In response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on the second of August 1990, a small group of air power advocates in the Pentagon proposed a strategic air campaign - "Operation Desert Storm" designed to drive the Iraqi army from Kuwait by a sustained effort against the major sources of Iraqi national power. John Andreas Olsen provides a coherent and comprehensive examination of the origins, evolution and implementation of this campaign. His findings derive from official military and political documentation, interviews with United States Air Force officers who were closely involved with the planning of the campaign and Iraqis with detailed knowledge and experience of the inner workings of the Iraqi regime.

This volume delves into the way conventional deterrence operates between nuclear-armed states in the third nuclear age. Unlike the first and second ages the advent of this new age has witnessed greater strain on the principles of mutual vulnerability and survivability that may result in increased risks of advertent or inadvertent escalation and horizontal nuclear proliferation. The book looks at the sum of three key simultaneous developments in the third nuclear age that merit attention. These include the emergence of asymmetric strategies, the introduction of unmanned platforms and the expansion of nuclear arsenals. The volume discusses how these concurrent developments might shape the practice of conventional deterrence and provides useful insights into conventional military dynamics, not just among the current nuclear dyads but also ones that may emerge in future. It seeks answers to several key issues in state security not limited to: What purpose and scope does the conventional military instrument have in a state’s overall military strategy versus other nuclear-armed states? If mutual vulnerability and deterrence are the frameworks, why did the prospect of escalation appear in the first place? What are the trends — political, doctrinal, or technological — that augment or diminish conventional and nuclear interface? With insights on military crises that have witnessed participation from nuclear-armed states like the United States, Russia, China, Pakistan, and India this book will especially be of interest to scholars and researchers working in the areas of security and deterrence studies, defence and strategic studies, peace and conflict studies, and foreign policy. It will also appeal to policymakers, career bureaucrats, security and defense practitioners, and professionals working with think tanks and embassies.

he 20th century saw air power transformed from novelists' fantasy into stark reality. From string and canvas to precision weaponry and stealth, air power has progressed to become not only the weapon of first political choice, but often the only conceivable option. This rapid development has given rise to considerable debate and controversy with those holding entrenched views rarely slow to shout their case. Many myths have grown over the period, ranging from the once much vaunted ability of air power to win wars alone through to its impact as a coercive tool. This volume examines the theory and practice of air power from its earliest inception. The contributors have been drawn from academia and the military and represent some of the world's leading proponents on the subject. All significant eras on air power employment are examined: some are evidently turning points, while others represent continuous development. Perhaps more importantly, the book highlights the areas that could be considered to be significant, and invites the reader to enter the debate as to whether it constitutes a continuum, a turning point, or indeed a revolution.

Why do states who are committed to the principle of civilian immunity and the protection of non-combatants end up killing and injuring large numbers of civilians during their military operations? Bugsplat explains this paradox through an in-depth examination of five conflicts fought by Western powers since 1989. It argues that despite the efforts of Western military organizations to comply with the laws of armed conflict, the level of collateral damage produced by Western military operations is the inevitable outcome of the strategies and methods through which their military organizations fight wars. Drawing on their superior technology and the strategic advantage of not having to fight on their own territory, such states employ highly-concentrated and overwhelming military force against a wide variety of political, economic, and military targets under conditions likely to produce high civilian casualties. As a result, collateral damage in western-fought wars is largely both foreseeable and preventable. The book title is derived from the name of a computer program that had been used by the Pentagon to calculate probable civilian casualties prior to launching air attacks.

On December 18, 1972, more than one hundred U.S. B-52 bombers flew over North Vietnam to initiate Operation Linebacker II. During the next eleven days, sixteen of these planes were shot down and another four suffered heavy damage. These losses soon proved so devastating that Strategic Air Command was ordered to halt the bombing. The U.S. Air Force's poor performance in this and other operations during Vietnam was partly due to the fact that they had trained their pilots according to methods devised during World War II and the Korean War, when strategic bombers attacking targets were expected to take heavy losses. Warfare had changed by the 1960s, but the USAF had not adapted. Between 1972 and 1991, however, the Air Force dramatically changed its doctrines and began to overhaul the way it trained pilots through the introduction of a groundbreaking new training program called "Red Flag." In The Air Force Way of War, Brian D. Laslie examines the revolution in pilot instruction that Red Flag brought about after Vietnam. The program's new instruction methods were dubbed "realistic" because they prepared pilots for real-life situations better than the simple cockpit simulations of the past, and students gained proficiency on primary and secondary missions instead of superficially training for numerous possible scenarios. In addition to discussing the program's methods, Laslie analyzes the way its graduates actually functioned in combat during the 1980s and '90s in places such as Grenada, Panama, Libya, and Iraq. Military historians have traditionally emphasized the primacy of technological developments during this period and have overlooked the vital importance of advances in training, but Laslie's unprecedented study of Red Flag addresses this oversight through its examination of the seminal program.

... dedicated to the advancement and understanding of those principles and practices, military and political, which serve the vital security interests of the United States.

American air power is a dominant force in today's world. Its ascendancy, evolving in the half century since the end of World War II, became evident during the first Gulf War. Although a great deal has been written about military operations in Desert Shield and Desert Storm, this deeply researched volume by Dr. Diane Putney probes the little-known story of how the Gulf War air campaign plan came to fruition. Based on archival documentation and interviews with USAF planners, this work takes the reader into the planning cells where the difficult work of building an air campaign plan was accomplished on an around-the-clock basis. The tension among air planners is palpable as Dr. Putney traces the incremental progress and friction along the way. The author places the complexities of the planning process within the context of coalition objectives. All the major players are here: President George H. W. Bush, General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, General Colin Powell, General Chuck Horner, and Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney. The air planning process generated much debate and friction, but resulted in great success-a 43-day conflict with minimum casualties. Dr. Putney's rendering of this behind-the-scenes evolution of the planning process, in its complexity and even suspense, provides a fascinating window into how wars are planned and fought today and what might be the implications for the future. C. R. Anderegg Director of Air Force History

In this balanced appraisal of air power's newly realized strengths in joint warfare, Benjamin Lambeth, a defense analyst and civilian pilot who has flown in most of the equipment described in this book, explores the extent to which the United States can now rely on air-delivered precision weapons in lieu of ground forces to achieve strategic objectives and minimize American casualties.".