Contributes to a better understanding of the policy, economic, and legal options of countries struggling with debt problems.

The insolvency of states is by no means a rare or new phenomenon. Despite this, it still seems to be widely felt that states do not go bankrupt. As of yet, there are no regulated insolvency proceedings for states. This book examines the current mechanisms for solving sovereign debt crises. It presents an analysis of their weaknesses and shows possibilities for dealing with such crises in the future. In this respect, the work focusses on crisis resolution measures at European level: the aid packages for Greece, the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism, the European Financial Stabilisation Facility and the European Stability Mechanism. These are examined for their appropriateness as well as whether they contain elements of insolvency law. Ultimately, it explores possible insolvency proceedings for states at EU level and their implementation options.

Motivated by the recent European debt crisis, this paper investigates the scope for a bailout guarantee in a sovereign debt crisis. Defaults may arise from negative income shocks, government impatience or a "sunspot"-coordinated buyers strike. We introduce a bailout agency, and characterize the minimal actuarially fair intervention that guarantees the no-buyers-strike fundamental equilibrium, relying on the market for residual financing. The intervention makes it cheaper for governments to borrow, inducing them borrow more, leaving default probabilities possibly rather unchanged. The maximal backstop will be pulled precisely when fundamentals worsen.

We review the impact of the global financial crisis, and its spillovers into the sovereign sector of the euro area, on the international “rules of the game” for dealing with sovereign debt crises. These rules rest on two main pillars. The most important is the IMF’s lending framework (policies, financing facilities, and financial resources), which is designed to support macroeconomic adjustment packages based on the key notion of public debt sustainability. The complementary pillar is represented by such contractual provisions as Collective Action Clauses (CACs) in sovereign bonds, which aim to facilitate coordination among private creditors in order to contain the costs of a debt default or restructuring. We analyze the most significant changes (and their consequences) prompted by the recent crises to the Fund’s lending framework, not only in terms of additional financial resources, new financing facilities (including precautionary ones), and cooperation with euro-area institutions, but also as regards the criteria governing exceptional access to the Fund’s financial resources. We highlight a crucial innovation to these criteria, namely that, for the first time, they now explicitly take account of the risk of international systemic spillovers. Finally, we discuss how the recent crises have provided new political support for a broader dissemination of CACs in euro-area sovereign bonds. Importantly, in the first case involving an advanced economy, CACs were activated in the debt exchange undertaken by Greece in Spring 2012.

This paper studies the role of IMF-supported programs in mitigating the likelihood of subsequent sovereign defaults in borrowing countries. Using a panel of 106 developing countries from 1970 to 2016 and an entropy balancing methodology, we find that IMF-supported programs significantly reduce the likelihood of subsequent sovereign defaults. This finding is robust to different specifications of the entropy balancing and alternative identification strategies. Our results suggest that a country that signs a program with the IMF, typically experiences a slight improvement in its sovereign credit rating and a decrease in both government debt-to-GDP and fiscal deficit-to-GDP.

The European Sovereign Debt Crisis: Breaking the Vicious Circle between Sovereigns and Banks explains why the euro area’s progress towards reining in the risks arising from the well-documented bi-directional financial contagion transmission mechanism that links sovereigns to commercial banks has been more prominent compared to the channel of contagion moving from banks to sovereigns. Providing an analysis of the legal and regulatory measures that Europe and the euro area have taken to mitigate the exposure of sovereigns to financial crises generated by commercial banks, this book draws attention to areas where improvements to the arsenal of tools hitherto introduced are either desirable or necessary. Chapters further explain – with recourse to economic and legal arguments – why the channel of contagion moving from sovereigns to commercial banks has proven harder to close, and explores ways in which progress could be made in the direction of closing it so as to avert the risk of future banking sector crises. This work provides essential reading for students, researchers and practitioners with an interest in sovereign debt crises and the euro-area banking system.

The euro was generally considered a success in its first decade. Nevertheless, the “unanticipated” financial crisis in the summer of 2007 has developed gradually into the worst global economic crisis in post-war economic history and a sovereign debt crisis, calling into question the endurance of positive externalities under the current form of European economic integration. The experience of double-dip recessions in the core of the euro-area and the occurrence of a deflationary spiral in its southern periphery brings into question the wisdom of fiscal consolidation via austerity in the adjustment programmes adopted to exit the crisis. They also put into doubt the adequacy and efficiency of the European Economic and Monetary Union’s core elements, its political instruments and macroeconomic assumptions, as can be seen in the role of the Stability and Growth Pact and the stance of the European Central Bank. The title of this collective volume refers to the country where the European sovereign debt crisis began, while its contents concentrate on the extent to which this crisis should be a national or a European concern. Moreover, the focus on Greece stimulates discussion about the neglected factor of the shadow economy and the potential to boost government revenue through its successful transfer to the formal economy. The chapters address the inefficiencies of both euro-area institutions and policies adopted to exit the current predicament. Experts from several disciplines review the literature and critically evaluate the existence of issues such as contagion effects, domino effects, deflationary spirals, institutional efficiency and the reality of the option to exit the euro-area.

The global financial crisis saw many Eurozone countries bearing excessive public debt. This led the government bond yields of some peripheral countries to rise sharply, resulting in the outbreak of the European sovereign debt crisis. The debt crisis is characterized by its immediate spread from Greece, the country of origin, to its neighbouring countries and the connection between the Eurozone banking sector and the public sector debt. Addressing these interesting features, this book sheds light on the impacts of the crisis on various financial markets in Europe. This book is among the first to conduct a thorough empirical analysis of the European sovereign debt crisis. It analyses, using advanced econometric methodologies, why the crisis escalated so prominently, having significant impacts on a wide range of financial markets, and was not just limited to government bond markets. The book also allows one to understand the consequences and the overall impact of such a debt crisis, enabling investors and policymakers to formulate diversification strategies, and create suitable regulatory frameworks.

The paper presents a tractable model to understand how international financial institutions (IFIs) should deal with the sovereign debt crisis of a systemic country, in which case private creditors' bail-ins entail international spillovers. Besides lending to the country up to its borrowing capacity, IFIs face the difficult issue of how to address the remaining financing needs with a combination of fiscal consolidation, bail-ins and possibly official transfers. To maximize social welfare, IFIs should differentiate the policy mix depending on the strength of spillovers. In particular, stronger spillovers call for smaller bail-ins and greater fiscal consolidation. Furthermore, to avoid requiring excessive fiscal consolidation, IFIs should provide highly systemic countries with official transfers. To limit the moral hazard consequences of transfers, it is important that IFIs operate under a predetermined crisis-resolution framework that ensures commitment.

This book offers a much-needed analysis of how the European Union (EU) has affected welfare state reforms in the Member States most severely hit by the 2008 economic crisis. Bringing together leading European social policy researchers, it shows that the EU’s responses to the sovereign debt crisis have changed the nature of EU intervention into domestic welfare states, with an enhanced focus on fiscal consolidation, increased surveillance and enforcement of EU measures. The authors demonstrate how this represents an unprecedented degree of EU involvement in domestic social and labour market policies. Readers will also discover how greater demands to attain balanced budgets have been institutionalized, leading to tensions with the EU's social investment strategy. This highly informative edited collection will engage students, social policy practitioners and researchers, scholars of the welfare state and political scientists. “/div>div