This book reviews the primary rules courts apply to discern a statute's meaning. However, each matter of interpretation before a court presents its own challenges, and there is no unified, systematic approach used in all cases. While schools of statutory interpretation may vary on what factors should be considered, all approaches start (if not necessarily end) with the language and structure of the statute itself. In analyzing a statute's text, courts are guided by the basic principle that a statute should be read as a harmonious whole, with its separate parts being interpreted within their broader statutory context.

Reprint of first edition (1896). "The following pages contain a condensed statement and exposition of the accepted canons and rules for the construction and interpretation of the written laws, whether constitutional or statutory. In accordance with the general plan of the Hornbook Series, these rules have been formulated somewhat after the manner of a code, expressed in brief black-letter paragraphs numbered consecutively throughout the book, and explained, developed, and illustrated in the text." --Preface, iii. HENRY CAMPBELL BLACK [1860-1927] was also the author of the standard American law dictionary, A Dictionary of Law Containing Definitions of the Terms and Phrases of American and English Jurisprudence, Ancient and Modern Including the Principal Terms of International, Constitutional, and Commercial Law, first published in 1891, and other works.

Contrary to traditional theories of statutory interpretation, which ground statutes in the original legislative text or intent, legal scholar William Eskridge argues that statutory interpretation changes in response to new political alignments, new interpreters, and new ideologies. It does so, first of all, because it involves richer authoritative texts than does either common law or constitutional interpretation: statutes are often complex and have a detailed legislative history. Second, Congress can, and often does, rewrite statutes when it disagrees with their interpretations; and agencies and courts attend to current as well as historical congressional preferences when they interpret statutes. Third, since statutory interpretation is as much agency-centered as judgecentered and since agency executives see their creativity as more legitimate than judges see theirs, statutory interpretation in the modern regulatory state is particularly dynamic. Eskridge also considers how different normative theories of jurisprudence--liberal, legal process, and antiliberal--inform debates about statutory interpretation. He explores what theory of statutory interpretation--if any--is required by the rule of law or by democratic theory. Finally, he provides an analytical and jurisprudential history of important debates on statutory interpretation.

Combining pragmatics, dialectics, analytics, and legal theory, this work translates interpretative canons into patterns of natural argument.

Use this form as an attachment to your pleadings when you are litigating against the government. It prevents abuses of presumption and "words of art" that will injure your rights.

Including a discussion of legislative powers, constitutional regulations relative to the forms of legislation and to legislative procedure.