Not long ago, secrecy was the byword in central banking circles, but now the unmistakable trend is towards greater openness and transparency. This, the third Geneva Report on the World Economy, describes and evaluates some of the changes in how central banks talk to the markets, to the press, and to the public. The report first assesses the case for transparency ? defined as providing sufficient information for the public to understand the policy regime ? and concludes that it is very strong, based on both policy effectiveness and democratic accountability. It then examines what should be the content of communication and argues that central banks ought to spell out their long-run objectives and methods. It then investigates the link between the decision-making process and central bank communication, drawing a distinction between individualistic and collegial committees. The report concludes with a review of the communications strategies of some of the main central banks.

Jan Qvigstad draws on his extensive experience in these six lectures on how central banks can make good policy decisions.

'Transparency' has become both a catch-word in public debate and also an important research topic. Comprised of authoritative yet accessible contributions, this handbook surveys existing economic research on transparency and provides an up-to-date account of its meaning and significance in economic policy, market integration and regulation, and corporate governance and disclosure.

Both studies of political power and Europeanization studies have tended to neglect central banks. As the age of the euro reaches its 10th anniversary, it is timely to reflect on what it means for central banks, which have been at the forefront of the establishment of Economic and Monetary Union in the European Union. Central banks have been caught up in a major historic political project. What does it mean for them? What does the age of the euro tell us about the power of central banks, their Europeanization and whether they are coming to resemble each other more closely? This book brings together a range of recognized academic specialists to examine the main political aspects of this question. How, and in what ways, has the euro Europeanized central banks (members and non-members of the Euro Area)? What have been its effects on the power of central banks and their use of power? Has the euro generated convergence or divergence in central banking? The book offers the first, in-depth and systematic political analysis of central banks in the first decade of the euro. It places the euro in its global and European contexts, including the US Fed and the Australasian central banks, patterns of differentiated integration in European central banking, and the European Central Bank. It offers a set of case studies of its effects on a representative sample of EU central banks (euro 'insiders' and 'outsiders') and looks at four main thematic areas (monetary policy, financial market supervision, accountability and transparency, and research). The book contributes to Europeanization studies, comparative political economy, and studies of Economic and Monetary Union. It will be of major interest to students of the European Union and European integration, comparative European politics, and area and 'country' studies. More generally, it will interest all those interested in central banking and their pivotal and problematic position between politics and markets.

This book explores implications of the modern view of central banks rising from the proposition that words have no meaning beyond their use in a particular context and setting. It studies coded language to explain why a central bank's decisions and communicative interactions can't be devoted to a coded language which is an artificial language.

In central banking, the need for effective governance and policy transformations has never been more pressing. Central banks serve as the bedrock of a nation's financial stability, and yet, they face an array of complex challenges in the modern era. The delicate balance between autonomy from government influence and the necessity of adapting to external economic forces has become increasingly elusive. As the world grapples with the aftermath of a global pandemic and persistent economic turbulence, the demand for innovative strategies to safeguard economic and financial stability has reached a crescendo. Central bankers, economists, and policy experts are left grappling with the daunting task of navigating these treacherous waters, in dire need of a compass to guide them toward a resilient future. Governance and Policy Transformations in Central Banking is a groundbreaking book that transcends traditional boundaries to offer a comprehensive solution to the complex challenges faced by central banks worldwide. This book not only diagnoses problems, it also presents a meticulously curated collection of new empirical and theoretical chapters that illuminate the path forward. It is an invaluable resource that empowers central banks with the knowledge and tools necessary for development, governance, and policy transformation.

An examination of how the European Central Bank was established to ensure stability and prosperity for the euro area.

The book investigates the contemporary functioning of financial institutions and monetary policies in order to assess their effects in different economic situations. It advances some proposals to improve their contribution towards a more stable and vigorous economy in the context of both developed and developing countries.

A leading economist and former central banker discusses the evolution of central bank communication from secretiveness to transparency and accountability. Central bank communication has evolved from secretiveness to transparency and accountability—from a reluctance to give out any information at all to the belief in communication as a panacea for effective policy. In this book, Otmar Issing, himself a former central banker, discusses the journey toward transparency in central bank communication. Issing traces the development of transparency, examining the Bank of England as an example of extreme reticence and European Central Bank's President Mario Draghi as a practitioner of effective communication. He argues that the ultimate goal of central bank communication is to make monetary policy more effective, and describes the practice and theory of communication as an evolutionary process. For a long time, the Federal Reserve never made its monetary policy decisions public; the European Central Bank, on the other hand, had to adopt a modern communication strategy from the outset. Issing discusses the importance of guiding expectations in central bank communication, and points to financial markets as the most important recipients of this communication. He discusses the obligations of accountability and transparency, although he notes that total transparency is a “mirage.” Issing argues that the central message to the public must always be that the stability of a nation's currency is the bank's priority.