An examination of the nature of Soviet policy towards Syria during the last two decades, which seeks to assess Moscow's objectives and the means of achieving those objectives. The study argues that the overriding concern of Soviet policy is preservation of regional stability.

Since 2011, the conflict in Syria has been one of the most catastrophic conflicts of our time and a dark stain on the peacemaking abilities of the United Nations (UN). At the heart of this book is a simple but critical question – what do UN mediators tasked with the responsibility to make peace actually do? By explaining this, the book offers a detailed record of what Kofi Annan, Lakhdar Brahimi, and Staffan de Mistura did in their roles as UN mediators in Syria and presents a comprehensive analysis of the dynamics that shaped their decision-making. Beyond the cases of these three mediators, Fadi Nicholas Nassar introduces a method by which to forensically identify a mediator's fingerprints on the peacemaking process and charts a map to examine their decision-making processes. In doing so, it paves the way to evaluate the performance of these mediators – to hold them accountable for their successes and failures.

Since the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia has tried to restore its lost status, prestige, and influence in the global political arena. At the same time, internal political challenges and international events – such as the Arab Spring and the colour revolutions in former Soviet republics – have threatened the security and the national interests of the country. Taking these challenges and opportunities into account, The Russian Military Intervention in Syria examines Russia’s assertive foreign policy and its attempts to protect its geostrategic interests in the Middle East and former Soviet territory. Ohannes Geukjian analyzes the history of Russian military presence in the Middle East and the country’s growing frustration with American and Western policy, revealing the objectives behind Russia’s use of military power – namely, to maintain its regional influence in Eurasia and to enhance its status in the world. Geukjian provides a detailed examination of the Geneva and Astana peace processes, the geopolitical objectives of Turkey, Iran, Israel, and Saudi Arabia, and how disagreements between Russia and the United States over issues of regime change, global security, and armaments have negative implications for international conflict management. The Russian Military Intervention in Syria is an authoritative overview, based on a wide range of new and updated sources, providing a fresh interpretation and analysis of Russia’s foreign policy goals and Russian diplomacy in handling the Syrian conflict.

This book situates the war in Syria within the actual and imagined system of international criminal justice. It explores the legal impediments and diplomatic challenges that have led to the fatal trinity affecting Syria: the massive commission of international crimes that are subject to detailed investigations and documentation but whose perpetrators have enjoyed virtually complete impunity. Given this tragic state of affairs, the book tracks a number of accountability solutions being explored within multilateral initiatives and by civil society actors, including innovations of institutional design; the renewed utility of a range of domestic jurisdictional principles (including the revival of universal jurisdiction in Europe); the emergence of creative investigative and documentation techniques, technologies, and organizations; and the rejection of state consent as a precondition for the exercise of jurisdiction. Engaging both law and policy around international justice, the text offers a set of justice blueprints, within and without the International Criminal Court. It also considers the utility, propriety, and practicality of pursuing a transitional justice program without a genuine political transition. All told, the book attempts to capture results of the creative energy radiating from members of the international community intent on advancing the accountability norm in Syria even in the face of geopolitical blockages within the U.N. Security Council. In so doing, it presents the range of juridical measures-both criminal and civil - that would be available to the international community to respond to the crisis, if only the political will existed.

For more than twenty years, the ruler of Syria, Hafiz al-Asad, has been at the heart of the power struggle in the Middle East. Patrick Seale's portrait of the leader shows a man driven by his personal vision for Syria and the Arab world.

This study demonstrates that Syria's role in the Middle East has been, since 1974, an unabated terrorist war against all attempts to resolve peacefully the Arab-Israeli conflict. Marius Deeb provides evidence that Syria's role in Lebanon, since 1975, has been to perpetuate the conflict among the various Lebanese communities in order to keep its domination of Lebanon.

This book provides a synopsis of the past four years of U.S. policy in Syria. It brings together the major turning points of this policy since the beginning of the Arab Spring and positions that different actors endorsed since 2009. The first section is dedicated to explaining President Obama's attempt to restore ties with the Syrian government after the 2008 Presidential Election in order to resolve the foreign fighters problem in Iraq. This effort was also aimed at launching a subsequent peace process between Arab states and Israel as well as the issue of weapons of mass destruction. Despite opposition from Congress and some segments of Washington, President Obama appointed an ambassador to Damascus and official talks were launched during his first two years in office. However, this process was disrupted by the Arab Spring and the Assad regime's heavy-handed response towards the demonstrations. Particularly, the use of force during some demonstrations and the increasing number of casualties drove the U.S. to change its course of action in its relations with Syria. This book illuminates U.S. policy in Syria over the last four years. Chapters 1 and 2 provide context for the Obama administration's treatment of the Syrian civil war by analyzing the status of relations in the years preceding the conflict. They conclude that the Obama administration worked cohesively to try to reverse George W. Bush's deliberate antagonizing of the Syrian regime and to launch a rapprochement with Assad to achieve its main goals in the Middle East. Chapters 3 through 6 address U.S.-Syrian relations since the Arab Spring and demonstrate the chokehold that risk aversion has held over the Obama administration despite ample, if imperfect, opportunities to strengthen the Syrian opposition and foster a possible transition to democracy in Syria. The final chapter assesses what changes, if any, stakeholders may expect in U.S. Syria policy during the Obama administration's remaining two years.