The economic and political aspects of energy subsidies, viewed both theoretically and empirically, with a focus on fossil fuel subsidies in developing nations. Government subsidies to energy are widespread and represent a heavy burden on public budgets in many countries. Both producers and consumers may be subsidized; the most common subsidies are for motor fuel consumption and electricity production and consumption. The subsidies to consumers often prove particularly harmful because they result in increased energy consumption, increased carbon emissions, and distortionary effects on consumer behavior. This book fills a void in the literature by providing a first, broad and diverse, analysis of several aspects of the economic and political economy aspects of government energy subsidies. The contributors take both theoretical and empirical approaches, with most of the focus on subsidies to fuel and electricity in non-OECD countries. The chapters cover such topics as energy pricing, reelection incentives for politicians that may encourage excessive subsidies; political corruption and “bribing equilibria,” the the “resource curse” in developing countries when the gains from natural resource windfalls are largely wasted, the “entitlement” of energy subsidies in autocracies, and distributional issues when subsidies targeted to the poor are removed in high-income countries. One chapter discusses nonharmful subsidies: the potential economic effects of subsidizing the manufacturing and deployment of renewable energy. Contributors Carolyn Fischer, Mads Greaker, Mohammad Habibpour, Michelle Harding, Christina Kolerus, Christos Kotsogiannis, Jim Krane, Alber Touna Mama, Raffaele Miniaci, Marco Pani, Ian Parry, Carlo Perroni, Leonzio Rizzo, Knut Einar Rosendahl, Carlo Scarpa, Neda Seiban, Suphi Sen, Jon Strand, Paola Valbonesi, Herman Vollebergh

This book proposes a simple framework for understanding the political economy of subsidy reform and applies it to four in-depth country studies covering more than 30 distinct episodes of reform. Five key lessons emerge. First, energy subsidies often follow a life cycle, beginning as a way to stabilize prices and reduce exposure to price volatility for low-income consumers. However, as they grow in size and political power, they become entrenched. Second, subsidy reform strategies vary because the underlying political economy problems vary. When benefits are concentrated, satisfying (or isolating) interest groups with alternative policies is an important condition for effective reform. When benefits are diffuse, it can be much harder to identify and manage the political coalition needed for reform. Third, governments vary in their administrative and political capacities to implement difficult energy subsidy reforms. Fourth, improvements in social protection systems are often critical to the success of reforms because they make it possible to target assistance to those most in need. Finally, the most interesting cases involve governments that take a strategic approach to the challenges of political economy. In these settings, fixing energy subsidies is central to the governments’ missions of retaining political power and reorganizing how the government delivers benefits to the population. These cases are examples of “reform engineering,†? where governments actively seek to create the capacity to implement alternative policies, depoliticize tariffs, and build credibility around alternative policies. The most successful reforms involve active efforts by policy leaders to identify the political forces supporting energy subsidies and redirect or inoculate them.

This Handbook is the first volume to analyse the International Political Economy, the who-gets-what-when-and-how, of global energy. Divided into five sections, it features 28 contributions that deal with energy institutions, trade, transitions, conflict and justice. The chapters span a wide range of energy technologies and markets - including oil and gas, biofuels, carbon capture and storage, nuclear, and electricity - and it cuts across the domestic-international divide. Long-standing issues in the IPE of energy such as the role of OPEC and the ‘resource curse’ are combined with emerging issues such as fossil fuel subsidies and carbon markets. IPE perspectives are interwoven with insights from studies on governance, transitions, security, and political ecology. The Handbook serves as a potent reminder that energy systems are as inherently political and economic as they are technical or technological, and demonstrates that the field of IPE has much to offer to studies of the changing world of energy.

Economists have long argued that market-based instruments such as, environmental taxes, and emission trading systems, are the superior way to offset the negative externalities of any kind of economic activities. Yet, whether the effects of using these instruments are sufficient, whether they are actually used efficiently, and especially which factors influence their effectiveness is subject to a lively debate. It is the ultimate task of research to identify existing barriers among economic agents so as to gain valuable insight into how to overcome them. There still is much work to be done when it comes to evaluating the effectiveness of policy instruments with regard to the achievement of environmental targets. This work examines this topic.

This paper shows that high energy subsidies and low public social spending can emerge as an equilibrium outcome of a political game between the elite and the middle-class when the provision of public goods is subject to bottlenecks, reflecting weak domestic institutions. We test this and other predictions of our model using a large cross-section of emerging markets and low-income countries. The main empirical challenge is that subsidies and social spending could be jointly determined (e.g., at the time of the budget), leading to a simultaneity bias in OLS estimates. To address this concern, we adopt an identification strategy whereby subsidies in a given country are instrumented by the level of subsidies in neighboring countries. Our Instrumental Variable (IV) estimations suggest that public expenditures in education and health were on average lower by 0.6 percentage point of GDP in countries where energy subsidies were 1 percentage point of GDP higher. Moreover, we find that the crowding-out was stronger in the presence of weak domestic institutions, narrow fiscal space, and among the net oil importers.

A volume on the political economy of clean energy transition in developed and developing regions, with a focus on the issues that different countries face as they transition from fossil fuels to lower carbon technologies.

This comprehensive volume provides the first book-length account on the politics of fossil fuel subsidies. This title is also available as Open Access.

In the debate over the treatment of China in trade remedy investigations, this book focuses exclusively on anti-subsidy law. As such, it brings a long neglected and often underestimated area of international trade law to the fore.Exploring the delicate relations between the WTO, the EU and China, it focuses on the current legal framework for the use of alternative benchmarks in anti-subsidy law and analyses the consequences that arise from its practical application in investigations against China. Scrutinizing recent developments in WTO anti-subsidy law, in particular the adoption of country-specific rules in accession protocols, the book reveals the shortcomings of the current approach and argues for fundamental reforms. Accordingly, the book provides academics and practitioners alike with vital insights into the legal evolution and practical application of alternative benchmark methodologies in the context of WTO and EU anti-subsidy law, while also putting forward a critical analysis of the status quo.

This much-needed book provides an empirically-grounded, and theoretically informed account of international law sources, mechanisms, initiatives and institutions which address and affect the practice of subsidising fossil fuel consumption and production. Drawing on recent scholarship on emerging international governance mechanisms, ‘informal’ international law-making and regime interaction, it offers suggestions, and critiques suggestions of others, for how the international law framework could be employed more effectively and appropriately to respond to environmentally and fiscally harmful fossil fuel subsidies.