FR-GOV-DOC (copy 2): From the John Holmes Library collection.

Whether bargaining for strategic arms reductions, rights to drill Siberian oil fields, or an apartment in Moscow, Americans are faced across the table by a distinct Russian negotiating style. What are its chief characteristics, and how can U.S. diplomats and businesspeople best deal with it as they pursue their own objectives? Jerrold Schecter explores these questions with a wealth of personal experience as a former government official, journalist, and corporate executive. His insights, deepened by his working knowledge of the Russian language, also draw on the testimony of U.S. and former Soviet diplomats and negotiators. As he examines the historical and cultural underpinnings of contemporary Russian negotiating behavior, Schecter finds that the Bolshevik legacy remains largely intact despite the Soviet Union's demise. A step-by-step examination of the negotiating process, based on unique inside accounts from retired Soviet officials, exposes the areas of greatest continuity in Russian interests and style, as well as areas of change. Russian Negotiating Behavior also identifies counterstrategies that western negotiators can use to protect their interests, and it outlines the requirements for doing business in Russia's nascent market economy.

Why did the Soviet Union collapse in 1991? The collapse of the Soviet Union has widely been seen as the result of the arms race and Cold War, and the failure of the Soviet side to keep pace with new technology. This book argues that the disintegration was mainly a result of two interrelated factors: the rise of the Soviet national republics, and the manipulation of the new Russian presidency by Boris Yeltsin in what became a direct power struggle between Yeltsin and the Soviet leader, Gorbachev. Written in a clear and accessible manner, the book provides: an explanation of how the national question came to dominate Soviet politics by 1990-1 analysis of the economic crisis that occurred in the late 1980s a chapter devoted to the year 1991, from the referendum to reform the Soviet Union to the unforeseen dissolution of the country by December a discussion of the personalities of and political confrontation between the two key statesman: Gorbachev and Yeltsin Also containing a Chronology, Glossary and Who's Who of key figures, The Collapse of the Soviet Union is essential reading for students of twentieth century European history.

For half of the twentieth century, the Cold War gripped the world. International relations everywhere--and domestic policy in scores of nations--pivoted around this central point, the American-Soviet rivalry. Even today, much of the world's diplomacy grapples with chaos created by the Cold War's sudden disappearance. Here indeed is a subject that defies easy understanding. Now comes a definitive account, a startlingly fresh, clear eyed, comprehensive history of our century's longest struggle. In The Cold War, Ronald E. Powaski offers a new perspective on the great rivalry, even as he provides a coherent, concise narrative. He wastes no time in challenging the reader to think of the Cold War in new ways, arguing that the roots of the conflict are centuries old, going back to Czarist Russia and to the very infancy of the American nation. He shows that both Russia and America were expansionist nations with messianic complexes, and the people of both nations believed they possessed a unique mission in history. Except for a brief interval in 1917, Americans perceived the Russian government (whether Czarist or Bolshevik) as despotic; Russians saw the United States as conspiring to prevent it from reaching its place in the sun. U.S. military intervention in Russia's civil war, with the aim of overthrowing Lenin's upstart regime, entrenched Moscow's fears. Soviet American relations, difficult before World War II--when both nations were relatively weak militarily and isolated from world affairs--escalated dramatically after both nations emerged as the world's major military powers. Powaski paints a portrait of the spiraling tensions with stark clarity, as each new development added to the rivalry: the Marshall Plan, the communist coup in Czechoslovakia, the Berlin blockade, the formation of NATO, the first Soviet nuclear test. In this atmosphere, Truman found it easy to believe that the Communist victory in China and the Korean War were products of Soviet expansionism. He and his successors extended their own web of mutual defense treaties, covert actions, and military interventions across the globe--from the Caribbean to the Middle East and, finally to Southeast Asia, where containment famously foundered in the bog of Vietnam. Powaski skillfully highlights the domestic politics, diplomatic maneuvers, and even psychological factors as he untangles the knot that bound the two superpowers together in conflict. From the nuclear arms race, to the impact of U.S. recognition of China on detente, to Brezhnev's inflexible persistence in competing with America everywhere, he casts new light on familiar topics. Always judicious in his assessments, Powaski gives due credit to Reagan and especially Bush in facilitating the Soviet collapse, but also notes that internal economic failure, not outside pressure, proved decisive in the Communist failure. Perhaps most important, he offers a clear eyed assessment of the lasting distortions the struggle wrought upon American institutions, raising questions about whether anyone really won the Cold War. With clarity, fairness, and insight, he offers the definitive account of our century's longest international rivalry.

“[Matlock’s] account of Reagan’s achievement as the nation’s diplomat in chief is a public service.”—The New York Times Book Review “Engrossing . . . authoritative . . . a detailed and reliable narrative that future historians will be able to draw on to illuminate one of the most dramatic periods in modern history.”—Los Angeles Times Book Review In Reagan and Gorbachev, Jack F. Matlock, Jr., a former U.S. ambassador to the U.S.S.R. and principal adviser to Ronald Reagan on Soviet and European affairs, gives an eyewitness account of how the Cold War ended. Working from his own papers, recent interviews with major figures, and unparalleled access to the best and latest sources, Matlock offers an insider’s perspective on a diplomatic campaign far more sophisticated than previously thought, waged by two leaders of surpassing vision. Matlock details how Reagan privately pursued improved U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations even while engaging in public saber rattling. When Gorbachev assumed leadership, however, Reagan and his advisers found a willing partner in peace. Matlock shows how both leaders took risks that yielded great rewards and offers unprecedented insight into the often cordial working relationship between Reagan and Gorbachev. Both epic and intimate, Reagan and Gorbachev will be the standard reference on the end of the Cold War, a work that is critical to our understanding of the present and the past.

The United States and the Soviet Union have been negotiating nuclear arms control agreements for over twenty years, yet radical differences remain in the two sides' concept of, and approaches to, strategic stability and arms control. This book compares and contrasts those approaches, using START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) as a case study. Throughout two decades of negotiation, U.S. policy has been directed toward dialogue that would encourage convergence of American and Soviet thought on nuclear deterrence. In Kartchner's view, that hope is belied not only by continuing asymmetries in the development and deployment of their strategic nuclear arsenals, but by differing U.S. and Soviet negotiating positions. The Reagan administration viewed START as a means of repudiating SALT II, restoring a measure of balance in the U.S.-Soviet strategic competition, and as a way of closing the so-called window of vulnerability. In contrast, Kartchner analyzes the Soviets' differing views of nuclear balance, emphasizing their satisfaction with SALT II and a strategic equilibrium shaped by a decade of bilateral arms control. Kartchner offers a detailed exposition of the major negotiating issues in START, contrasting concerns of U.S. and Soviet negotiators. Not surprisingly, each side's agenda was dominated by weapon systems that figure prominently in the other's development program. The author concludes by summarizing and comparing American and Soviet quests for stability and drawing up an assessment of U.S. efforts in both SALT and START to use arms control negotiations as a kind of classroom for instructing Soviet officials in American notions of "stabilizing" versus "destabilizing" weapon technology and America's own ethnocentric view of stability. START will profoundly affect the acquisition, operation, maintenance, and cost of U.S. strategic nuclear forces well into the next century. The history and analysis presented here will provide an essential source to policymakers and students of military-political relations for much-needed further study of this treaty's implications.

Hutchings adds a scholar's balanced judgment and historical perspective to his insider's view from the White House as he reconstructs how things looked to policymakers in the United States and in Europe, describes how and why decisions were made, and critically examines those decisions in the light of what can now be known.

When the Cold War ended, the world let out a collective sigh of relief as the fear of nuclear confrontation between superpowers appeared to vanish overnight. As we approach the new millennium, however, the proliferation of nuclear weapons to ever more belligerent countries and factions raises alarming new concerns about the threat of nuclear war. In Return to Armageddon, Ronald Powaski assesses the dangers that beset us as we enter an increasingly unstable political world. With the START I and II treaties, completed by George Bush in 1991 and 1993 respectively, and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), signed by Bill Clinton in 1996, it seemed as if the nuclear clock had been successfully turned back to a safer hour. But Powaski shows that there is much less reason for optimism than we may like to think. Continued U.S.-Russian cooperation can no longer be assured. To make matters worse, Russia has not ratified the START II Treaty and the U.S. Senate has failed to approve the CTBT. Perhaps even more ominously, the effort to prevent the acquisition of nuclear weapons by nonweapon states is threatened by nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan. The nuclear club is growing and its most recent members are increasingly hostile. Indeed, it is becoming ever more difficult to keep track of the expertise and material needed to build nuclear weapons, which almost certainly will find their way into terrorist hands. Accessible, authoritative, and provocative, Return to Armageddon provides both a comprehensive account of the arms control process and a startling reappraisal of the nuclear threat that refuses to go away.

At the heart of political leadership lies choice. And at the heart of choice lies judgment. A leader's psychology and experience intersect with political realities to produce consequences that can make or break a leader--or a country. Nowhere is judgment more important than in the making of foreign policy. Good judgments can avoid wars, or win them. Poor judgments can start wars or lose them. This book draws together a distinguished group of contributors--psychologists, political scientists, and policymakers--to focus on and understand both good and poor judgment in foreign policy making. Case studies of key leadership decisions combine with theoretical overviews and analyses to offer a highly textured portrait of judgment in action in the all-important foreign policy arena. An up-to-the-minute case on George W. Bush and the war on terrorism applies good judgment theory to contemporary events.