"Liberty was the most cherished right possessed by English-speaking people in the eighteenth century. It was both an ideal for the guidance of governors and a standard with which to measure the constitutionality of government; both a cause of the American Revolution and a purpose for drafting the United States Constitution; both an inheritance from Great Britain and a reason republican common lawyers continued to study the law of England." As John Philip Reid goes on to make clear, "liberty" did not mean to the eighteenth-century mind what it means today. In the twentieth century, we take for granted certain rights—such as freedom of speech and freedom of the press—with which the state is forbidden to interfere. To the revolutionary generation, liberty was preserved by curbing its excesses. The concept of liberty taught not what the individual was free to do but what the rule of law permitted. Ultimately, liberty was law—the rule of law and the legalism of custom. The British constitution was the charter of liberty because it provided for the rule of law. Drawing on an impressive command of the original materials, Reid traces the eighteenth-century notion of liberty to its source in the English common law. He goes on to show how previously problematic arguments involving the related concepts of licentiousness, slavery, arbitrary power, and property can also be fit into the common-law tradition. Throughout, he focuses on what liberty meant to the people who commented on and attempted to influence public affairs on both sides of the Atlantic. He shows the depth of pride in liberty—English liberty—that pervaded the age, and he also shows the extent—unmatched in any other era or among any other people—to which liberty both guided and motivated political and constitutional action.

In his new book, Michal Jan Rozbicki undertakes to bridge the gap between the political and the cultural histories of the American Revolution. Through a careful examination of liberty as both the ideological axis and the central metaphor of the age, he is able to offer a fresh model for interpreting the Revolution. By establishing systemic linkages between the histories of the free and the unfree, and between the factual and the symbolic, this framework points to a fundamental reassessment of the ways we think about the American Founding. Rozbicki moves beyond the two dominant interpretations of Revolutionary liberty—one assuming the Founders invested it with a modern meaning that has in essence continued to the present day, the other highlighting its apparent betrayal by their commitment to inequality. Through a consistent focus on the interplay between culture and power, Rozbicki demonstrates that liberty existed as an intricate fusion of political practices and symbolic forms. His deeply historicized reconstruction of its contemporary meanings makes it clear that liberty was still understood as a set of privileges distributed according to social rank rather than a universal right. In fact, it was because the Founders considered this assumption self-evident that they felt confident in publicizing a highly liberal, symbolic narrative of equal liberty to represent the Revolutionary endeavor. The uncontainable success of this narrative went far beyond the circumstances that gave birth to it because it put new cultural capital—a conceptual arsenal of rights and freedoms—at the disposal of ordinary people as well as political factions competing for their support, providing priceless legitimacy to all those who would insist that its nominal inclusiveness include them in fact.

Cet ouvrage revisite l'histoire intellectuelle et politique canadienne entre la révolution américaine et les rébellions de 1837-1838 au Haut et au Bas-Canada en la réintégrant dans le cadre des Révolutions atlantiques qui ont secoué l'Europe et l'Amérique entre 1776 et 1838. Reposant sur un cadre théorique inspiré des travaux des historiens intellectuels du monde atlantique, il traite plus particulièrement de l'importance du concept de liberté dans le développement de l'État dans les deux colonies. Il démontre que ces dernières se sont développés dès 1791 en suivant un idéal de liberté qui, tout en étant différent de la liberté à l'oeuvre au sein des mouvements révolutionnaires de la fin du XVIIIe siècle, n'en était pas moins issu des Lumières. Il présente également les rébellions de 1837-1838 comme étant en partie le résultat d'un affrontement entre deux concepts très différents de liberté.

Examines the history of the liberty of contract and shows how this right has been continuously diminished by court decisions and by our country's growing regulatory and welfare state.

There is an extraordinary range of material in this anthology, from Lincoln’s Gettysburg address to a contemporary account of a visit from the Ku Klux Klan. The primary sources reproduced are both visual and written, and the secondary materials present a remarkable breadth and quality of relevant scholarship. Contains an extensive selection of writings and illustrations on the American Civil War Reflects society and culture as well as the politics and key battles of the Civil War Reproduces and links primary and secondary sources to encourage exploration of the material Includes editorial introductions and study questions to aid understanding

An original interpretation of 'the people's two bodies' that illuminates the opposite attitudes toward compromise throughout the American founding.

An astonishing variety of captivity narratives emerged in the fifty years following the American Revolution; however, discussions about them have usually focused on accounts of Native American captivities. To most readers, then, captivity narratives are synonymous with "godless savages," the vast frontier, and the trials of kidnapped settlers. This anthology, the first to bring together various types of captivity narratives in a comparative way, broadens our view of the form as it shows how the captivity narrative, in the nation-building years from 1770 to 1820, helped to shape national debates about American liberty and self-determination. Included here are accounts by Indian captives, but also prisoners of war, slaves, victims of pirates and Barbary corsairs, impressed sailors, and shipwreck survivors. The volume's seventeen selections have been culled from hundreds of such texts, edited according to scholarly standards, and reproduced with the highest possible degree of fidelity to the originals. Some selections are fictional or borrow heavily from other, true narratives; all are sensational. Immensely popular with American readers, they were also a lucrative commodity that helped to catalyze the explosion of print culture in the early Republic. As Americans began to personalize the rhetoric of their recent revolution, captivity narratives textually enacted graphic scenes of defiance toward deprivation, confinement, and coercion. At a critical point in American history they helped make the ideals of nationhood real to common citizens.

Fourteen individual state essays elucidate the complexitites of local and regional interests that shaped the debate over individual rights and the eventual adoption of the Bill of Rights.

In a scholarly, yet accessible work, Bernstein reveals the Founding Fathers not as shining demigods but as imperfect human beings who nevertheless achieved political greatness.

In this book, Edward Keynes examines the fundamental-rights philosophy and jurisprudence that affords constitutional protection to unenumerated liberty, property, and privacy rights. He is critical of the failure of the U.S. Supreme Court to adopt a coherent theory for identifying which rights are to be considered fundamental and how these private rights are to be balanced against the public interests that the government has a duty to articulate and promote. Keynes develops his argument by first surveying how substantive due process grew out of the tradition of Anglo-American jurisprudence and came to evolve over time. He pays special attention to the shift in its application early in the twentieth century, from protecting "liberty of contract" against economic regulation to protecting "privacy" and other noneconomic rights (as in Roe v. Wade) against social regulation.