This book, first published in 1963, is an analysis of modern warfare in the enemy’s rear, written by the leading authority on irregular warfare, and stemming from a close examination of real-life examples. Rear warfare on scale poses many problems, such as the exact field of operations; supply line issues; combat or harassment; and coordination with frontline troops. There is also the issue of protecting one’s own rear troops.

An introduction to the works of authoritative and innovative Chinese authors whose writings focus on the future of the Chinese military. These carefully selected, representative essays make Chinese military thinking more accessible to western readers. It reveals, for example, China's keen interest in the Revolution in military affairs. This volume is an important starting point for understanding China's future military modernization. "Must reading for every executive of every Western firm doing business in China." "Readers will be impressed by China's ambitions in space, information warfare, stealth, and robots, in future warfare." Photos.

What is Littoral Warfare In military and naval warfare, littoral warfare is operations in and around the littoral zone, within a certain distance of shore, including surveillance, mine-clearing and support for landing operations and other types of combat shifting from water to ground, and back. How you will benefit (I) Insights, and validations about the following topics: Chapter 1: Littoral warfare Chapter 2: United States Armed Forces Chapter 3: United States Navy SEALs Chapter 4: Littoral combat ship Chapter 5: United States Naval Special Warfare Command Chapter 6: Fleet Marine Force insignia Chapter 7: USS Freedom (LCS-1) Chapter 8: Philippine Navy Chapter 9: Marines Chapter 10: Green-water navy (II) Answering the public top questions about littoral warfare. Who this book is for Professionals, undergraduate and graduate students, enthusiasts, hobbyists, and those who want to go beyond basic knowledge or information for any kind of Littoral Warfare.

Colonel Paddock traces the origins of Army special warfare from 1941 to 1952, the year the Armys special warfare center was established. While the Army had experience in psychological warfare, the major recent U. S. experience in unconventional warfare had been in the Office of Strategic Services, a civilian agency, during World War II. Many army leaders, trained and experienced in conventional warfare, hesitantly accepted psychological warfare as a legitimate weapon in the Armys wartime arsenal, but questioned the validity and appropriateness of the Armys adoption of unconventional operations. The continuing tensions of the cold war and hostilities in Korea resolved the ambivalence in favor of coordinating in a single operation the techniques of both types of warfare. Colonel Paddocks extensively documented work traces a portion of a brief episode in our Nations military hisotyr, but an instructive one. For the historian and military scholar, it provides the necessary backdrop for understanding the subsequent evolution of the Armys special warefare capability. For the national security policymaker, it suggests the value of the innovative impulse and the need for receptivity to new ideas and adaptability to change. John S. Pustay Lieutenant General, United States Air Force President, National Defense University