This book explores Anglo-American military cooperation since the end of the Cold War. It shows that working so closely with the US military in both peacetime and conflict has generated both risks and benefits for Britain's armed forces and has led to numerous tensions between the two sides.

This book seeks to demystify the persistence of the Anglo-American Special Relationship (AASR) in the post-Cold War era by constructing a new theory of alliance persistence. This theory of alliance persistence not only has stronger explanatory power than the predominant model of interests and sentiments, but also opens a new way for understanding what factors have prevented the AASR from collapsing. This innovative new volume fills the gap in AASR literature by focusing on the important role of institutionalization in sustaining the AASR, a factor that has been significantly overlooked in existing academic research.

The joint British and US campaigns in the European theater of operations during World War II rank among the most impressive examples of coalition warfare in history. In just eighteen months, the US and British armies integrated their planning, intelligence, and command structures more thoroughly than any previous alliance. Millions of British and American soldiers fighting alongside one another liberated North Africa, France, Italy, and western Germany. How did these two armies come together so quickly? How did they combine their forces to a degree never before seen among the services of sovereign nations? And how did they sustain their alliance in the face of severe disagreements and battlefield setbacks? In Forging the Anglo-American Alliance, Tyler Bamford answers these questions by presenting the first history of the two armies’ relations from 1917 to 1941. Great Britain and the United States emerged from World War I as the strongest military powers in the world. Forging the Anglo-American Alliance examines why the armies of these two nations chose to view each other as their closest strategic partner instead of their greatest potential threat and illustrates the legacy that World War I had on the attitudes of the US and British armies toward one another and alliance warfare. Through personal interactions and military education in the years leading up to World War II, army officers shared large amounts of military intelligence and formed positive opinions of one another. As the threat of Germany and Japan grew, army officers were the first to anticipate the need for an alliance between their nations and to begin thinking about ways to structure their combined forces. Using untapped archival sources, official reports, and officers’ personal papers, Bamford presents an important and engaging new analysis of how this partnership grew out of the experiences and initiative of British and US Army officers and attachés during World War I and the two decades that followed.

By the beginning of the twentieth century, the United States had already become an international power and a recognized force at sea, but its army remained little more than a frontier constabulary. In fact, when America finally entered World War I, the U.S. Army was still only a tenth the size of the smallest of the major European forces. While most previous work on America's participation in the Great War has focused on alliance with Great Britain, Robert Bruce argues that the impact of the Franco-American relationship was of far greater significance. He makes a convincing case that the French, rather than the British, were the main military partner of the United States in its brief but decisive participation in the war-and that France deserves much credit for America's emergence as a world military power. In this important new look at the First World War, Bruce reveals how two countries established a close and respectful relationship-marking the first time since the American Revolution that the United States had waged war as a member of a military coalition. While General Pershing's American Expeditionary Forces did much to buoy French morale and military operations, France reciprocated by training over 80 percent of all American army divisions sent to Europe, providing most of their artillery and tanks, and even commanding them in combat. As Bruce discloses, virtually every military engagement in which the AEF participated was a Franco-American operation. He provides significant new material on all major battles—not only the decisive Second Battle of the Marne, but also St. Mihiel, Cantigny, Reims, Soissons, and other engagements—detailing the key contributions of this coalition to the final defeat of Imperial Germany. Throughout the book, he also demonstrates that there was a mutual bond of affection not only between French and American soldiers but between the French and American people as well, with roots planted deep in the democratic ideal. By revealing the overlooked importance of this crucial alliance, A Fraternity of Arms provides new insights not only into World War I but into coalition war-making as well. Contrary to the popular belief that relations between France and the United States have been tenuous or tendentious at best, Bruce reminds us that less than a century ago French and American soldiers fought side by side in a common cause—not just as allies and brothers-in-arms, but as true friends.

Former US naval intelligence officer Bath describes how his own area (before he was in it) was as responsible as Allied warships in the successful 1942-43 campaign against German U-boats known as the Battle of the Atlantic. He describes the cooperation at all levels, in all theaters of war, and at all points in the cycle from gathering through analysis to dissemination. He also considers the naval intelligence in the South Pacific, throughout highlighting the contributions of Britain and other Commonwealth states. Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR