The defence industrial strategy published in December 2005 (Command paper Cm. 6697, ISBN 0101669720). Its aim was to provide greater transparency on the UK's future defence requirements and to set out those industrial capabilities the UK needs to maintain appropriate sovereignty and operate equipment independently. The Committee praises the production of the strategy to a tight timetable and with wide consultation. The strategy has been well received by industry. In the future there will be more focus on upgrading and maintaining platforms rather than designing and building new equipment. The Committee wants the Ministry of Defence (MoD) to continue improvements in the procurement process, and to give more information about future requirements. Investment in research and technology needs to increase, or the result will be lower quality defence equipment. The MoD also needs to develop a greater understanding of the vital role of small and medium-sized enterprises in the supply chain. Competitive procurement will not always be possible in some areas, where there is only a single company with the capacity and capability to deliver the MoD's requirements. The Committee expresses concerns about the planned use of long-term partnering arrangements, seeing the risk of possible monopoly supply and lack of access of other companies to sub-contract work.

This strategy document sets out the Government's analysis of the UK's defence industrial capabilities requirement, and is divided into three parts: i) a strategic overview including information on the principles and processes that underpin procurement and industrial decisions, the need for transparency, the evolving defence industry environment, developments and innovation in defence research technology; ii) a review of different industrial sectors and cross-cutting industrial capabilities; and iii) how the strategy will be implemented and an assessment of implications for the Ministry of Defence and industry as a whole.

The relationship between government and the businesses that contribute towards the defence and security of the state is a critical one; it often underscores a modern state’s foreign policy and sense of place in the world. Yet, despite its clear importance, this subject is underexplored and rarely analysed in a rigorous manner. As a consequence, government defence industrial policies, if they exist at all, often seem somewhat contrived, ill-considered and contradictory. The Defence Industrial Triptych systematically analyses the components and drivers of the relationships that bind a government to its defence industrial base by examining three major case studies: the UK, US and Germany, who between them account for over three quarters of NATO defence spending. The features of their defence industrial relationships –whether common or unique – provide vital lessons for policy-makers, industrialists and the taxpayer. As defence cuts bite across NATO and as the UK approaches the 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review, the relationships this Whitehall Paper considers are more important than ever.

The mission of the MoD's (Ministry of Defence's) Defence Equipment and Support (DE & S) organisation is to equip and support our Armed Forces for operations now and in the future. Support to current operations in Afghanistan and Iraq has taken priority and the organisation has performed well. The Urgent Operational Requirement (UOR) system remains highly effective in enabling vital equipment to be provided quickly to the two theatres to meet rapidly changing threats, but there are concerns that UORs represent a partial failure to equip our forces for predicted expeditionary operations, and on their effects on the core budget in future years. DE & S' performance in procuring longer-term equipment declined significantly in 2007-08. The forecast costs for the 20 largest defence projects increased by £205 million and the forecast delays increased by some 100 months in the year. The improvements promised by both the long-standing application of the principles of 'smart procurement' and the more recent formation of the DE & S organisation appear not to have materialised. The FRES (Future Rapid Effect System) programme has been a fiasco, being poorly conceived and managed from the outset. The Committee condemns the failure to date to publish an updated version of the Defence Industrial Strategy and considers that its continuing absence increases the risk that the UK Defence Industrial Base will not be able to meet the future requirements of our Armed Forces. Finally, the UK's future military capability depends on the investment made today in Research and Development. Sufficient funding for defence research needs to be ring-fenced and the MoD must recognise the very high priority of research and reverse the recent cut in research spending.

On 7 July 2009 the Ministry of Defence announced its plan for a Strategic Defence Review to follow the 2010 General Election. The predecessor Defence Committee reported its views on the proposed Review in its fourth report of session 2009-10 (HC 53, ISBN 9780215543912). The current Defence Committee supports the recommendation in that report that the Review be broadened in scope in order to set the country's defence needs in a stronger foreign and security policy context. It is however recognised that the inclusion of broadly defined security concerns within the Review risks the dilution of the defence contribution. Immediate or short-term security issues and threats might dominate the Review to the exclusion of the medium to long-term defence assessments made by the MoD. The Government's need to tackle the deficit is understood yet there is concern at the possible consequences of the MoD's budget not being ring-fenced for the future, unlike those of the DFID and Department of Health. The capacity of the country even to sustain current in-use capabilities and therefore current operations could well be put at risk by the proposed cuts of between 10% and 20%. This report looks at these risks and the specific issues, including those of public consultation and the speed at which the Review process is being undertaken, involved

A revolutionary technological development of the late twentieth century, photonics embraces lasers, fiber optics, imaging devices, and optical applications to computing. It affects the fortunes of numerous industries and, other than conventional microelectronics, may now be the leading arena for worldwide technological rivalry. While Japan has seen its photonic industries grow faster than any other high technology sector, the United States, where much of photonics originated, has experienced a declining industrial capability in world markets. Why is the U.S. floundering in this critical new technology? Are market solutions adequate as a national response to such massive technological change? After describing the history and economic implications of photonics, this book places these questions in the context of industrial policy debates about the proper role of government in response to strategic industrial sectors. The author then assesses the U.S. public policy response by examining various government programs directed at photonics. These programs add up to an implicit government photonics policy, but one that is shortsighted, incoherent, and unplanned. Sternberg concludes that it is this failure to plan that explains United States' retrogression in a critical technology.

Peter Batchelor and Susan Willett analyse the response of the South African defence industry to drastic cuts in military expenditure and the demilitarization of society since the end of the cold war and apartheid, and the stabilization of the regional security situation. The new ANC-led government is seeking to use the resources released - the `peace dividend' - to restructure and revitalize the country's industrial base and to support reconstruction, development, and redistribution. A lively debate on the country's security needs and strategic doctrine is under way. As in other countries, strategies of industrial diversification and conversion have met with limited success. In the absence hitherto of any coherent government policy on defence industrial adjustment, significant skills and technologies have been lost or wasted. This book provides a historical analysis of South Africa's unique opportunity to develop new and innovative policies on defence and security matters, the arms industry and arms exports, and makes a valuable contribution to the international debate on the relationship between disarmament and development.

Defence and aerospace industries in Scotland generate nearly £2.31 billion in sales and together with the MoD support almost 50,000 jobs and a record number of apprentices. As well as a recognised expertise in naval ship building, Scotland also has a strong defence electronics industry and a strong aerospace industry based around Prestwick. This report examines the delay in the signing of the contract for two new aircraft carriers: the Committee is concerned that similar delays during the construction phase could lead to job losses and damage the ship-building skills base the UK needs to support if it wishes to retain sovereign capability in key areas. The Committee also comments on the Government's decision to treat the Military Afloat Reach and Sustainability (MARS) vessels as commercial rather than naval vessels, making them subject to EU competition law. There is confusion over the status of these vessels. The report also looks at the supply of skilled, semi-skilled and graduate workers, the Modern Apprenticeship programme, and the funding for adult apprentices. It is vital for Scottish industry to look at upskilling throughout the workforce, including mature workers who were not able to access apprenticeships as school leavers. The issue of constitutional change also affects the future sustainability of the Scottish defence industry. In the long term it is unclear what naval requirement an independent Scotland would have and whether this would make up for the potential loss of UK MoD orders. Government and industry need to work effectively together to ensure that Scotland's engineering and manufacturing base continues to be world class.

The Defence Committee accepts that there are deep-rooted problems with the present acquisition system, and draws attention to the example of the decision in 2010 to change to the carrier variant of the Joint Strike Fighter, a decision which later had to be reversed. The Committee agrees with the Government that the current arrangements for acquisition, constrained by public sector employment rules, are unsatisfactory. But the proposal to entrust acquisition to a Government owned, Contractor operated company is not universally accepted as the best way forward, and there are particular concerns about how the MoD's overall responsibility for acquisition could be maintained within a GoCo. The Committee considers that problems might arise if a non-UK company were given responsibility for UK defence acquisition. It further considers it vital that consultations are satisfactorily concluded with allies, to ensure that there is no adverse impact on co-operation, before any proposals are implemented.