Considers problems of strengthening NATO after France's withdrawal.

Through a theoretical and empirical examination of the 1956 Suez Crisis, the 1966 NATO crisis, and the 2003 Iraq crisis, Eznack explores the connections between affect and emotion, the occurrence of crises, and the repair of those crises in close allies' relationships, and provides a new perspective on alliances and friendly relations among states.

More than three years have passed since the petroleum crisis of 1973 forced the United States to confront the multifaceted challenge posed by an impending imbalance between energy supply and demand. The crisis posed two special problems for the West regarding the linkage between energy and the security of the Free World. First, the recognition that military power is sustained by the economic strength of the alliance partners and, at present, is contingent upon an adequate supply of petroleum. The second centered around the danger that the greater dependence of the European states and Japan on imports of oil could lead to begger-thy-neighbor competition and tend to undermine the cohesion of the Western alliance. The United States reaction to the latter issue is the subject of this first National Defense University monograph on national security affairs. In it, Professors Joseph S. Szyliowicz and Bard E. O'Neill have reviewed the interaction between the United States and its allies. They have described short- and long-term effects of the crisis on American-European relations and suggested several factors to account for changes which occurred.

This conference-based work offers the views of seven American diplomatic historians on the role of NATO from an American perspective, placing the alliance within the larger frame of America's foreign policy as a superpower. Each reveals an aspect of how NATO has fashioned the American Century.