1. Introduction Kant considered the doctrine of transcendental idealism an indisp- sable part of the theory of knowledge presented in the Critique of Pure Reason. My aim in this book is to present a new defense of the coh- ence and plausibility of Kant’s transcendental idealism and its indisp- sability for his theory of knowledge. I will show that the main argument of the Transcendental Aesthetic and the Transcendental Analytic is - fensible independently of some of Kant’s claims which are said to threaten its coherence. I have undertaken an inquiry into the coherence of Kant’s transc- dental idealism for the following reasons. A defense of the coherence of transcendental idealism is required by the existing state of Kantian scholarship. The claim that Kant’s transcendental idealism is incoh- ent has appeared in various forms over the last two centuries. The most powerful and elaborate criticism of Kant’s transcendental idealism is found in Part Four of Strawson’s The Bounds of Sense. Several comm- tators have tried to reestablish its coherence. Although Allison and other commentators have contributed ideas that are valuable for an 1 account of the coherence of Kant’s transcendental idealism, their - guments fall short as a response to the standard objection. Indeed, the claim that Kant’s transcendental idealism is incoherent continues to be the view held by most thinkers. I have limited my goal in this book to establishing the coherence of Kant’s transcendental idealism due to two related reasons.

This key collection of essays sheds new light on long-debated controversies surrounding Kant’s doctrine of idealism and is the first book in the English language that is exclusively dedicated to the subject. Well-known Kantians Karl Ameriks and Manfred Baum present their considered views on this most topical aspect of Kant's thought. Several essays by acclaimed Kant scholars broach a vastly neglected problem in discussions of Kant's idealism, namely the relation between his conception of logic and idealism: The standard view that Kant's logic and idealism are wholly separable comes under scrutiny in these essays. A further set of articles addresses multiple facets of the notorious notion of the thing in itself, which continues to hold the attention of Kant scholars. The volume also contains an extensive discussion of the often overlooked chapter in the Critique of Pure Reason on the Transcendental Ideal. Together, the essays provide a whole new outlook on Kantian idealism. No one with a serious interest in Kant's idealism can afford to ignore this important book.

This landmark book is now reissued in a rewritten & updated edition that takes account of recent Kantian literature. It includes a new discussion of the 'Third Analogy', an expanded discussion of Kant's 'Paralogisms' & new chapters on Kant's theory of reason, theology & the 'Appendix to the Dialectic'.

Other works on Kant and on his Critical Philosophy attempt either to remove Kant's transcendental idealism from his system or to defend it as being essential to the Kantian enterprise. In Kant's Idealism, Professor Neujahr argues - he may be the first to do so - that there is no single doctrine that is Kant's transcendental idealism to either explain or explain away. In his Critique of Pure Reason, Kant claims to present a distinctive form of idealism he calls "transcendental" idealism and that he contrasts with the "empirical" idealism of his predecessors. Professor Neujahr argues that on the contrary there is no single form of idealism in Kant's system and no simple contrast between Kant's transcendental idealism and the idealist doctrines of his philosophical forebears. Neujahr finds (and clearly delineates) "strands of idealism" in Kant's philosophy. He argues that the source of these various forms of idealism is the conflicting demands of Kant's theories of perception (sensibility) and thought (understanding). How in fact a subject relates to an object finds no single unified explanation in the Critical Philosophy of Kant. Indeed, in spite of Kant's efforts to combine his various theories into a single theory of experience, his doctrines of perception and thought do not fit together. It is, Neujahr contends, this lack of fit that ultimately prevents there being any single transcendental version of idealism in Kant's system. This also helps explain why Kant's system is so difficult. Neujahr's critical review of that system in Kant's Idealism may be the "handle" needed to get hold of Kant's notoriously difficult but potentially very useful Critical Philosophy.

First published in 1988. Clarifies the coherence theory and critically discusses the standard objections to it as well as those who can be interpreted as advocating it. This book should be of interest to students of philosophy and epistemology and professional philosophers. In the view of the author, contemporary philosophy the coherence theory of truth occupies rather an odd position. On the one hand a number of textbook arguments against it are widely accepted, arguments which make it look as though the theory is hardly worth serious attention. On the other hand some of the principal currents of philosophical thought seem to be flowing away from the traditional conception of truth and towards a different conception, one which some of its supporters and some of its detractors have recognized as taking truth to consist in coherence. In the first two chapters the author tries to clarify what the coherence theory is (and is not), to show that it deserves serious attention, and to exhibit the pressures that can drive one towards it. Also attempted is to show how it relates to various other things that philosophers have said about truth, and also to idealism and anti-realism.

For much of the twentieth century, many Anglo-American philosophers supported three theses - one about reality, one about truth, and one about human knowledge - that, taken together, underwrote debates in epistemology. The first was realism: the commonsensical-sounding view that the world of physical objects exists independently of human thought or language. The second was the correspondence theory of truth, according to which true statements or beliefs are those which accurately represent the way the world is. The third was foundationalism: the view that our knowledge of the world, like an edifice, must rest on firm foundations (i.e. on beliefs whose justification does not depend on any other beliefs). In the last two decades, however, a radical anti-epistemology movement led by the influential American philosopher Richard Rorty has put partisans of all three theses on the defensive. Moreover, Rorty has repeatedly claimed that his opposition to the shibboleths of traditional epistemology draws inspiration from the grand tradition of Pragmatism (especially from William James and John Dewey. In this important new book, Douglas McDermid argues persuasively for two key claims: first, that the so-called "Neo-Pragmatist" critique of traditional epistemology is thoroughly unconvincing; second, that Rorty is guilty of taking the name of Pragmatism in vain, since there are crucial and far-reaching differences between Neo-Pragmatism and the Classical Pragmatism of James and Dewey. The Varieties of Pragmatism will take its place in the forefront of the literature on this most vital part of the American philosophical legacy.

Based on an insightful and innovative reading of Kant's theory of knowledge, this book explores the political implications of Kant's philosophical writings on knowledge. It suggests that Kant offers a stable foundation for the reconsideration of the idea of progress as crucial in matters of political management at the outset of the 21st Century.

This book provides a robustly metaphysical, Hegelian account of the relation between appearance, thought and reality.

The Edinburgh Critical History of Philosophy is a seven-volume reference work on the history of philosophy. This volume surveys the key issues and debates distinct to nineteenth-century philosophy.

An innovative and comprehensive interpretation of Kant's concept of freedom analyzes the role it plays in his moral philosophy and psychology and considers critical literature on the subject.