage is entirely accidental and was confined to one particular historical period in the West. Against the background of what they term the Discovery of the Individual, the authors show how individualism gave capitalism a particular shape, and capitalism in turn highlighted the possessive features of the individual. Oriental capitalism and late capitalism in the West bear no particular relationship to individualism; indeed, they flourish best in the absence of individualistic culture. Collectivism increasingly dominates both economic and social life. These issues once informed the sociological enterprise, but have not been systematically addressed in recent times. This book revives the classical tradition of the historical and comparative analysis of culture and economy in capitalist society, in the context of the late twentieth-century world.

This volume provides a fascinating perspective on the social sciences through its examination of the leading proponents, their ideas and careers. It includes useful suggestions for further reading. All the great names in the history of the subject are here – Freud, Marx, Weber, Adam Smith and so on – along with many less prominent but nevertheless important thinkers.

Karl Mannheim (1893-1947) occupies a prominent position among the leading social scientists of the twentieth century; his ideas and his books are relevant for many issues engaging the concern of sociologists today. Mannheim’s life spanned three cultural traditions – Hungarian, German and British – and in this authoritative study Professor Remmling covers all these phases in his life and work. Mannheim began as an idealistic philosopher, but soon began to make important contributions to the developing area of sociology of knowledge. After his emigration to England in 1933, Mannheim developed a theory of social planning to combat the socio-political consequences of the crisis of liberalism. During the Second World War his attention shifted to the ethical and religious values of Western humanism and the related role of mass education in democratic social planning. Finally, Mannheim forged the rudiments of a political sociology attacking the abuse of politico-military power and the resulting danger of a third world war, while simultaneously calling for counter-attack under the banner of planning for freedom on behalf of militant, fundamental democracy. In tracing these development in Karl Mannheim’s work, Gunter Remmling provides insights into major theoretical and practical issues of the first half of the twentieth century, problems which remain central to the modern experience. A comprehensive bibliography is provided to introduce the sociology of knowledge and related topics, such as ideology, utopia, intellectuals, Weimar culture, and social planning.

In this provocative analysis of the central issues and developments in modern social theory, Dr Strasser contends that enquiry into the function, tasks and mission of sociology as a discipline can be understood only in relation to the subject's historical development. He believes that a discussion of the origin and intention of sociology, particularly in relation to the established social order, enables us to grasp fully the nature of sociological theory, both past and present. He maintains that a sociologist's own position in society, and consequently his views on its development and his way of expressing those views, will affect the theoretical position he takes up.

'One may state Dilthey's significance in most general fashion by characterizing his work as the first thorough-going and sophisticated confrontation of history with positivism and natural science. Dilthey's sweep was universal: he strove to reduce to order the multifarious realms of knowledge, the conflicting traditions of cultural study, that he had embraced. Thus Dilthey laid out a program that no mortal – and certainly no one whose mind had been formed in the third quarter of the nineteenth century – could hope to bring to completion. Yet despite its inconclusiveness, Dilthey's work exerted enormous influence. The distinction he had drawn between natural and cultural science became standard for historians and, to a lesser extent, for social scientists also. After Dilthey historians no longer needed to apologize for the "unscientific" character of their discipline: they understood why its methods could never be quite the same as those of natural science. And the contemporary tradition of intellectual history grew naturally out of Dilthey's teaching.' – H. Stuart Hughes