Originally published in 1889, Ferdinand Tonnies published versions of two works by Thomas Hobbes. His editions of The Elements of Law: Natural and Politic and of Behemoth: or The Long Parliament were the first modern critical editions, based on manuscripts of works by Hobbes. Completed in 1640, The Elements of Law was Hobbes's first systematic political work. The book helps us see Hobbes's mind at work, for it is the first version of his later political works.

Reprint of the original, first published in 1875.

This volume demonstrates the enduring relevance of the philosophy of Thomas Hobbes for the political and social problems we face today.

Yves Charles Zarka shows you how Hobbes established the framework for modern political thought. Discover the origin of liberalism in the Hobbesian theory of negative liberty; that Hobbesian interest and contract are essential to contemporary discussions of the comportment of economic actors; and how state sovereignty returns anew in the form of the servility of the state. At the same time, Zarka controversially argues against received readings claiming that Hobbes is a thinker of a state monopoly on legitimate violence.

American national trade bibliography.

Legalism or legal formalism usually depicts judges as resolving cases by allegedly merely applying pre-existing legal rules. They do not seem to legislate, exercise discretion, balance or pursue policies, and they definitely do not look outside of conventional legal texts for guidance in deciding new cases. For them, the law is an autonomous domain of knowledge and technique. What they follow are the maxims of clarity, determinacy, and coherence of law. This perception of law and adjudication is sometimes designated as “an orthodox lawyering”. However, at least in certain cases, it is very difficult to say that legalism is not an inappropriate theory or a method of legal interpretation. Different theories have attested that legal interpretation is much more than just legalism, which appears to be far too naïve. In the framework of modern legal interpretation, the following questions can be raised. Is it possible to integrate legalism in a coherent theory of legal interpretation? Is legalism as a distinctive theory of legal interpretation still a feasible theory of interpretation? How can such a formalist approach withstand a critique from Dworkinian moral interpretivism or accusations of being a myth, masking political preferences from legal realists? These and many other issues about legal interpretation are discussed in this book by prominent legal philosophers and legal theorists.