Agency theory is ubiquitous in company law. This book explores (a) the limits of such deployment, and (b) the logic of how to deploy it. The book makes five linked arguments in respect of the limits of agency theory in company law. First, it argues that agency theory has become so broad that it can be used to analyse most human relationships. Such breadth, though, comes at the expense of legal clarity: as agency relationships cover such a broad range of relationships, there are no normative legal conclusions that can be drawn merely from identifying such a relationship. Second, it argues that we need to differentiate more specific concepts with clearer legal implications, such as externalities, and the particular manifestation of moral hazard that appears in insurance dynamics. Third, it argues that considerable amounts of existing company law theory - which is ostensibly built from agency theory - is in fact based on a series of hidden value judgments at each stage of the analysis. Fourth, it argues that company law theory should use agency theory less to rebalance the discipline: agency theory has become hegemonic, which is dangerous for the discipline, obscures company law’s role in establishing incentives, undermines accountability, and reduces company law’s autonomy. The book then moves to the logic of agency theory and makes three arguments. First, it argues that we need to factor in the company, only apply agency theory to voluntary interactions, and foreground our value judgments when identifying agency relations to do it properly. Second, it argues that it is rational to incur agency costs when we perceive the benefits of doing so to outweigh the costs, meaning that agency costs can be facilitative and we should look to front-end them rather than universally minimise them. Third, it argues that this needs to be undertaken through mandatory laws. Exploring the external limits and internal logic of agency cost analysis, this book will be of interest to academics, students, and researchers of corporate and company law.

"Agency theory is ubiquitous in company law. This book explores (a) the limits of such deployment, and (b) the logic of how to deploy it. The book makes five linked arguments in respect of the limits of agency theory in company law. First, it argues that agency theory has become so broad that it can be used to analyse most human relationships. Such breadth, though, comes at the expense of legal clarity: as agency relationships cover such a broad range of relationships, there are no normative legal conclusions that can be drawn merely from identifying such a relationship. Second, it argues that we need to differentiate more specific concepts with clearer legal implications, such as externalities, and the particular manifestation of moral hazard that appears in insurance dynamics. Third, it argues that considerable amounts of existing company law theory which is ostensibly built from agency theory, is in fact based on a series of hidden value judgments at each stage of the analysis. Fourth, it argues that company law theory should use agency theory less to rebalance the discipline: agency theory has become hegemonic which is dangerous for the discipline, obscures company law's role in establishing incentives, undermines accountability, and reduces company law's autonomy. The book then moves to the logic of agency theory and makes three arguments. First, it argues that we need to factor in the company, only apply agency theory to voluntary interactions, and foreground our value judgments when identifying agency relations to do it properly. Second, it argues that it is rational to incur agency costs where we perceive the benefit of doing so outweighs such costs, meaning that agency costs are facilitative and we should look to front-end them rather than universally minimise them. Third, it argues that this needs to be undertaken through mandatory laws. Exploring the external limits and internal logic of agency cost analysis, this book will be of interest to academics, students and researchers of corporate and company law"--

'Company Law in Context' is an ideal main text for company law courses. David Kershaw places company law in its economic, business, and social context, making more accessible and relevant the cases, statutes, and other forms of regulation. A running case study provides a practical perspective.

This new book examines the relationship between agency theory and executive pay. It argues that while Jensen and Meckling (1976) were right in their analysis of the agency problem in public corporations they were wrong about the proposed solutions. Drawing on ideas from economics, psychology, sociology and the philosophy of science, the author explains how standard agency theory has contributed to the problem of executive pay rather than solved it. The book explores why companies should be regarded as real entities not legal fictions, how executive pay in public corporations can be conceptualised as a collective action problem and how behavioral science can help in the design of optimal incentive arrangements. An insightful and revolutionary read for those researching corporate governance, HRM and organisation theory, this useful book offers potential solutions to some of the problems with executive pay and the standard model of agency.

Who enjoys statutory preferred creditor status? What justifications exist for jurisdictions to maintain statutes that favour 'priority' creditors over other creditors and contributories? This book examines preferential debts derived from specific legislative provisions applying to corporate insolvency. In exploring the concept of preferential treatment, Statutory Priorities in Corporate Insolvency Law includes chapters that provide a doctrinal, theoretical and historical analysis of who enjoys preferred creditor status. As well as examining the traditional major categories of priorities, this work also identifies potential new categories for priority status such as environmental clean-up costs, international creditors, tort claimants and consumers among other non-consensual creditors. While the study focuses on Australian corporate insolvency law, where appropriate, comparisons are made with other common law jurisdictions, particularly the UK, Canada, New Zealand and the US.

This book advances an innovative, multi-jurisdictional argument for the necessity of company law reform to reorient companies towards environmental sustainability.

This book examines the limited liability business forms that have recently emerged, and seeks to identify the forces that have led to the emergence of new business forms for small and medium-sized businesses. Focusing on the US, UK, and continental Europe, the contributors analyse the Limited Liability Company, the Limited Liability Partnership, and the new business forms proposed in Europe.

Agency Theory is a new branch of economics which focusses on the roles of information and of incentives when individuals cooperate with respect to the utilisation of resources. Basic approaches are coming from microeco nomic theory as well as from risk analysis. Among the broad variety of ap plications are: the many designs of contractual arrangements, organiza tions, and institutions as well as the manifold aspects of the separation of ownership and control so fundamental for business finance. After some twenty years of intensive research in the field of information economics it might be timely to present the most basic issues, questions, models, and applications. This volume Agency Theory, Information, and Incentives offers introductory surveys as well as results of individual rese arch that seem to shape that field of information economics appropriately. Some 30 authors were invited to present their subjects in such a way that students could easily become acquainted with the main ideas of informa tion economics. So the aim of Agency Theory, Information, and Incentives is to introduce students at an intermediate level and to accompany their work in classes on microeconomics, information economics, organization, management theory, and business finance. The topics selected form the eight sections of the book: 1. Agency Theory and Risk Sharing 2. Information and Incentives 3. Capital Markets and Moral Hazard 4. Financial Contracting and Dividends 5. External Accounting and Auditing 6. Coordination in Groups 7. Property Rights and Fairness 8. Agency Costs.

Strategy is a much-discussed, much-misunderstood topic among managers. In this new edition of The Strategic Manager, Harry Sminia continues to focus on how strategy works in practice, questioning readers’ existing expectations that strategy is a matter of strategic planning in order to help them to move into practicing strategy as an everyday activity. The book is based around six different strategy theories, individually presented and supplemented with useful lists of questions that encourage readers to become competent strategic thinkers. Bridging theory and practice, a range of real life case studies open a window into the real world of strategic management. Essential reading for postgraduate students and those in executive education, this text will also be a useful tool for managers trying to develop a better understanding of this easily confused subject.

The urgent and sustained interest in corporate governance is unprecedented, with the connections between corporate governance and economic performance being emphasized by the World Bank, the IMF and others in the global economic community. In this timely and definitive intellectual analysis of a key discipline, The SAGE Handbook of Corporate Governance offers a critical overview of the key themes, theoretical controversies, current research and emerging concepts that frame the field. Consisting of original substantive chapters by leading international scholars, and examining corporate governance from an inter-disciplinary basis, the text highlights how governance issues are critical to the formation, growth, financing, structural development, and strategic direction of companies and how corporate governance institutions in turn influence the innovation and development of industrial and economic systems globally. Comprehensive, authoritative and presented in a highly-accessible framework, this Handbook is a significant resource to those with an interest in understanding this important emerging field.