This is a collection of essays on the work of philosophy of Wittgenstein, where the editor seeks to present his ideas as 'one or a unity' rather than the treatment of the usual early and later works. First published in 1969, the essays span the areas of the use and reference of names, ontology and identity in Tractatus , mathematics, human beings, Wittgenstein and Strawson on others, pain and private language and Wittgenstein's look at Freud.

Many books have been written about Wittgenstein's philosophy, but this collection of articles on Wittgenstein and education is the first study in book form in this area. There have been several articles in scholarly education journals, but the special cachet of this collection is that the contributors come from six countries. The collection has been edited by Paul Smeyers and Jim Marshall, philosophers of education who live in Belgium and New Zealand, respectively. Each of the chapters represents an original study of Wittgenstein, commissioned by the editors from colleagues they know to have written well on Wittgenstein and the implications of his ideas for education. Audience: Teachers, students and academics in the field of philosophy and education. Especially interesting to advanced students in these areas.

Three prominent Wittgenstein scholars introduce the broad educational significance of Ludwig Wittgenstein's work to a wider audience of educational researchers and practitioners through provocative, innovative, and playful readings of his work. They vividly demonstrate the influence of his thinking and its centrality to understanding our contemporary condition. Wittgenstein fundamentally shaped contemporary theories of language, representation, cognition, and learning. The book also traces the "pedagogical turn" of his thinking during the period from 1920 to 1926. What is most radical about Wittgenstein's later work is that it suggests learning and initiation into practices are fundamental to understanding his philosophy. The book not only provides a new and fresh interpretation of Wittgenstein's thought but also explores a new way of thinking about education as a way of revealing the educational dimension of philosophical problems.

Wittgenstein's aphoristic style holds great charm, but also a great danger: the reader is apt to glean too much from a single fragment and too little from the fragments as a whole. In my first confron tations with the Philosophical Investigations I was such a reader, and so, it turned out, were most of the writers on Wittgenstein's later philosophy. Wittgenstein's remarkable ability to bring together many facets of his thought in one fragment is fully exploited in the critical literature; but hardly any attention is paid to the connection with other fragments, let alone to the many hitherto unpublished manuscripts of which the Philosophical Investigations is the final product. The result of this fragmentary and ahistorical approach to Wittgenstein's later work is a host of contradictory interpretations. What Wittgenstein really wanted to say remains insufficiently clear. Opinions are also strongly divided about the value of his work. Some authors have been encouraged by his aphorisms and rhetorical questions to dismiss the whole Cartesian tradition or to halt new movements in linguistics or psychology; others, exasperated, reject his philo sophy as anti-scientific conceptual conservatism. After consulting unpublished notebooks and manuscripts which Wittgenstein wrote between 1929 and 1951, I became a very different reader. Wittgenstein turned out to be a kind of Leonardo da Vinci, who pursued a form from which every sign of chisel ling, every attempt at improvement, had been effaced.

This book, bringing together contributions by forty-five authors from fourteen countries, represents mostly new material from both emerging and seasoned scholars in the field of philosophy of education. Topics range widely both within and across the four parts of the book: Wittgenstein’s biography and style as an educator and philosopher, illustrating the pedagogical dimensions of his early and late philosophy; Wittgenstein’s thought and methods in relation to other philosophers such as Cavell, Dewey, Foucault, Hegel and the Buddha; contrasting investigations of training in relation to initiation into forms of life, emotions, mathematics and the arts (dance, poetry, film, and drama), including questions from theory of mind (nativism vs. initiation into social practices), neuroscience, primate studies, constructivism and relativity; and the role of Wittgenstein’s philosophy in religious studies and moral philosophy, as well as their profound impact on his own life. This collection explores Wittgenstein not so much as a philosopher who provides a method for teaching or analyzing educational concepts but rather as one who approaches philosophical questions from a pedagogical point of view. Wittgenstein’s philosophy is essentially pedagogical: he provides pictures, drawings, analogies, similes, jokes, equations, dialogues with himself, questions and wrong answers, experiments and so on, as a means of shifting our thinking, or of helping us escape the pictures that hold us captive.

These works, as the sub-title makes clear, are unfinished sketches for Philosophical Investigations, possibly the most important and influential philosophical work of modern times. The 'Blue Book' is a set of notes dictated to Witgenstein's Cambridge students in 1933-1934: the 'Brown Book' was a draft for what eventually became the growth of the first part of Philosophical Investigations. This book reveals the germination and growth of the ideas which found their final expression in Witgenstein's later work. It is indispensable therefore to students of Witgenstein's thought and to all those who wish to study at first-hand the mental processes of a thinker who fundamentally changed the course of modern philosophy.

In his writings around 1930, Wittgenstein relates his philosophy in different ways to the idea of phenomenology. He indicates that his main philosophical project had earlier been the construction of a purely phenomenological language, and even after having given up this project he believed that "the world we live in is the world of sense-data,,,l that is, of phenomenological objects. However, a problem is posed by the fact that he does not appear ever to have given a full, explicit account of what he means by his 'phenomenology', 'phenomenological language', or 'phenomenological problems'. In this book, I have tried to unravel the nature of Wittgenstein's phenomenology and to examine its importance for his entire work in philosophy. Phenomenology can be characterized as philosophy whose primary concern is what is immediately given in one's experience. This 'immediately given' is not merely impressions inside one's mind, but includes also the part of objective reality that impinges upon one's consciousness. Thus, an aim of phenomenological enterprise is to grasp this objective reality by attending to immediate experience. Husserl's phenomenology is in fact a case in point.

Religion Within the Limits of Language Alone provides a critical examination of the Wittgensteinian philosophers of religion who claim that the word 'God' cannot be understood as referring to a metaphysical being who may or may not exist. McCutcheon traces the arguments offered by these philosophers of religion back to Wittgenstein's own criticisms of speculative metaphysics, arguing that in its religious usage the concept of God does not fall under Wittgenstein's anti-metaphysical gaze. In presenting a detailed account of Wittgenstein's own philosophical method, including his criticisms of metaphysics, McCutcheon shows that it is possible to accept Wittgenstein's criticisms of metaphysics whilst retaining the metaphysical content of religious language. This book offers a fresh understanding of Wittgenstein's philosophical method and a new critique of religious discourse for those studying philosophy and religious studies.

This book puts forward a "theory of Nothing" and shows how a praxis of "Nothing" can offer new possibilities for educational research and practice. Taking inspiration from Heidegger’s and Wittgenstein’s philosophy and with regards to phenomenology and language, the book indicates how nothing can be a condition for an educational technology. The book translates the complex philosophical thinking of Heidegger and Wittgenstein into the realm of education studies, drawing on their perspectives to contribute to an understanding of how nothingness comes into being and how this relates to education. Arguing that nothingness addresses new possibilities for understanding and how we perceive the world and our place in it, the book theorises different aspects that can be included in a theory of Nothing; including indeterminateness, embodiment and how the inexpressible can be made expressible. The book presents vignettes and examples of educational practice and explores how nothing can show up in educational research, theory and practice. Outlining a unique conceptualisation of nothingness in education, the book will be of great interest to academics, researchers and post-graduate students in the field of educational philosophy and educational theory.