This book presents the reader with a detailed analysis of the U.S. policy toward Cuba that was designed and adopted by the Lyndon B. Johnson administration. Based in governmental and other sources from both the U.S. and Cuba, the book analyzes the changes in the U.S. policy and its political and practical effects. Cuba still had to face a combination of "dirty war" and "passive containment," but during the course of the 1960s, the influence of the "dirty war" policy was weakened due to the failure of the tactics to overthrow the Cuban Revolution by violent means. Instead, the policy was directed towards "passive containment," characterized by its focus on an intensification of the economic blockade, the promotion of diplomatic isolation, and propaganda campaigns and psychological warfare. The book is unique since it is written from a Cuban perspective and it complements and enriches the knowledge of the U.S.-Cuban relationship during the 1960s, and the policy adopted by the Johnson administration.

The Foreign Policies of Lyndon Johnson.

From 1869 to 1877, the United States found itself deeply involved in the Caribbean as Washington sought to replace European influence and colonialism with an informal American empire. The Ulysses S. Grant administration primarily dealt with an uprising in Spanish Cuba known as the Ten Years’ War that threatened to draw in the United States. The Cuban rebels used the United States as a base of support, causing conflict between Washington and Madrid. Many Americans, including Grant, wanted to replace Spanish rule in Cuba with a U.S. protectorate, but Secretary of State Hamilton Fish opposed American colonial entanglements. President Grant looked to expand U.S. interests in the Caribbean. He looked to acquire colonies to provide naval bases to protect the trade routes to a potential American built and controlled canal in Central America. Fish preferred to expand U.S. commercial interests in the region rather than acquiring colonies. At no time was he prepared to obligate the United States to any long-term commitments. He wanted to end the war in Cuba because it hurt U.S. economic interests. He had no desire to acquire territory, but expected the Caribbean to fall into the U.S. economic sphere. Despite his personal opposition to territorial acquisition in Fish went along with Grant’s Dominican annexation project because he foresaw it as a chance to end European imperialism and to gain the president’s confidence. The Senate’s failure to approve the Dominican annexation only hardened his opposition to the creation of an American empire. He rejected Haitian offers of a naval base within that country, and he continually sought an end to the Cuban rebellion, lest it drag in the United States. Though the administration’s many peace initiatives failed, it forestalled Congressional intervention and kept the United States neutral in the conflict.

The Caribbean Basin: An International History provides a study of the entire Caribbean region, including Central America and the Caribbean coast of northern South America. It also offers analysis of: * the role of international intervention * the complex interaction among major world powers in the area * conflicts over colonial possessions and trade routes * Soviet-American confrontation in the Cold War years. Integrating the recent political, social and economic history of the Caribbean with its miltary and diplomatic past, this book charts the region's emergence from colonialism during the course of the twentieth century.

The Congressional Record is the official record of the proceedings and debates of the United States Congress. It is published daily when Congress is in session. The Congressional Record began publication in 1873. Debates for sessions prior to 1873 are recorded in The Debates and Proceedings in the Congress of the United States (1789-1824), the Register of Debates in Congress (1824-1837), and the Congressional Globe (1833-1873)

The twentieth-century history of Cuba borders on fantasy. This diminutive country boldly and repeatedly exercises the foreign policy of a major power. Although closely tied to the United States through most of its modern history, Cuba successfully defied the U.S. government after 1959, consolidated its own power, and defeated an invasion of U.S.-backed exiles at the Bay of Pigs in 1961. Fidel Castro then brought the world alarmingly close to nuclear war in 1962. Jorge Domínguez presents a comprehensive survey of Cuban international relations since Castro came to power. Domínguez unravels Cuba's response to the 1962 missile crisis and the U.S.-Soviet understandings that emerged from that. He explores the ties that link Cuba to the U.S.S.R. and other Communist countries; analyzes Cuban support for revolutionary movements throughout the world, especially in Latin America and Africa; and assesses the significance of Cuban political and economic relations with Western Europe, Canada, and Japan. Some have charged that Cuba does not have a foreign policy, that Fidel Castro merely takes orders from his Soviet bosses. Domínguez argues that there is indeed a specifically Cuban foreign policy, poised not only between hegemony and autonomy, between compliance and self-assertion, but also between militancy and pragmatism. He believes that within the context of Soviet hegemony Cuba's foreign policy is very much its own, and he marshals impressive evidence to support this belief. His book is based on extensive documentation from Cuba, the United States, and other countries, as well as from many in-depth interviews carried out during trips to Cuba.

A major three-volume bibliography, including an additional supplement, of an annotated listing of American Studies monographs published between 1900 and 1988.

History is being made in U.S.-Cuban relations right now. This powerful book is essential to making sense of the new and ongoing steps towards normalization between the longtime antagonists. Challenging the conventional wisdom of perpetual hostility between the United States and Cuba--beyond invasions, covert operations, assassination plots using poison pens and exploding seashells, and a grinding economic embargo--Back Channel to Cuba chronicles a surprising, untold history of bilateral efforts toward rapprochement and reconciliation. Since 1959, conflict and aggression have dominated the story of the United States and Cuba. Now, William M. LeoGrande and Peter Kornbluh present a remarkably new and relevant account. From John F. Kennedy's offering of an olive branch to Fidel Castro after the missile crisis, to Henry Kissinger's top secret quest for normalization, to Barack Obama's promise of a new approach, LeoGrande and Kornbluh reveal a fifty-year record of dialogue and negotiations, both open and furtive, indicating a path toward a world beyond the legacy of hostility. LeoGrande and Kornbluh have uncovered hundreds of formerly secret U.S. documents and conducted interviews with dozens of negotiators, intermediaries, and policy makers, including Fidel Castro and Jimmy Carter. The authors describe how, despite the intense political clamor surrounding efforts to improve relations with Havana, serious negotiations have been conducted by every presidential administration since Eisenhower's through secret, back-channel diplomacy. Including ten critical lessons for U.S. negotiators, the book offers a key perspective on the normalization process underway and illuminates a fascinating passage in U.S.-Cuban relations as it happens.

This controversial book maintains that in Colombia the US has long supported a pervasive campaign of state violence directed against both armed insurgents and a wide range of unarmed progressive social forces. While the context may change from one decade to the next, the basic policies remain the same: maintain the pro-US Colombian state, protect US economic interests and preserve strategic access to oil. Colombia is now the third largest recipient of US military aid in the world, and the largest by far in Latin America. Using extensive declassified documents, this book shows that the so-called "war on drugs", and now the new war on terror in Colombia are actually part of a long-term Colombian "war of state terror" that predates the end of the Cold War with US policy contributing directly to the human rights situation in Colombia today.

This book investigates the phenomenon of the political coexistence of the United States with Cuba that developed between the beginning of the John F. Kennedy administration and the Cold War détente of the mid-1970s. It is revealed that due to the US global commitments, related to the Cold War and the risk of confrontation with the Soviet Union, the political approach of Washington to the Fidel Castro’s Cuba constituted a perpetuated condition of suspense between war and peace. Despite the failure of both the US hostile policies and diplomatic dialogue with Castro, the mutual tension remained under control of recurrent crisis management course. Ultimately, the US attempts to discipline and moderate Cuban policies led to an actual political coexistence between the two countries, establishing a long-term dynamics of the US attitude toward Cuba for the following decades. By combining a historical approach with political and international analysis through broad reference to primary sources, the study offers an insightful investigation of the global processes affecting the U.S. – Cuban dynamics of political coexistence. This volume will be of great value to those studying American history, 20th century history, international relations and political science across North America, Europe and other parts of the world.