This paper examines credibility and reputational factors in explaining the December 1994 crisis of the Mexican peso. After reviewing events leading to the crisis, a model emphasizing the inflation-competitiveness trade-off is presented to explain the formation of devaluation expectations. Estimation results indicate that investors appear to have seriously underestimated the risk of devaluation, despite early warning signals. The collapse of confidence that followed the December 20 devaluation may have been the result of a shift in the perceived commitment of the authorities to exchange rate stability.

The Mexican crisis of 1994 raised, throughout the world, a number of questions about the sustainability -- and even the merits -- of the market oriented reform process in Latin America and other regions. Understanding the way events unfolded in Mexico during the early 1990s continues to be fundamentally important to assess the mechanics of currency crises. More importantly, perhaps, the eruption of the East Asian currency crises in the summer and fall of 1997 has raised the question of whether the lessons from Mexico have indeed been learned by policy makers, private sector analysts and international civil servants. More specifically, as a result of the recent events in South East Asia, many observers have argued that the international financial organizations -- the IMF and the World Bank -- and the governments of the advanced countries have failed to revamp the early warning system that was supposed to prevent a repetition of a Mexico-style crisis. This paper analyzes the causes behind the Mexican crisis, emphasizing the role of capital inflows, inflationary inertia and real exchange rate overvaluation. I also ask a number of questions regarding the predictability of the crisis: Should Wall Street analysts have known that things were getting out of hand? And if they did, why didn't they alert their clients? And, how much did officials at the US Treasury know about the depth of the Mexican problems? And, what was the role of the media? I conclude that although the US Treasury was fully aware of what was going on, most private sector analysts were unaware of the seriousness of the situation.

We argue that allowing for the possibility of a self-fulfilling panic helps in understanding several features of the recent Mexican crisis. Self-fulfilling expectations became decisive in generating a panic only after the government ran down gross reserves and ran up short-term dollar debt. We present a simple model to explain how and why multiple equilibria can occur for some levels of reserves or debt, but not for others. Lastly, we argue that the imperfect credibility of Mexican exchange rate policy made it advisable to follow more contractionary fiscal and monetary policies in 1994. Our model formalizes the reasons why this is so.

There is no universally accepted definition of a currency crisis, but most would agree that they all involve one key element: investors fleeing a currency en masse out of fear that it might be devalued, in turn fueling the very devaluation they anticipated. Although such crises—the Latin American debt crisis of the 1980s, the speculations on European currencies in the early 1990s, and the ensuing Mexican, South American, and Asian crises—have played a central role in world affairs and continue to occur at an alarming rate, many questions about their causes and effects remain to be answered. In this wide-ranging volume, some of the best minds in economics focus on the historical and theoretical aspects of currency crises to investigate three fundamental issues: What drives currency crises? How should government behavior be modeled? And what are the actual consequences to the real economy? Reflecting the latest thinking on the subject, this offering from the NBER will serve as a useful basis for further debate on the theory and practice of speculative attacks, as well as a valuable resource as new crises loom.

The currency crises that engulfed East Asian economies in 1997 and Mexico in 1994 - and their high development costs - raise a serious concern about the net benefits for developing countries of large flows of potentially reversible short-term international capital. Written by senior policy-makers and academics, the contributions to this volume examine in depth the macroeconomic and other policy dilemmas confronting public authorities in the emerging economies as they deal with short-term capital movements, especially in the period before the outbreak of these crises. The studies are based on comparative case studies of key emerging economies. Valuable insights are also derived from contrasts between the East Asian, Latin American, African, and European experiences, between the financial and real effects of financial flows, and between private and public responsibilities in managing financial markets. The great value of the chapters in this volume is that they analytically identify the weaknesses in both domestic and international capital market regimes. The recommendations derived from this analysis apply to the development of financial markets in developing countries, the monitoring and regulation of mutual funds in source countries, and the future development of international capital markets. They will make an important contribution both to the discussion of national policies and of a new international financial architechture.