Gerry Nagtzaam contends that in recent decades neoliberal institutionalist scholarship on global environmental regimes has burgeoned, as has constructivist scholarship on the key role played by norms in international politics. In this innovative volume, the author sets these interest- and norm-based approaches against each other in order to test their ability to illustrate why and how different environmental norms take hold in some regimes and not others. The book explores why some global environmental treaties seek to preserve and protect some parts of nature from human utilization, some seek to conserve certain parts of nature for human development, whilst others allow the reckless exploitation of nature without accounting for the consequences. It tracks the fate of these three underlying environmental norms preservation, conservation and exploitation using case studies on whaling, mining in Antarctica and tropical timber. The book illustrates how international political battles to shape environmental regimes inevitably result in clashes between these competing environmental norms. This unique study will prove a fascinating read for both academics and practitioners in the fields of international environmental politics and international environmental law.

Despite the growing recognition of the importance of environmental issues for nation-state security, current research on international environmental security is insufficient. Although scholars in the field of International Relations believe that there is an appropriate role for international relations theory in analyzing global environmental concerns, the existing literature is predominantly descriptive or prescriptive rather than analytical. This study attempts to remedy this problem by conducting an empirical analysis of nation-state behavior in the international environmental realm.

International environmental agreements provide a basis for countries to address ecological problems on a global scale. However, countries are heterogeneous with respect to their economic structures and to the problems relating to the environment that they encounter. Therefore, economic externalities and global environmental conflicts are common and can cause problems in implementation and compliance with international agreements. Economics of International Environmental Agreements illuminates those issues and factors that might cause some countries or firms to take different positions on common problems. This book explores why international environmental agreements deal with some problems successfully but fail with others. The chapters address issues that are global in nature, such as: transboundary pollution, provision of global public goods, individual preferences of inequality- aversion, global cooperation, self-enforcing international environmental agreements, emission standards, abatement costs, environmental quota, technology agreement and adoption and international institutions. They examine the necessary conditions for the improved performance of international environmental agreements, how cooperation among countries can be improved and the incentives that can be created for voluntary compliance with international environmental agreements. This text is of great importance to academics, students and policy makers who are interested in environmental economics, policy and politics, as well as environmental law.

The environment suffers enormously during armed conflicts and, despite the increasing awareness of the pressing need to protect the planet, devastating environmental damage can occur legally at times of war. This book suggests that – apart from the protection offered under law of armed conflict – environmental treaties or multilateral agreements (MEAs) can complement and strengthen environmental protection when war occurs. Previous research has focused on the protection offered under the law of armed conflict (in particular international humanitarian law) and customary international environmental law concerning wartime environmental damage, or whether environmental treaties remain applicable at times of armed conflict. This book, however, is the first in-depth scholarly examination of how environmental treaties can apply in wartime and how they can contribute to the protection of the environment in relation to armed conflict. It also offers an updated study of environmental protection under the law of armed conflict, including the latest developments in the International Law Commission's work on this underexplored topic.

International environmental agreements provide a practical basis for countries to address environmental issues on a global scale. This book explores the workings and outcomes of these agreements, and analyses key questions of why some problems are dealt with successfully and others ignored. By examining fundamental policies and issues in environmental protection this text gives an easily comprehensible introduction to international environmental agreements, and discusses problems in three areas: air, water and on land. It traces the history of agreements in broad thematic areas related to long-distance air pollution, ozone-depleting and greenhouse gases, ocean management, biological diversity, agricultural plant diversity and forest stewardship. Drawing on experts in their respective fields, this book provides an insightful evaluation of the successes and failures, and analysis of the reasons for this. Concluding with an insightful examination of research to show how performance of agreements can be improved in the future, this volume is a vital contribution to our understanding of the politics associated with establishing international environmental consensus. International Environmental Agreements will be of interest to scholars, students and researchers in global environmental politics, international relations and political science. Steinar Andresen is Senior Research Fellow at the Fridtjof Nansen Institute, Norway, and formerly professor at the Dept. of Political Science, University of Oslo. Elin Lerum Boasson is Research Fellow at the Fridtjof Nansen Institute, Norway. Geir Hønneland is Research Director at the Fridtjof Nansen Institute and adjunct professor at the University of Tromsø.

This title was first published in 2000: In examining the domestic politics of international co-operation, this book addresses two important questions: 1. Why do governments often take different positions in negotiations about common problems - why do some states push for international regulation while others hold back? 2. How can variance in the domestic implementation of and compliance with, international agreements be explained - why do some states deliver more than they have promised, others less? The authors report findings and observations from a major study which focused on efforts to establish international regulations to cope with the problem known as acid rain. They provide in-depth case studies of nine European countries as well as a comparative analysis searching for patterns and general conclusions.

Prompted by recent events in the EU’s international environmental cooperation, this thought-provoking book explores the establishment and use of multilateral environmental compliance mechanisms as part of the EU’s external environmental action. Expanding upon current discussions in external relations law, this timely book uses a doctrinal approach to analyse EU engagement with this key instrument of treaty-based international environmental governance.

First published in 1990, this is a reissue of Professor Hilary Putnam’s dissertation thesis, written in 1951, which concerns itself with The Meaning of the Concept of Probability in Application to Finite Sequencesand the problems of the deductive justification for induction. Written under the direction of Putnam’s mentor, Hans Reichenbach, the book considers Reichenbach’s idealization of very long finite sequences as infinite sequences and the bearing this has upon Reichenbach’s pragmatic vindication of induction.

This title was first published in 2000: Conflicts between developed and developing countries over global environmental problems, and the fact that the co-operation required to solve environmental collective action problems is typically elusive in the world of international relations, suggests a research agenda regarding how one might hop to bring about co-operation in an inherently non-co-operative international setting. In particular, what can economic theory tell us about the design of international environmental agreements (IEAs) that will protect the world's fragile environmental resources? This book collects work on IEAs which demonstrates the value of rigorous microeconomic and econometric modelling in comprehending the many and varied facets of the design and implementation in IEAs.