In this book Bosko Tripkovic develops a theory of value-based arguments in constitutional adjudication. In contrast to the standard question of constitutional theory that asks whether the courts get moral answers wrong, it asks a more fundamental question of whether the courts get the morality itself wrong. Tripkovic argues for an antirealist conception of value -one that does not presuppose the existence of mind-independent moral truths- and accounts for the effect this ought to have on existing value-based arguments made by constitutional courts. The book identifies three dominant types of value-based arguments in comparative constitutional practice: arguments from constitutional identity, common sentiment, and universal reason, and explains why they fail as self-standing approaches to moral judgment. It then suggests that the appropriate moral judgments emerge from the dynamics between practical confidence, which denotes the inescapability of the self and the evaluative attitudes it entails, and reflection, which denotes the process of challenging and questioning these attitudes. The book applies the notions of confidence and reflection to constitutional reasoning and maintains that the moral inquiry of the constitutional court ought to depart from the emotive intuitions of the constitutional community and then challenge these intuitions through reflective exposure to different perspectives in order to better understand and develop the underlying constitutional identity. The book casts new light on common constitutional dilemmas and allows us to envisage new ways of resolving them.

The idea of constitutional identity has been central to the negotiation of authority between EU and national constitutional orders. Many national constitutional courts have declared that the reach of EU law is limited by certain core elements of the national constitution, often labelled 'constitutional identity'. With the rise of illiberal democracies within the EU, the idea of constitutional identity has increasingly come under criticism, being seen as easily embedded in authoritarian, nativist rhetoric and vulnerable to being abused. In The Abuse of Constitutional Identity in the European Union, Julian Scholtes provides novel insights into how European authoritarians have utilised the concept of constitutional identity to further their illiberal goals. Employing a comparative theoretical perspective, his book identifies the factors behind legitimate constitutional identity claims and critically analyses the ways in which these claims can be abused. Scholtes examines abuses of constitutional identity in three distinct theoretical dimensions: generative, substantive, and relational. The generative dimension looks at how constitutional identity claims come about, while the substantive dimension examines a claim's broader relation to a normative theory of constitutionalism. The relational dimension, on the other hand, considers how constitutional identity claims are advanced and whether they are employed as a means of constitutional dialogue or constitutional disengagement.

This book analyses unamendability in democratic constitutionalism and engages critically and systematically with its perils, offering a much-needed corrective to existing understandings of this phenomenon. Whether formalized in the constitutional text or developed as part of judicial doctrines of implicit unamendability, eternity clauses raise fundamental questions about the core democratic commitments underpinning any given constitution. The book takes seriously the democratic challenge eternity clauses pose and argues that this goes beyond the old tension between constitutionalism and democracy. Instead, eternity clauses reveal themselves to be a far more ambivalent constitutional mechanism, one with greater and more insidious potential for abuse than has been recognized. The 'dark side' of unamendability includes its propensity to insulate majoritarian, exclusionary, and internally incoherent values, as well as its sometimes purely pragmatic role in elite bargaining. The book adopts a contextual approach and brings to the fore a variety of case studies from non-traditional jurisdictions. These insights from the periphery illuminate the prospects of unamendability fulfilling its intended aims - protecting constitutional democracy foremost among them. With its promise most appealing in transitional, post-conflict, and fragile democracies, unamendability reveals itself, counterintuitively, to be both less potent and potentially more dangerous in precisely these contexts. The book also places the rise of eternity clauses in the context of other significant trends in recent constitutional practice: the transnational embeddedness of constitution-making and of constitutional adjudication; the rise of popular participation in constitutional reform processes; and the ongoing crisis of democratic backsliding in liberal democracies.

Analysis of case law from the US, Germany, South Africa, Canada, Israel, and the ECtHR forms the basis of Tripkovic's exploration of constitutional adjudication from an antirealist standpoint. This highly original work identifies the salient value-based arguments in constitutional practice and exposes the implicit assumptions that lie therein.

This Major Reference series brings together a wide range of key international articles in law and legal theory. Many of these essays are not readily accessible, and their presentation in these volumes will provide a vital new resource for both research and teaching. Each volume is edited by leading international authorities who explain the significance and context of articles in an informative and complete introduction.