This report analyzes the objectives, instruments, and achievements of Soviet policy toward Western Europe. It focuses on the mechanisms used by the Soviet Union to pursue its objectives in Europe, including diplomacy, military power, arms control, the West European Communist parties, ties with the non-Communist left, propaganda, and trade. The author concludes that the Soviet Union has achieved mixed results in its policy toward Western Europe. While it has succeeded in helping to consolidate postwar gains, Soviet policy has not yet made a dramatic breakthrough toward its stated objective of fostering a system of 'collective security' in Europe. Nevertheless, there is little evidence to suggest that failure to achieve these maximal goals has led the Soviets to rethink their objectives of lower their expectations. (Author).

This book, first published in 1990, examines the nature and causes of the changes to Soviet national security policy under Gorbachev. Changes in leadership and institutional arrangements, economic policy, ideology and military involvement all fostered new patterns of cooperation and competition. Authors look at the historical, economic and cultural contexts of change and proceed to a discussion of change agents, such as modernization, technology and domestic politics. Specific components of foreign and military policy, such as arms control and relations with Western Europe, the Warsaw Pact and the Third World, are also examined.

This report examines the ways in which Soviet control of Eastern Europe has both contributed to and detracted from the Soviet Union's pursuit of foreign policy goals in Western Europe. In successive sections, it (1) reviews the highlights of past USSR-East European-West European interactions and outlines general characteristics of the triangular relationship; (2) examines the impact of the Polish crisis; and (3) traces the East European foreign policy activity related to NATO's 1983 decision to deploy intermediate-range nuclear forces and analyzes the emergence of a group of East European states--East Germany, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Romania--whose policies differed from those of the Soviets. The author suggests that, while Eastern Europe serves as a constraint on Soviet relations with Western Europe, Western Europe also acts as a constraint on Soviet policy toward Eastern Europe. (Author).

Over 2,400 total pages ... Russian outrage following the September 2004 hostage disaster at North Ossetia’s Beslan Middle School No.1 was reflected in many ways throughout the country. The 52-hour debacle resulted in the death of some 344 civilians, including more than 170 children, in addition to unprecedented losses of elite Russian security forces and the dispatch of most Chechen/allied hostage-takers themselves. It quickly became clear, as well, that Russian authorities had been less than candid about the number of hostages held and the extent to which they were prepared to deal with the situation. Amid grief, calls for retaliation, and demands for reform, one of the more telling reactions in terms of hardening public perspectives appeared in a national poll taken several days after the event. Some 54% of citizens polled specifically judged the Russian security forces and the police to be corrupt and thus complicit in the failure to deal adequately with terrorism, while 44% thought that no lessons for the future would be learned from the tragedy. This pessimism was the consequence not just of the Beslan terrorism, but the accumulation of years of often spectacular failures by Russian special operations forces (SOF, in the apt US military acronym). A series of Russian SOF counterterrorism mishaps, misjudgments, and failures in the 1990s and continuing to the present have made the Kremlin’s special operations establishment in 2005 appear much like Russia’s old Mir space station—wired together, unpredictable, and subject to sudden, startling failures. But Russia continued to maintain and expand a large, variegated special operations establishment which had borne the brunt of combat actions in Afghanistan, Chechnya, and other trouble spots, and was expected to serve as the nation’s principal shield against terrorism in all its forms. Known since Soviet days for tough personnel, personal bravery, demanding training, and a certain rough or brutal competence that not infrequently violated international human rights norms, it was supposed that Russian special operations forces—steeped in their world of “threats to the state” and associated with once-dreaded military and national intelligence services—could make valuable contributions to countering terrorism. The now widely perceived link between “corrupt” special forces on the one hand, and counterterrorism failures on the other, reflected the further erosion of Russia’s national security infrastructure in the eyes of both Russian citizens and international observers. There have been other, more ambiguous, but equally unsettling dimensions of Russian SOF activity as well, that have strong internal and external political aspects. These constitute the continuing assertions from Russian media, the judicial system, and other Federal agencies and officials that past and current members of the SOF establishment have organized to pursue interests other than those publicly declared by the state or allowed under law. This includes especially the alleged intent to punish by assassination those individuals and groups that they believe have betrayed Russia. The murky nature of these alleged activities has formed a backdrop to other problems in the special units.

Yost suggests that the challenges for Western policy posed by Soviet ballistic missile defense (BMD) programs stem partly from Soviet military programs, Soviet arms control policies, and Soviet public diplomacy campaigns, and partly from the West's own intra-alliance disagreements and lack of consensus about Western security requirements.

This book, first published in 1990, examines the relationship between the Soviet Union and the Western Alliance at a time of great changes. Experts on a range of topics analyse the relationship from both the Soviet perspective (the impact of Gorbachev, and the role of Eastern Europe), and from the standpoint of the nations of the West including France, Great Britain and West Germany). Also included is a discussion of the role of the northern flank in Soviet nuclear-free proposals. The book concludes with an assessment of the challenges posed by the changing Soviet perspective, and the opportunities that these present for the Western Alliance.

This book examines Russian influence operations globally, in Europe, and in Russia’s neighboring countries, and provides a comprehensive overview of the latest technologies and forms of strategic communication employed in hybrid warfare. Given the growing importance of comprehensive information warfare as a new and rapidly advancing type of international conflict in which knowledge is a primary target, the book examines Russia’s role in Global Knowledge Warfare. The content is divided into three parts, the first of which addresses conceptual issues such as the logic of information warfare, the role of synthetic media, and Russia’s foreign policy concepts, including the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on influence operations. The second part analyzes technological, legal and strategic challenges in modern hybrid warfare, while the third focuses on textual, cultural and historical patterns in information warfare, also from various regional (e.g. the Western Balkans, Romania, Ukraine, and the Baltic) perspectives. The book is primarily intended for scholars in the fields of international relations, security and the military sciences who are interested in Russian foreign policy and influence operations, but also their impact on the global security environment.

This book, first published in 1989, analyses Western and Soviet perceptions of each other’s military thoughts and doctrines, a key part of the Cold War, where both sides planned to both win a possible conflict, and to avoid one. The work demonstrates that both East and West made judgments about each other’s military profile on the basis of political preconceptions.

Includes Reports (R-series), Rand Memorandums (RM-series), papers (P-series), and Books.