Western philosophy has often claimed for itself not just a distinct sphere of knowledge, but a distinct form of communication, set against ordinary speech. In Speaking Philosophically, Thomas Sutherland proposes that for some philosophers, authentic philosophizing demands a specific manner of speaking or writing, adoption of which enables one to gesture toward truths that propositional speech will never grasp. Drawing on a variety of thinkers – Heraclitus, Plato, Kant, Fichte, Nietzsche, Kierkegaard, Weil, Foucault, and Irigaray – Sutherland argues this emphasis on the form of philosophical communication can function as an exclusionary mechanism, determining who is deemed capable of speaking philosophically.

A book on legal philosophy, necessarily, focuses attention on law. In addition to this focus, An Introduction to an African Legal Philosophy focuses attention on philosophy. The link between law and philosophy is brought into relief, which is done through an African context. An attempt is made to spell out what is African about legal philosophy without being cut off of African legal philosophy from non-African legal philosophy. The book draws attention to the view that a basic component of African legal philosophy consists of an investigation of what it is to be an African, and because an African is a human being among other human beings, the investigation is about what it is to be a human being. Ubuntuism is an African-derived word that captures this mode of being human. Moreover, because human beings are cultural beings, African cultural context guides the investigation. Inescapably, it is claimed that, every legal philosophy is embedded in a culture. African legal philosophy is not an exception. It is deeply rooted in African culture –a culture that is today shaped, in part, by a European colonialist culture. One feature that will strike one as one reads the book is that the book approaches African legal philosophy as a means of decolonization of African culture. African legal philosophy can accomplish this intelligently and effectively if it is itself decolonized. In doing this it contrasts sharply with mainstream Western legal philosophy.

In Life-Destroying Diagrams, Eugenie Brinkema brings the insights of her radical formalism to bear on supremely risky terrain: the ethical extremes of horror and love. Through close readings of works of film, literature, and philosophy, she explores how diagrams, grids, charts, lists, abecedaria, toroids, tempos, patterns, colors, negative space, lengths, increments, and thresholds attest to formal logics of torture and cruelty, violence and finitude, friendship and eros, debt and care. Beginning with a wholesale rethinking of the affect of horror, orienting it away from entrenched models of feeling toward impersonal schemes and structures, Brinkema moves outward to consider the relation between objects and affects, humiliation and metaphysics, genre and the general, bodily destruction and aesthetic generation, geometry and scenography, hatred and value, love and measurement, and, ultimately, the tensions, hazards, and speculative promise of formalism itself. Replete with etymological meditations, performative typography, and lyrical digressions, Life-Destroying Diagrams is at once a model of reading without guarantee and a series of generative experiments in the writing of aesthetic theory.

Each volume includes list of members, and "objects of the institute" (except v. 31, which has no list of members). Beginning with v. 12, a list of the papers contained in preceding volumes is issued regularly with each volume.