This book investigates various aspects of freedom as developed in the philosophical systems of Kant and Fichte. Freedom, both Kant and Fichte insist, does not mean that we can choose or think independently from all rules or necessity, but rather that we willingly accept a certain kind of submission under these rules. Therefore, the conditions of our knowledge affect and inform our self-understanding, our willing, and the ways we justify our practical choices. The essays in this volume explore both philosophers’ conceptions of human freedom as they relate to art, history, politics, and religion. They reveal how integrating freedom into a system of thought is crucial for our understanding of modern philosophy. System and Freedom in Kant and Fichte will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working on Kant, modern philosophy, and German Studies.

This book investigates various aspects of freedom as developed in the philosophical systems of Kant and Fichte. Freedom, both Kant and Fichte insist, does not mean that we can choose or think independently from all rules or necessity, but rather that we willingly accept a certain kind of submission under these rules. Therefore, the conditions of our knowledge affect and inform our self-understanding, our willing, and the ways we justify our practical choices. The essays in this volume explore both philosophers’ conceptions of human freedom as they relate to art, history, politics, and religion. They reveal how integrating freedom into a system of thought is crucial for our understanding of modern philosophy. System and Freedom in Kant and Fichte will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working on Kant, modern philosophy, and German Studies.

Kant's early critics maintained that his theory of freedom faces a dilemma: either it reduces the will's activity to strict necessity by making it subject to the causality of the moral law, or it reduces the will's activity to blind chance by liberating it from rules of any kind. This Element offers a new interpretation of Kant's theory against the backdrop of this controversy. It argues that Kant was a consistent proponent of the claim that the moral law is the causal law of a free will, and that the supposed ability of free will to choose indifferently between options is an empty concept. Freedom, for Kant, is a power to initiate action from oneself, and the only way to exercise this power is through the law of one's own will, the moral law. Immoral action is not thereby rendered impossible, but it also does not express a genuine ability.

Contrary to received scholarship, Beck concludes that Kant's theory of rights, like Fichte's, contains an unsettling message for many incompletely reasoned contemporary liberal theories of rights, which rarely discuss those additional ontological, epistemological, and psychological foundations on which the defense of liberal individualistic rights ultimately rests. Fichte and Kant on Freedom, Rights, and Law is an essential book for scholars of these two philosophers."--BOOK JACKET.

Freedom is one of the main issues of modern philosophy and Kant’s philosophy of freedom a major source for comprehending it. Whereas in contemporary debates Kant’s concept of practical freedom is addressed frequently, the cosmological foundation of it is much less discussed and even mostly taken for granted. In Metaphysics of Freedom?, by contrast, Kant’s concept of cosmological freedom is scrutinized both in a historical and a systematic perspective. As a result, a deeper and broader understanding of Kant’s conception of freedom, its presuppositions, and problems emerges.

Freedom after Kant situates Kant's concept of freedom in relation to leading philosophers of the period to trace a detailed history of philosophical thinking on freedom from the 18th to the 20th century. Beginning with German Idealism, the volume presents Kant's writings on freedom and their reception by contemporaries, successors, followers and critics. From exchanges of philosophical ideas on freedom between Kant and his contemporaries, Reinhold and Fichte, through to Kant's ideas on rational self-determination in Hegel and Schelling, we see Kant's original arguments transformed through concepts of autonomy, freedom and absolutes. The political aspect of Kant's freedom finds further articulation in chapters on Marx and Mill who developed their own notions of political freedom after Kant. Revealing how Kant's concept of freedom shaped the history of philosophy in the broadest sense, contributors chart the development of an ethics of freedom in the 20th century which brings Kant into conversation with Heidegger, Beauvoir, Sartre, Levinas and Murdoch. This line of thinking on freedom signals a new departure for Kantian studies which brings his ideas into the present day and traverses major schools of thought including Idealism, Marxism, existentialism and moral philosophy.

This book provides a detailed account of the role of property in German Idealism. It puts the concept of property in the center of the philosophical systems of Kant, Fichte, and Hegel and shows how property remains tied to their conceptions of freedom, right, and recognition.The book begins with a critical genealogy of the concept of property in modern legal philosophy, followed by a reconstruction of the theory of property in Kant's Doctrine of Right, Fichte's Foundations of Natural Right, and Hegel's Jena Realphilosophie. By turning to the tradition of German Rechtsphilosophie as opposed to the more standard libertarian and utilitarian frameworks of property, it explores the metaphysical, normative, political, and material questions that make property intelligible as a social relation. The book formulates a normative theory of property rooted in practical reason, mutual recognition, and social freedom. This relational theory of property, inspired by German Idealism, brings a fresh angle to contemporary property theory. Additionally, it provides crucial philosophical background to 19th-century debates on private property, inequality, labor, socialism, capitalism, and the state.The Concept of Property in Kant, Fichte, and Hegel will appeal to scholars and advanced students interested in 19th-century German philosophy, social and political philosophy, philosophy of law, political theory, and political economy

The book explains Fichte’s position on free will and predestination, including its rationale and significance. It argues that Fichte affirms both free will and predestination and explains how he purports to do so without contradiction. The book presents Fichte‘s position as a form of compatibilism that has not yet been explored in the literature. Due to early rationalist convictions, Fichte is as much concerned with reconciling freedom with a logical and a theological determinism as he is with a causal determinism. He sees in Kant’s novel concept of a pure practical reason a new form of rationalism, one consisting of a system of moral rather than natural necessitating grounds. At the same time, he adopts a more radically libertarian stance on free will than Kant. Every member in a sequence of free actions is a “first and absolute member” and could be other than it is given the same antecedent natural events and natural laws. The interest of Fichte as a theorist of freedom lies in how he brings together freedom and predetermination in a way that challenges our assumption about their mutual exclusivity. The book provides an overview of Fichte’s philosophical system—the so-called “Doctrine of Science”—from 1793-1800 with the aim of contextualizing his theory of free agency and destiny. In doing so, it sheds light on how consideration of these issues in turn shapes the system. Fichte on Free Will and Predestination will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working on Fichte’s philosophy, the history of modern philosophy, German Idealism, and the history of the philosophical issue of free will.

In this essay, Hegel attempted to show how Fichte's Science of Knowledge was an advance from the position of Kant in the Critique of Pure Reason, and how Schelling (and incidentally Hegel himself) had made a further advance from the position of Fichte. Hegel finds the idealism of Fichte too abstractly subjective and formalistic, and he tries to show how Schelling's philosophy of nature is the remedy for these weaknesses. But the most important philosophical content of the essay is probably to be found in his general introduction to these critical efforts where he deals with a number of problems about philosophical method in a way which is of general interest to philosophers, and not merely interesting to those who accept the Hegelian "dialectic method" which grew out of these first beginnings. Finally, the Difference essay is important in the development of "Nature-Philosophy" as a movement in the history of science.

Freedom is one of the central themes of classical German philosophy. For Kant freedom is the "keystone of the edifice of a system of pure reason." Fichte called his Science of Knowledge the "first system of freedom." To the early Schelling freedom is "the alpha and omega of all philosophy," while the later Schelling joins the philosophy of freedom with the question of the origin of evil. Hegel conceives freedom as "the essence of spirit," whose concrete forms in art, religion, and world history it is the task of philosophy to describe. The articles collected in the 9th volume of the Internationales Jahrbuch des Deutschen Idealismus/International Yearbook of German Idealism offer views from different perspectives on the diverse significance and systematic function distinctive of the concept of freedom in classical German philosophy. Beiträger/Contributors: Hans Friedrich Fulda, Pierre Keller, Heiner F. Klemme, Christian Klotz, Franz Knappik, Michelle Kosch, Charles Larmore, Wayne Martin, Alex Neill / Sandy Shapshay, Rocco Porcheddu, Sebastian Schwenzfeuer, Allen Wood. Herausgeber/Editors: Fred Rush (University of Notre Dame); Jürgen Stolzenberg (Martin-Luther-Universität Halle/Wittenberg)