An important examination of the legislative veto and the ongoing battle between the executive and the legislature to control policy

“I have an Article II,” Donald Trump has announced, citing the US Constitution, “where I have the right to do whatever I want as president.” Though this statement would have come as a shock to the framers of the Constitution, it fairly sums up the essence of “the unitary executive theory.” This theory, which emerged during the Reagan administration and gathered strength with every subsequent presidency, counters the system of checks and balances that constrains a president’s executive impulses. It also, the authors of this book contend, counters the letter and spirit of the Constitution. In their account of the rise of unitary executive theory over the last several decades, the authors refute the notion that this overweening view of executive power has been a common feature of the presidency from the beginning of the Republic. Rather, they show, it was invented under the Reagan Administration, got a boost during the George W. Bush administration, and has found its logical extension in the Trump administration. This critique of the unitary executive theory reveals it as a misguided model for understanding presidential powers. While its adherents argue that greater presidential power makes government more efficient, the results have shown otherwise. Dismantling the myth that presidents enjoy unchecked plenary powers, the authors advocate for principles of separation of powers—of checks and balances—that honor the Constitution and support the republican government its framers envisioned. A much-needed primer on presidential power, from the nation’s founding through Donald Trump’s impeachment, The Unitary Executive Theory: A Danger to Constitutional Government makes a robust and persuasive case for a return to our constitutional limits.

First Published in 1991. This is a collection of essays which address themselves to the American concern for constitutional government and its attendant political liberty. Against a backdrop of the current international movement towards establishing new governing orders, this work explains the principles of the American founding and the politics which established them and now flow from them.

This book on case study of the Federal Trade Commission appropriations crisis of 1980 is intended to provide historical understanding of the network relationships between the public and private sectors in the United States during our modern period.

The idea that a radical transformation of the Presidency took place during the FDR administration has become one of the most widely accepted tenets of contemporary scholarship. According to this view, the Constitutional Presidency was a product of the Founders' fear of arbitrary power. Only with the development of a popular extra-Constitutional Presidency did the powerful "modern Presidency" emerge. David K. Nichols argues to the contrary that the "modern Presidency" was not created by FDR. What happened during FDR's administration was a transformation in the size and scope of the national government, rather than a transformation of the Presidency in its relations to the Constitution or the other branches of government. Nichols demonstrates that the essential elements of the modern Presidency have been found throughout our history, although often less obvious in an era where the functions of the national government as a whole were restricted. Claiming that we have failed to fully appreciate the character of the Constitutional Presidency, Nichols shows that the potential for the modern Presidency was created in the Constitution itself. He analyzes three essential aspects of the modern Presidency--the President's role in the budgetary process, the President's role as chief executive, and the War Powers Act--that are logical outgrowths of the decisions made at the Constitutional Convention. Nichols concludes that it is the authors of the American Constitution, not the English or European philosophers, who provide the most satisfactory reconciliation of executive power and limited popular government. It is the authors of the Constitution who created the modern Presidency.

The Law of U.S. Foreign Relations is a comprehensive and incisive discussion of the rules that govern the conduct of U.S. relations with foreign countries and international organizations, and the rules governing how international law applies within the U.S. legal system. Among other topics, this volume examines the constitutional and historical foundations of congressional, executive, and judicial authority in foreign affairs. This includes the constitutional tensions prevalent in legislative efforts to control executive diplomacy, as well as the ebb and flow of judicial engagement in transnational disputes - with the judiciary often serving as umpire but at times invoking doctrines of abstention. The process of U.S. adherence to treaties and other international agreements is closely scrutinized as the authors examine how such law, as well as customary international law and the law-making acts of international organizations, can become a source of U.S. law. Individual chapters focus on the special challenges posed by the exercise of war powers by the federal government (including during recent incidents of international armed conflict), the complex role of the several states in foreign affairs, and the imperative to protect individual rights in the transnational sphere. Among the contemporary issues discussed are the immunity of foreign heads of State, treatment of detainees at Guantánamo, movement of the U.S. Embassy in Israel to Jerusalem, state-level foreign compacts to address climate change, bans affecting refugees and asylum-seekers, and recent interpretations of key statutes, such as the Alien Tort Statute, the Torture Victim Protection Act, and the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.

Public administration as an American profession originated in the early twentieth century with urban reformers advocating the application of scientific and business practices to rehabilitate corrupt city governments. That approach transformed governance in the United States but also guaranteed recurrent debate over the proper role of public administrators, who must balance the often contradictory demands of efficiency and politically defined notions of the public good. Currently the business approach holds sway. Legitimated by Al Gore's National Performance Review, the New Public Management movement promotes entrepreneurs over civil servants, performance over process, decentralization over centralization, and flexibility over rules. John Rohr demurs, arguing that the movement goes too far in downplaying the distinctively American challenges arising from the separated powers principle. Consequently, the NPM alienates public management from its natural home—a nation-state established within a constitutional order. According to Rohr, "nothing is more fundamental to governance than a constitution; and therefore to stress the constitutional character of administration is to establish the proper role of administration as governance that includes management but transcends it as well." This is not a novel argument for Rohr, who was recognized in 1999 by the Louis Brownlow Committee of the National Academy of Public Administration for his lifetime contributions on the "constitutional underpinnings" of public administration. But this new version of his rule-of-law critique directly addresses the NPM's excesses, framed convincingly as a comparative study of cases found in four countries spanning three centuries. As a result, Rohr establishes that the constitutional-administrative nexus is intimate, stable, pervasive, and enduring. The first half of the book examines the linkages between constitutions and administrations in France, the United Kingdom, and Canada, all of them sufficiently similar to the United States to make comparisons meaningful and sufficiently different to provide illuminating perspectives on domestic practices. The examples extend from the French Revolution through the founding of the Canadian Confederation in the 1860s to such contemporary issues as the influence of administrative directives from Brussels on the British courts. The second half of the book examines American cases in three categories: separation of powers, individual rights, and federalism. In each case Rohr highlights instances of public management "with all its warts and wrinkles tending to the mundane details of translating great constitutional principles into everyday actions." American administrative law, Rohr concludes, has structured safeguards to protect the integrity of administrative decision-making while also holding it accountable. Constitutional law has helped establish civil servants' freedom of speech and applied the fundamental principles of federalism to the administrative process. He summarizes his findings from the case studies by saying that the constitutional role of American civil servants comes not only from specific American experiences but also from the very nature of civil service.

Written by a leading scholar of the constitutional amending process, this two-volume encyclopedia, now in its fifth edition, is an indispensable resource for students, legal historians, and high school and college librarians. This authoritative reference resource provides a history and analysis of all 27 ratified amendments to the Constitution, as well as insights and information on thousands of other amendments that have been proposed but never ratified from America's birth until the present day. The set also includes a rich bibliography of informative books, articles, and other media related to constitutional amendments and the amending process.