This study's main concern is with the growth of Communism within Burma, Thailand, Malaya, Indonesia, Indochina, and the Philippines. The author explores the origin and fate of these indigenous movements, their role in domestic politics and relationship to the metropolitan parties (in the case of colonial dependencies) and to the Soviet Union, and their success or failure under the conditions of independence. He also assesses the influence of Communist experience in China, the formation of Russian policy in Southeast Asia, and the policies of the domestic Communist parties. Originally published in 1966. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

First published in 1992, this book examines Soviet foreign policy towards Southeast Asia in the context of the transformation of the perestroĭka era in the Soviet Union. The discussion begins in 1985 and ends in 1989 with the Soviet partial withdrawal from Cam Ranh Bay. Buszynski considers Gorbachev’s effort to disengage from the Cambodian problem, the weakening of the Soviet alliance with Vietnam and the real effort to overcome old hostilities with growth areas in ASEAN such as Thailand and Singapore. This is a fascinating and relevant title, of particular value to students with an interest in Russia and the history of international relations in Southeast Asia.

The Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in 1978 and the consequent outbreak of the Cambodian conflict brought Southeast Asia into instability and deteriorated relations between Vietnam and the subsequently established Vietnam-backed government in Cambodia on the one hand and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries on the other. As a result of the conflict, the Soviet Union established a foothold in Southeast Asia while China, through its support of the anti-Vietnam Cambodian resistance, improved relations with Southeast Asian countries such as Thailand. Japan's Fukuda Doctrine - it’s declared priorities of promoting cooperative and friendly relations between Communist Indochinese nations and non-Communist ASEAN countries – became increas¬ingly at odds with Japan’s role as a member of the Free World in the broader Cold War confrontation. Tokyo had to steer a path between Washington’s hard-line policy of isolating Vietnam and its own desire to prevent regional destabilization. Against this background, this book addresses the following questions: what was Japan’s response to the challenges to its objectives and interests in Southeast Asia and to the Fukuda Doctrine? What role did Japan play for the settlement of the conflict in Cambodia? How did Japan’s diplomacy on the Cambodian problem affect the Japanese role in the region? It argues that Japan’s contribution was more active than has widely been recognized.

The central problem of international politics in Southeast Asia since December 1978 has been the Vietnamese armed presence in Kampuchea. The noncommunist nations of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have insisted that Vietnam withdraw from Kampuchea; the Vietnamese, perceiving a threat from the PRC and an ASEAN-sponsored Khmer resistance, maintain that the situation is irreversible. The contributors discuss the conflict from the point of view of all parties involved (ASEAN, Vietnam, the PRC, the USSR, and the U.S.) and assess various strategies for its resolution.

When China and Russia established a strategic partnership in 1996, both nations declared that they would further develop military cooperation in various fields. Tsai examines the course of this military cooperation to reveal the nature of the military ties with the hopes of determining whether these two traditional adversaries have put aside historical legacies and mutual mistrust to create a full-fledged military partnership. After analyzing the motives and concerns of both powers, Tsai concludes that, while progress has been made in reducing military tensions in border regions, the level of trust has not increased substantially. The nature of these ties remains extremely fragile. Among Western analysts, there has been concern that a closer partnership might adversely affect U.S. interests in the region. China and Russia have developed cooperation in certain areas, such as arms transfers and military-technical cooperation, and these achievements have successfully reduced political tension. However, reciprocal threats against each other's territories and China's increasing ambitions and capacity to act as a great military power in the region could eventually become a major source of friction. Based on research in both Chinese and Russian, this study offers a comprehensive analysis on the development of and limits to this military cooperation.