In its White Paper (published in December 2006 as Cm 6994, ISBN 0101699425) on the future of the UK's nuclear deterrent, the Government reaffirmed its commitment to maintain the submarine-based Trident weapons system. This will require the procurement of a new generation of nuclear-powered Trident submarines to replace the current fleet of Vanguard-class submarines. Following on from the Committee's earlier report on the strategic context and timetable for decision-making on the renewal of the UK's nuclear deterrent (HCP 986, session 2005-06; ISBN 0215029445), this report focuses on issues related to the UK manufacturing and skills base. These include: the level of investment needed to sustain essential infrastructure and core skills in the UK submarine construction industry; the potential consequences of a gap in the submarine building programme for the long-term viability of the domestic manufacturing and skills base; the implications of the rationalisation of the UK shipbuilding industry for the construction, maintenance and affordability of a Vanguard-class successor; and the linkage between the Government's Defence Industrial Strategy and the decision on retention, replacement or abolition of the UK's Trident system. It also examines the Government's investment programme at the Atomic Weapons Establishment and the possible impact of a new civil nuclear build programme for the retention of nuclear skills and expertise in the military sector.

Since 1969, the United Kingdom always has always had one submarine armed with nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles underwater, undetected, in constant communication, ready at a set notice to fire at targets anywhere in the world. This is part of its Trident Programme, which includes the development, procurement, and operation of the current generation of British nuclear weapons, as well as the means to deliver them. Operated by the Royal Navy and based at Clyde Naval Base on Scotland’s west coast, it is the most expensive and most powerful capability of the British military forces. In 2016, the United Kingdom had to decide on whether to go ahead and build the next generation of nuclear submarines that will allow the UK to remain in the nuclear business well into the second half of this century. The book presents the political, cultural, technical, and strategic aspects of Trident to provide a thoughtful overview of the UK’s complex relationship with nuclear weapons. The authors, both scholars and practitioners, bring together diverse perspectives on the issue, discussing the importance of UK nuclear history as well as the political, legal, and diplomatic aspects of UK nuclear weapons—internationally and domestically. Also addressed are the new technical, military, and strategic challenges to the UK nuclear thinking and strategy.

President Obama and the UK Labour and Coalition governments have all backed the renewed momentum for serious progress towards a world free of nuclear weapons, whilst the UK finds itself embarked on a controversial and expensive programme to renew its Trident nuclear weapons system. What does the UK process tell about the prospects for disarmament?

In December 2003 the British government announced that within a few years it would need to take decisions about the future of Britain's strategic nuclear deterrent. Exactly three years later, its plans were revealed in a White Paper. The existing Trident system is to be given a life-extension, which includes building new submarines to carry the missiles, costing £15–20 billion. Britain has a substantial nuclear legacy, having owned nuclear weapons for over half a century. The strategic context for the deterrent has changed completely with the end of the Cold War, but nuclear weapons retain much of their salience. This Adelphi Paper argues that it makes sense to remain a nuclear power in an uncertain and nuclear-armed world. Given that deterrence needs are now less acute, but more complex than in the past, the paper asserts that deterrence also needs to be aligned with non-proliferation policies, which seek to reduce the scale of threats that need to be deterred. Somewhat overlooked in current policy are appropriate measures of defence, which can raise the nuclear threshold and, if required, mitigate the effects of deterrence failure. It concludes that the government's decisions about the future form of the deterrent are very sensible, but cautions that they still need to be integrated into a broader policy that embraces diplomacy, deterrence and defence to counter the risks posed by nuclear proliferation.

This report sets out the work of the Committee during 2007. The report highlights aspects of the Committee's working practices which depart from previous practice or which may otherwise be of interest. In particular it draws attention to the webforum held during its inquiry into Medical Care for the Armed Forces; its taking of evidence outside Westminster, in Birmingham and Edinburgh; and the growing amount of informal activities of the Committee. It also underlines the importance of visits to the Armed Forces on operational deployments. Whilst the MoD was commended for overall timeliness in responding to the Committee's inquiries, in one inquiry: 'UK Defence: commitments and resources'; there was a delay which hindered the progress of the Committee

This report is presented prior to the NATO Summit at Bucharest in April 2008 and examines the status of NATO in dealing with the security environment that exists in Europe today. The situation in Afghanistan offers a key test of the strengths and failings of the NATO Alliance. To bring stability and encourage development and reconstruction in this region requires a long-term military and financial commitment on the part of the Alliance. Failure in Afghanistan may diminish the effectiveness of NATO and undermine allied unity, perhaps pushing the United States to question the purpose of NATO itself. The Bucharest Summit will have to address a number of issues in respect of Afghanistan, including the need to generate sufficient military forces to carry out operations. NATO faces broader questions about its role and relevance in the 21st century, and the Defence Committee believes it needs to launch a far-reaching review of its strategic concept, setting forth a future role and purpose. NATO's willingness to fulfil a global role is critical to the continued support of the United States. NATO has shortfalls across a range of specific military capabilities which are seen as compromising its ability to mount and sustain the expeditionary operations that underpin the Alliance. The creation of the NATO Response Force is seen as representing a significant achievement but it needs to be financed out of NATO Common Funding. The Committee states that NATO's biggest shortfall is a lack of political will, where a large and growing gap exists between the United States and the European members in defence spending. The Committee further states that the relationship between NATO and the EU is plagued by mistrust and characterised by unhealthy competition. Improving communication and cordination between the two is seen as essential. The Committee views NATO as indispensable to the Alliance.

In Distilling the Frenzy, the UK's leading contemporary historian examines the special considerations that apply to writing the history of one's own times, and revisits the grand themes running through the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. He looks at Britain's persistent impulse to punch well above its weight in the world; at the sustenance of the nuclear weapons policy which has accompanied that impulse; and at the intelligence operations which underpin it. For the human perspective on these huge issues, he applies his trademark blend of scholarship and wit to assess the contrasting styles and achievements of post-war prime ministers from Clement Attlee to David Cameron. As one of Britain's foremost constitutional experts (and now a cross-bench peer) Peter Hennessy brings a unique perspective to the question of reform of the House of Lords, that irritation to the body politic once again at the very forefront of political debate. Shot through with a thread of autobiography that gives the book an especial immediacy, Distilling the Frenzy is a major work of contemporary history.

Britain's military forces have rarely been busier. It is therefore crucial to understand the developing trends and underlying assumptions of British Defence Policy, in regard to both foreign policy and international security. This volume, which covers both the Blair and Brown eras in defence policy making, places developments post 11 September in a wider context, assessing the impact of key personalities and events on a range of issues, notably the perennial concern of military overstretch. By critically appraising contemporary developments, and examining the driving policy in specific cases, this volume provides a relevant and up-to-date assessment of this vital policy area. As well as being contemporary in its analysis, the work is also comprehensive in scope, embracing both policy objectives - such as the expeditionary strategy and the desire to be a bridge between the US and EU - and the instruments that underpin such policy.

This comprehensively updated second edition provides an introduction to the political, normative, technological and strategic aspects of nuclear weaponry. It offers an accessible overview of the concept of nuclear weapons, outlines how thinking about these weapons has developed and considers how nuclear threats can continue to be managed in the future. This book will help you to understand what nuclear weapons are, the science behind their creation and operation, why states build them in the first place, and whether it will be possible for the world to banish these weapons entirely. Essential reading for all students of International Relations, Security Studies and Military History.

The Ministry of Defence needs the capability to transport personnel, equipment and stores from the UK to operational theatres across the globe. This capability, known as Strategic Lift, can by delivered by sea, land or air, and its annual cost to the MoD is almost £800 million a year. The Committee's report examines the progress of the MoD in delivering the Strategic Lift requirements set out in the Strategic Defence Review and whether these requirements need to be revisited given the experience of the operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Findings include that good progress has been made in improving strategic sea-lift, particularly in relation to Ro-Ro ships and the acquisition of Landing Platform Dock (Auxiliary) vessels. However, strategic air-lift is a particular concern given the age of many of the aircraft, and the report looks at the progress of two major equipment programmes designed to deliver new transport aircraft (the A400M transport aircraft) and new tanker aircraft (the Future Strategic Tanker Aircraft).