This book investigates the dynamic intertwinement of law and morality, with a focus on new and developing fields of law. Taking as its starting point the debates and mutual misunderstandings between proponents of different philosophical traditions, it argues that this theoretical pluralism is better explained once law is accepted as an essentially ambiguous concept. Continuing on, the book develops a robust theory of law that increases our grasp on global legal pluralism and the dynamics of law. This theory of legal interactionism, inspired by the work of Lon Fuller and Philip Selznick, also helps us to understand apparent anomalies of modern law, such as international law, the law of the European Convention on Human Rights and horizontal interactive legislation. In an ecumenical approach, legal interactionism does justice to the valuable core of truth in natural law and legal positivism. Shedding new light on familiar debates between authors such as Fuller, Hart and Dworkin, this book is of value to academics and students interested in legal theory, jurisprudence, legal sociology and moral philosophy.

This volume collects many of the key essays exploring the possible relationships between the concepts of law and morality, a central concern of contemporary philosophizing about law. It is organized around five conceptual issues: classical natural law theory; legal positivism's separability thesis; Ronald Dworkin's constructive interpretivism; inclusive legal positivism's assertion that there can be legal systems with moral criteria of legality; and the relevance of morality and moral theorizing in theorizing about the concept of law and associated legal concepts. Each of the essays makes an important contribution toward addressing these issues.

Property Law and Social Morality develops a theory of property that highlights the social construction of obligations that individuals owe each other. By viewing property law through the lens of obligations rather than through the lens of rights, the author affirms the existence of important property rights (when no obligation to another exists) and defines the scope of those rights (when an obligation to another does exist). By describing the scope of the decisions that individuals are permitted to make and the requirements of other-regarding decisions, the author develops a single theory to explain the dynamics of private and common property, including exclusion, nuisance, shared decision making, and decision making over time. The development of social recognition norms adds to our understanding of property evolution, and the principle of equal freedom underlying social recognition that limit government interference with property rights.

Contents P. Capps: Positivism in Law and International Law D. von Daniels: Is Positivism a State Centered Theory? K. E. Himma: Legal Positivism's Conventionality Thesis and the Methodology of Conceptual Analysis R. Nunan: A Modest Rehabilitation of the Separability Thesis A. Oladosu: Choosing Legal Theory on Cultural Grounds: An African Case for Legal Positivism C. Orrego: Hart's Last Legal Positivism: Morality Might Be Objective; Legality Certainly is Not M. Pavcnik: Die (Un)Produktivitat der Positivistischen Jurisprudenz M. Haase: The Hegelianism in Kelsen's Pure Theory of Law S. Papaefthymiou: The House Kelsen Built U. J. Pak: Legal Practitioners' Need of Reflective Application of Legal Philosophy in Korea U. Schmill: Jurisprudence and the Concept of Revolution D. Venema: Judicial Discretion: a Necessary Evil? J. Baker: Rights, Obligations, and Duties, and the Intersection of Law, Conventions and Morals S. Bertea: Legal Systems' Claim to Normativity and the Concept of Law J. Dalberg-Larsen: On the Relevance of Habermas and Theories of Legal Pluralism for the Study of Environmental Law A. Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos: A Connection of No-Connection in Luhmann and Derrida.

This new collection of essays opens with a pivotal essay, not previously published, on the implications of the moral duties which arise out of concern for the well-being of others. The first part of the book concentrates on the consequences of two central aspects of well-being: the importance of membership in groups - the role of belonging - and the active character of well-being - that it largely consists in successful activities. Both aspects have far-reaching political implications, explored in essays on free expression, national self-determination, and multiculturalism, among others. Against the background of the moral and political views developed in the first part, the second part of the book explores various aspects of the dynamic inter-relations between law and morality, offering some building blocks towards a theory of law.

Rules perform a moral function by restating moral principles in concrete terms, so as to reduce the uncertainty, error, and controversy that result when individuals follow their own unconstrained moral judgment. Although reason dictates that we must follow rules to avoid destructive error and controversy, rules—and hence laws—are imperfect, and reason also dictates that we ought not follow them when we believe they produce the wrong result in a particular case. In The Rule of Rules Larry Alexander and Emily Sherwin examine this dilemma. Once the importance of this moral and practical conflict is acknowledged, the authors argue, authoritative rules become the central problems of jurisprudence. The inevitable gap between rules and background morality cannot be bridged, they claim, although many contemporary jurisprudential schools of thought are misguided attempts to do so. Alexander and Sherwin work through this dilemma, which lies at the heart of such ongoing jurisprudential controversies as how judges should reason in deciding cases, what effect should be given to legal precedent, and what status, if any, should be accorded to “legal principles.” In the end, their rigorous discussion sheds light on such topics as the nature of interpretation, the ancient dispute among legal theorists over natural law versus positivism, the obligation to obey law, constitutionalism, and the relation between law and coercion. Those interested in jurisprudence, legal theory, and political philosophy will benefit from the edifying discussion in The Rule of Rules.

How are law and morality connected, how do they interact, and in what ways are they distinct? These questions have been a fundamental concern in the modern analytic philosophy of law. In Where Law and Morality Meet Matthew Kramer reviews the most influential accounts of legal and moral reasoning and presents his own conception of whether moral principles should be incorporated into a concept of law. In Part One, Kramer argues that moral principles can enter into the law of any jurisdiction. He contends that legal officials can invoke moral principles as laws for resolving disputes, and that they can also invoke them as threshold tests which ordinary laws must satisfy. In opposition to many other theorists, Kramer argues that these functions of moral principles are consistent with the essential characteristics of any legal system. Part Two reaffirms the legal positivist argument that law and morality are separable, arguing against the position of natural-law theory, which portrays legal requirements as a species of moral requirements. Kramer contends that even though the existence of a legal system in any sizeable society is essential for the realization of fundamental moral values, law is not inherently moral either in its effects or in its motivational underpinnings. In the final part, Kramer contests the widespread view that people whose conduct is meticulously careful cannot be held morally responsible for harmful effects of their actions. Through this argument, he reveals that fault-independent liability is present even more prominently in morality than in the law.