“An in-depth account of the events and personal actions which led to a great tragedy in the history of America’s space program.” —James D. Smith, former Solid Rocket Booster Chief, NASA, Marshall Space Flight Center When the Space Shuttle Challenger exploded on January 28, 1986, millions of Americans became bound together in a single, historic moment. Many still vividly remember exactly where they were and what they were doing when they heard about the tragedy. Diane Vaughan recreates the steps leading up to that fateful decision, contradicting conventional interpretations to prove that what occurred at NASA was not skullduggery or misconduct but a disastrous mistake. Why did NASA managers, who not only had all the information prior to the launch but also were warned against it, decide to proceed? In retelling how the decision unfolded through the eyes of the managers and the engineers, Vaughan uncovers an incremental descent into poor judgment, supported by a culture of high-risk technology. She reveals how and why NASA insiders, when repeatedly faced with evidence that something was wrong, normalized the deviance so that it became acceptable to them. In a new preface, Vaughan reveals the ramifications for this book and for her when a similar decision-making process brought down NASA’s Space Shuttle Columbia in 2003. “Vaughn finds the traditional explanation of the [Challenger] accident to be profoundly unsatisfactory . . . One by one, she unravels the conclusions of the Rogers Commission.” —The New York Times “A landmark study.” —Atlantic “Vaughn gives us a rare view into the working level realities of NASA . . . The cumulative force of her argument and evidence is compelling.” —Scientific American

List of Figures and TablesPreface1: The Eve of the Launch 2: Learning Culture, Revising History 3: Risk, Work Group Culture, and the Normalization of Deviance 4: The Normalization of Deviance, 1981-1984 5: The Normalization of Deviance, 1985 6: The Culture of Production 7: Structural Secrecy 8: The Eve of the Launch Revisited 9: Conformity and Tragedy 10: Lessons Learned Appendix A. Cost/Safety Trade-Offs? Scrapping the Escape Rockets and the SRB Contract Award Decision Appendix B. Supporting Charts and Documents Appendix C. On Theory Elaboration, Organizations, and Historical EthnographyAcknowledgments Notes Bibliography Index Copyright © Libri GmbH. All rights reserved.

'Performance' has become one of the key terms for the new century. But what do we mean by 'performance'? In today's world it can refer to experimental art; productivity in the workplace; and the functionality of technological systems. Do these disparate fields bear any relation to each other? In Perform or Else Jon McKenzie asserts that there is a relationship cultural, organisational, and technological performance. In this theoretical tour de force McKenzie demonstrates that all three paradigms operate together to create powerful and contradictory pressures to 'perform...or else'. This is an urgent and important intervention in contemporary critical thinking. It will profoundly shape our understanding of twenty-first century structures of power and knowledge.

The continuous reporting and study of human-induced disasters in this technological age makes this a worthwhile reference. This covers a span of 80 years and over 100 incidents--from the 1907 collapse of a bridge over the St. Lawrence River to the Chernobyl plant explosion in 1986. Covered here are dozens of airplane accidents, the major space program failures (including Russian ones), and a number of nuclear-reactor mishaps. Arrangement is by general topic, 16 in all, with the individual disaster listed within its topic. Bibliographic citations are given chronologically, with book citations preceding article citations. A brief annotation for each citation gives an idea of coverage, but there is no general description of each disaster to orient the researcher unfamiliar with the incident. A chronological listing of disasters and several useful indexes are also given. Highly recommended for all reference collections.

Phillip K. Tompkins' book provides unparalleled longitudinal insight into the organizational successes and failures of NASA. In focusing on organizations in trouble, Tompkins identifies ten "communication transgressions."

Rather than present decision making strictly as a quantitative science, this text views it as a multidimensional process involving values, psychology, sociology, social psychology, and politics. Using a process modela focus on the process of a decision rather than the outcomethe book presents a variety of perspectives useful for making and evaluating decisions in all kinds of organizations.

This text is a compilation of 67 engaging, flexible, & tested exercises for active learning of organizational behavior. Exercises range from the simple to the complex & can be implemented as individual or group activities. Self-inventories, role-plays, & case studies provide a diversity of experiences. A section of 11 short readings serves as an anchor to students new to experiential methods, group processes, & case analysis.