In March 2008 the Government published "The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom: Security in an interdependent world" (NSS) (Cm. 7291, 2008, ISBN 9780101729123). Part dealt with the contribution of the armed forces to the overarching security policy of the UK, and the Defence Committee set out to examine "how the MoD and the Armed Forces interact with other departments and agencies to ensure the safety and security of the UK". The report looks at the developing area of Parliamentary scrutiny of national security, welcomes the proposed creation of a Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy, but does question which minister will give evidence to that Committee. The vital role of the ministry of Defence is outlined, and the contribution must be appropriately understood, directed and resourced. The Committee recommends that the Government investigate how the Territorial Army could be used in civil emergencies, rather than always resorting to regular troops. It is essential that all activity relating to national security is appropriately funded from an indicative national security budget. The NSS should also make a clearer connection between the strategy and industry, and the Committee welcomes the Government's engagement with the UK Security and Resilience Industry Suppliers' Community. Current issues examined include: the London 2012 Olympic Games; maritime security - the Committee comments on only six Royal Navy ships being dedicated to this, and the level of action taken to address identified threats to aspects of critical infrastructure such as ports; the impact of current operations and the extent to which UK forces are stretched or overstretched.

This report is in response to the Government's reply to the Committee's May 2009 Report on the Defence contribution to national security and resilience. The Committee is disappointed with the content of the Government's response to its earlier Report, and challenges the Ministry of Defence to be more open in setting out its role in contributing to the nation's security. In this Report, the Committee: calls upon the Government to provide regular updates on national security to appropriate select committees; deplores the Government's failure so far to establish a Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy following the announcement of July 2008; and stresses the importance of the forthcoming defence Green Paper and Strategic Defence Review in making the necessary and important connections between national security and strategic defence capabilities. The next Government must spell out more clearly the role of the UK's defence assets in our national security.

This book argues that the UK, as a post-modern globalised state, will require means to have influence over events and opponents that threaten the UK's interests in the 21st century, and that its means is the Royal Navy. However, unlike other studies, this research emphasizes the role of logistics, especially afloat support logistics and the Royal Fleet Auxiliary. In doing so, the author rejects the current theory underpinning military operations at distance, that distance degrades capability, and posits an alternative theory, that time is the key factor, for maritime-based forces. The UK must reengage with its maritime status and maintain a maritime-based capability to protect its interests in the new maritime century as a leader within the international community. The book will be of use to scholars and researchers interested in naval history and defence policy.

Why did Britain come to play such a prominent role in the war on terror and why did the military instrument come to be the dominant theme in the British prosecution of what was an ideological and political struggle? This book is an analysis of Britain’s war against Al Qaeda and the phenomenon of international terrorism which marked a paradigm shift in the nature and conduct of war in the twenty-first century. At the heart of the book is an attempt to understand why Britain, which possessed a wealth of experience in the conduct of counterterrorism, counterinsurgency and small wars, developed a strategic and operational design to defeat the Islamist threat which proved to be deeply flawed. In addressing this question the book explores the complex intellectual, doctrinal and geopolitical challenge posed by Al Qaeda and international terrorism and how and why the British response took the form that it did. In conducting this analysis the book raises important questions about the assumptions and perceptions of those in government who led the UK into this conflict, the nature of the civil military relationship in Britain and how well it functioned, and finally the competence of its security forces in being able to deal with this threat both domestically and overseas.

This report notes mounting concern that UK Armed Forces may be falling below the minimum utility required to deliver the commitments that they are currently being tasked to carry out let alone the tasks they are likely to face between 2015 to 2020 when it is acknowledged that there will be capability gaps. The Committee is concerned that UK Armed Forces will be continually operating at the maximum level envisaged by the Defence Planning Assumptions. The Committee is not convinced that this aspiration can be achieved by co-operation with our allies given the challenges of aligning political with operational needs. The SDSR identified seven military tasks and the Defence Planning Assumptions that underpin them. However the Review fails to show how decisions such as those on the Aircraft Carriers and Nimrod MRA4 will lead to the Armed Forces being able to undertake those military tasks. The Committee has serious concerns over the realisation of what is called "Future Force 2020", the Government's intended shape of the Armed Forces from 2020, particularly as the provision of the necessary resources is only a Government aspiration, not Government policy. The MoD must reform, and ensure substantially improved transparency and control over, its finance and budgetary practices. When committing to undertake new operations the Government should state from the outset where that operation fits in the Defence Planning Assumptions and which of the military tasks it is meeting. The Committee is concerned that the Government seems to have postponed the sensible aspiration of bringing commitments and resources into line, in that it has taken on the new commitment of Libya while reducing the resources available to MoD.

This paper analyses the UK's approach to identifying and managing threats to the national security of the UK, and the implications for these arrangements of a vote for independence. It complements analysis of the UK's approach to defence explored elsewhere in the Scotland analysis series. It is clearly in the UK's interests to be surrounded by secure and resilient neighbouring countries, including - in the event of a yes vote - an independent Scottish state. While the UK endeavours to work with other countries and international organisations to improve security and fight organised crime for everyone's mutual benefit there is something qualitatively different about being influential and intimately connected with the rest of the UK by being a part of it. Issues of national security are of the utmost sensitivity, linked to a country's foreign, security and defence policy posture, and any decisions are closely related to matters of sovereignty and democratic accountability. For this reason, a security union is closely connected to the existence of a political union. The creation of an independent Scottish state would see an end to the current arrangements for ensuring Scotland's security, as Scotland, including Police Scotland, would no longer be part of the UK's national security infrastructure and capabilities. In practical terms this means that the present level of strategic and operational communication and co-ordination that occurs everyday across the UK, with Scotland playing a key role within it - whether concerned with counter-terrorism, fighting serious and organised crime or protecting against cyber threats - would end

In the years since 9/11, counter-terrorism law and policy has proliferated across the world. This handbook comprehensively surveys how the law has been deployed in all aspects of counter-terrorism. It provides an authoritative and critical analysis of counter-terrorism laws in domestic jurisdictions, taking a comparative approach to a range of jurisdictions, especially the UK, the US, Australia, Canada, and Europe. The contributions to the book are written by experts in the field of terrorism law and policy, allowing for discussion of a wide range of regulatory responses and strategies of governance. The book is divided into four parts, reflective of established counter-terrorism strategic approaches, and covers key themes such as: Policing and special powers, including surveillance Criminal offences and court processes Prevention of radicalisation and manifestations of extremism Protective/preparative security The penology of terrorism In addressing counter-terrorism laws across a broad range of topics and jurisdictions, the handbook will be of great interest and use to researchers, students and practitioners in criminal law, counter-terrorism, and security studies.

Critical infrastructures are the backbone of modern, interconnected economies. The disruption of key systems and essential services - such as telecommunications, energy or water supply, transportation or finance - can cause substantial economic damage. This report looks at how to boost critical infrastructure resilience in a dynamic risk landscape, and discusses policy options and governance models to promote up-front resilience investments.

Bringing a dose of reality to the stuff of literary thrillers, this masterful study is the first closely detailed, comparative analysis of the evolution of the modern British and American intelligence communities. Intelligence and Government in Britain and the United States: A Comparative Perspective is an intensive, comparative exploration of the role of organizational and political culture in the development of the intelligence communities of America and her long-time ally. Each national system is examined as a detailed case study set in a common conceptual and theoretical framework. The first volume lays out that framework and examines the U.S. intelligence community. The second volume offers the U.K. case study as well as overall conclusions. Particular attention is paid here to the fundamentally different concepts of what "intelligence" entails in the United States and United Kingdom, as well as to the nations' different approaches to managing change- and information-intensive activities. The impact of these differences is demonstrated by examining the evolution of the two intelligence communities from their inceptions prior to World War II through their development during the Cold War and the transformations that have taken place since, especially in the wake of the September 2001 terrorist attacks and 2003 invasion of Iraq.