This study analyzes the strategic effectiveness of special operations conducted by the Far East Command (FECOM) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in Korea during the Korean Conflict from 1950 to 1953. Each organization’s effectiveness is determined by examining the areas of strategy, organization and operations. Special operations as defined in Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication Number 2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF) was the standard by which operations were selected for examination. The study answers four questions: 1) What were the U.N. Command strategic objectives within the Korean theater, and how did these change? , 2) How these changing strategic objectives development and coordination of special operations objectives, forces and headquarters?, 3) What did U.S. special operations in Korea accomplish strategically? 4) What conclusions can be drawn from U.S. special operations forces’ effectiveness or ineffectiveness in Korea? FECOM special operations were limited to partisan operations and psychological operations. The partisans consisted of anti-communist North Koreans organized and led by U.S. cadre beginning in January, 1951. Psychological operations were conducted continuously from July, 1950 by a separate staff element whose capabilities expanded dramatically during the course of the conflict. CIA operations within Korea consisted of intelligence gathering and special (or covert) activities controlled from headquarters in Japan. CIA operations remained autonomous of FECOM control throughout the conflict. The control issue was the source of bureaucratic conflict that inhibited operational coordination between FECOM and CIA throughout the conflict.

This book argues that the root of effective special operations lies in understanding the relationship between moral and material attrition - this is achieved by examining both strategic theory and real-life case studies.

This book focuses on strategic special operations and how these have led to the achievement of major foreign policy goals, which is illustrated by six case studies. The study specifically focuses on the alignment of the policies, strategies, and tactics that dominated these operations, providing a fresh perspective. Theoretically, the work underscores the continued relevance of relative superiority as the dominant theory in the field. Importantly, it aligns the potential ways of achieving and sustaining relative superiority with the ability to conduct contemporary special operations across multiple domains, thereby generating cross-dimensional effects. In terms of methodology, the book includes a description and analysis of six distinct case studies in special operations, ranging from short-term surgical strikes to sustained special warfare campaigns and spanning multiple geographic regions – including in Iran, Lebanon, Syria, Ukraine, and the South China Sea. From that perspective, relative superiority theory is extrapolated to explain how this critical condition can be achieved and sustained during protracted special operations. The unique value of this research is underscored by the author's collection of exclusive primary source data on the operations in the respective countries. The book’s conclusions explain how the personnel involved fulfill the strategic promise of special operations, given their position within the larger framework of foreign policy. This book will be of much interest to students of special operations, military and strategic studies, defense studies, and security studies in general.

This volume undertakes a systematic analysis of the relationship between Special Forces and contemporary strategy, explaining the resurgence of interest in Special Forces, particularly in the West, by exploring their appeal over traditional conventional force options in the current ‘War on Terror’. Special Forces, Terrorism and Strategy comprises four overarching themes: theory and practice command and control culture and technology operations and the ‘War on Terror’. By developing a credible theory about the role of Special Forces in contemporary strategy, Alastair Finlan assesses the changing character of the relationship between conventional forces and Special Forces, illustrating the prominent role of these forces in the ‘War on Terror’. This book will be of great interest to students of strategic studies and military history, as well as for professional military colleges.

Armies in the 1990s are commonly involved in low-level, ill-defined, politically charged, messy situations known collectively as "unconventional warfare". Thomas Adams argues for a shift in expectations with a greater willingness to accept lengthy commitments and incremental progress.

Special Operations Success establishes a new benchmark in military theory in this deeply analytic and innovative work. It answers several pressing questions: How successful have American special operations been over the past quarter-century? Are special forces fated to cycles of expansion and misuse? Will special forces invariably exceed the authorities granted to them because of they are? Is a general theory of special operations feasible given the range of activities and conditions that fall under the category? Kiras' work is based on two decades of practical, teaching, and consulting experience within different special operations communities, and its analysis and conclusions are designed to inform practitioners, policymakers, educators, and the general public. The book develops a framework, in the form of a theory comprising capabilities and control, for the comprehensively evaluating special operations success, and is divided into three parts: Part I lays the foundation for a general theory of special operations, Part II explores the two component parts of theory, capabilities and control, and Part III uses various aspects of the theory, depending on available information, to assess the success of special operations over a twenty-year period in the United Kingdom, South Africa, and the United States.