In the 1970s tactical nuclear warfare was a topical issue. The introduction of the new generation of tactical nuclear weapons into Europe could have had disastrous consequences. These new weapons had already been developed by nuclear-weapon laboratories and pressures were growing for their deployment. On first sight, smaller and more accurate nuclear weapons may seem more humane and militarily preferable to the relatively high-yield tactical nuclear weapons currently deployed. But some of these new types of weapons would blur the distinction between nuclear and conventional weapons and their use would make escalation to strategic nuclear war extremely likely. Indeed, the argument for these new weapons is that their use in wartime is more credible (and therefore ‘acceptable’) than current types of tactical nuclear weapons. This perception could easily lead to the exceedingly dangerous idea that some types of tactical nuclear war were ‘winnable’. The fact has to be faced that any use of nuclear weapons is almost certain to escalate until all available weapons are used. To believe otherwise is to believe that one side will surrender before it has used all the weapons in its arsenal. History shows that this is most unlikely to happen. Because of its importance, SIPRI organized a meeting to discuss the whole question. Originally published in 1978, this book is the outcome of that meeting.

For three decades, arms control treaties have provided a legal basis for limiting and reducing long-range nuclear weapons. However, thousands of sub-strategic, or tactical, nuclear weapons (TNWs) are not monitored or controlled by any existing treaties or formal agreements, even though they can pose security risks equal to or exceeding those of strategic nuclear weapons. As the world has seen, the rise of international terrorism highlights the potential dangers of tactical nuclear weapons. Because they can be relatively small and portable-particularly but not exclusively in the case of so-cal.

"NATO has been a "nuclear" alliance since its inception. Nuclear weapons have served the dual purpose of being part of NATO military planning as well as being central to the Alliance's deterrence strategy. For over 4 decades, NATO allies sought to find conventional and nuclear forces, doctrines, and agreed strategies that linked the defense of Europe to that of the United States. Still, in light of the evolving security situation, the Alliance must now consider the role and future of tactical or non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNWs). Two clear conclusions emerge from this analysis. First, in the more than 2 decades since the end of the Cold War, the problem itself -- that is, the question of what to do with weapons designed in a previous century for the possibility of a World War III against a military alliance that no longer exists -- is understudied, both inside and outside of government. Tactical weapons, although less awesome than their strategic siblings, carry significant security and political risks, and they have not received the attention that is commensurate to their importance. Second, it is clear that whatever the future of these arms, the status quo is unacceptable. It is past the time for NATO to make more resolute decisions, find a coherent strategy, and formulate more definite plans about its nuclear status. Consequently, decisions about the role of nuclear weapons within the Alliance and the associated supporting analysis are fundamental to the future identity of NATO. At the Lisbon Summit in Portugal in November 2010, the Alliance agreed to conduct the Deterrence and Defense Posture Review (DDPR). This effort is designed to answer these difficult questions prior to the upcoming NATO Summit in May 2012. The United States and its closest allies must define future threats and, in doing so, clarify NATO's identity, purpose, and corresponding force requirements. So far, NATO remains a "nuclear alliance," but it is increasingly hard to define what that means."--Publisher's website.

Amidst many developments in the constantly evolving Indo-Pak conflict paradigm, the latest and perhaps the most intriguing has been the induction of Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNWs) by Pakistan. While nuclear sabre rattling is not new to Pakistan's strategy, this time around there seems to be a strong pitch among security analysts to project these as the proverbial 'Brahmastra' in its possession, foreclosing any sort of military retaliatory strike by India. This is significant at a time when sporadic Pak sponsored terror attacks on Indian soil continue unabated. For the Indian security analysts this raises some pertinent questions. • Is the threat of TNWs credible enough to deter India from launching a suitable military response to a Pakistan supported terror attack? • Does induction of TNWs by Pakistan materially alter the Indo-Pak nuclear balance and consequently, the direction any future conflict may assume? • What are the response options for India to retain/ restore the nuclear as well as overall security balance? This book is an endeavour to find answers to all these. In the process, the author attempts to explore how the two protagonists view nuclear deterrence, what is the relevance of nuclear weapons for both of them, how are the fundamental drivers of the ongoing conflict and the ever changing dynamics and influences in the region affecting it. Using these parameters and the technical capabilities of TNWs believed to be held by Pakistan, the author constructs five possible scenarios for the foreseeable future. The outcome is interesting as it answers the fundamental question – are Pakistan's TNWs indeed the game changer they are being touted as or are we giving the devil more than his due?

This book offers a comprehensive examination of the important security issue of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. Nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament have returned to the top of the international political agenda. The issue assumes particular importance in regard to NATO, given that some 150–200 US tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) are still present in five countries belonging to the Alliance (Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Turkey). The past few years have seen animated debate in the United States and Europe on the role of such weapons in the current scenario of international security, and whether they can be further reduced or completely removed from Europe. Bringing together leading scholars and analysts of TNW with country-specific competences, this volume improves our understanding of this debate by providing in-depth analysis of the presence, role, perceived value and destiny of TNWs in Europe. The book addresses the issue in a systematic manner, taking into account the perspectives of all main actors directly or indirectly involved in the debate. This approach provides new and important insights that can inform both theoretical and policy work on a very critical and timely international issue, especially during the ongoing review of NATO's deterrence and defence posture. This book will be of much interest to students of European politics, European security, nuclear proliferation, and IR in general.

is understudied, both inside and outside of government. Tactical weapons, although less awesome than their strategic siblings, carry significant security and political risks, and they have not received the attention that is commensurate to their importance. Second, it is clear that whatever the future of these arms, the status quo is unacceptable. It is past the time for NATO to make more resolute decisions, find a coherent strategy, and formulate more definite plans about its nuclear status. Consequently, decisions about the role of nuclear weapons within the Alliance and the associated supporting analysis are fundamental to the future identity of NATO. At the Lisbon Summit in Portugal in November 2010, the Alliance agreed to conduct the Deterrence and Defense Posture Review (DDPR). This effort is designed to answer these difficult questions prior to the upcoming NATO Summit in May 2012.

As politicians and policy makers trumpet the successes of strategic reductions and the achievements of the START agreements, Russia has increasingly focused on a rhetorical and doctrinal campaign to enhance the credibility of nuclear war fighting threats by legitimizing theater or tactical nuclear systems. The Russian Federation is convinced that its security rests upon these weapons, and it has therefore attempted to shield both the personnel and the hardware from the effects of the military rollback. The notion that the two largest possessors of nuclear weapons could speedily draw down their arsenals to under 2000 warheads, as a START 3 regime suggests, is misguided. This ignores the thousands of so called tactical nuclear weapons possessed by both states. The very real threats associated with Russia's tactical nuclear arsenal should impel those with genuine concerns to redirect their efforts toward the lower end of nuclear weapons spectrum. The arms control proposal presented in this paper incorporates a regime calling for the elimination of air delivered tactical nuclear weapons that may prove to be a useful model for reinvigorating the stalled process of nuclear arms reductions.

Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNWs), often referred to as “battlefield”, “sub-strategic”, or “non-strategic” nuclear weapons, usually have a plutonium core and are typically distinct from strategic nuclear weapons. Therefore, they warrant a separate consideration in the realm of nuclear security. The yield of such weapons is generally lower than that of strategic nuclear weapons and may range from the relatively low 0.1 kiloton to a few kilotons. Pakistan’s quest to acquire tactical nuclear weapons has added a dangerous dimension to the already precarious strategic equation in South Asia. The security discourse in the subcontinent revolves around the perennial apprehension of a conventional or sub-conventional conflict triggering a chain reaction, eventually paving the way for a potential nuclear crisis haunting peace and stability in the region. Pakistan believes that the successful testing of the 60-km nuclear-capable short-range m issile Hatf-9 (Nasr) “adds deterrence value to Pakistan’s strategic weapons development programme at shorter ranges.” In paradox, the fact remains that this step has further lowered Pakistan’s nuclear threshold through the likely use of TNWs. The introduction of TNWs into the tactical battle area further exacerbates credibility of their control. Pakistan has not formally declared a nuclear doctrine, but it is well known that nuclear weapons are its first line of defence. The use of TNWs in the India-Pakistan case will alter the strategic scenario completely as Pakistan would threaten India with the use of TNWs in the event of New Delhi responding against Islamabad with a conventional strike in reaction to a 26/11-style terrorist attack. Pakistan forgets that given its offensive strategic posture and continuing involvement in terror strikes in India, it is New Delhi which is confronted with the problem of developing a strategy to counter Pakistan’s “first-strike” and proxy war in the light of its declared “no-first-use” policy. This edited volume attempts to address and decipher complex issues, including aspects such as China’s WMD collaboration with Pakistan, nuclear command and control dynamics within Pakistan, overall rationale and implications of TNWs, safety and security of nuclear weapons, scenarios for nuclear usage, India’s potential response options and, more specifically, the technical aspects of the Nasr delivery system.

What is Tactical Nuclear Weapon A tactical nuclear weapon (TNW) or non-strategic nuclear weapon (NSNW) is a nuclear weapon that is designed to be used on a battlefield in military situations, mostly with friendly forces in proximity and perhaps even on contested friendly territory. Generally smaller in explosive power, they are defined in contrast to strategic nuclear weapons, which are designed mostly to be targeted at the enemy interior far away from the war front against military bases, cities, towns, arms industries, and other hardened or larger-area targets to damage the enemy's ability to wage war. As of 2024, no tactical nuclear weapons have ever been used in combat. How you will benefit (I) Insights, and validations about the following topics: Chapter 1: Tactical nuclear weapon Chapter 2: Nuclear warfare Chapter 3: Neutron bomb Chapter 4: Nuclear artillery Chapter 5: List of states with nuclear weapons Chapter 6: Russia and weapons of mass destruction Chapter 7: Suitcase nuclear device Chapter 8: List of nuclear weapons Chapter 9: Single Integrated Operational Plan Chapter 10: B61 nuclear bomb (II) Answering the public top questions about tactical nuclear weapon. Who this book is for Professionals, undergraduate and graduate students, enthusiasts, hobbyists, and those who want to go beyond basic knowledge or information for any kind of Tactical Nuclear Weapon.