Neoclassical political economy explains why developing countries do not adopt development specialists' advice more regularly. But it misrepresents the dynamics of policymaking in developing countries and cannot easily explain policy changes or "wise" policy choices.

This paper discusses the theory that less politics makes better economics. It argues that this perspective on politics misrepresents the dynamics of policymaking in developing countries and is seriously limited in its ability to explain how policy changes come about or how policies are chosen that lead to socially beneficial outcomes. The author indicates that most models of political economy are not relevant for developing countries and are therefore unable to explain policy changes or wise policy choices. In light of this, the paper recommends an alternative approach to political economy that does not treat politics as a negative factor in policy choice. It emphasizes understanding the preferences and perceptions of policy elites, the circumstances that surround the emergence of policy issues, the concerns of decision makers, and the factors that affect the implementation and sustainability of policy change. In such an alternative, politics consists of efforts at problem solving through bargaining and the use of political resources in the context of great uncertainty.

This volume serves as an introduction to the field of positive political economy and the economic and political processes with which it is concerned. This new research tradition is distinct from both normative and historical approaches to political economy. Grounded in the rational-actor methodology of microeconomics, positive political economy is the study of rational decisions in a context of political and economic institutions. More analytical than traditional approaches, it is concerned with the derivation of principles and propositions against which real-world experience may be compared. Its focus is on empirical regularities, and its goal is theoretical explanation. The field has focused on three main areas of research: models of collective action, constraints on competitive market processes, and the analysis of transaction costs. Developments in all of these areas are covered in the book. The first part of the volume surveys the field, while the second part displays positive political economy at work, examining a variety of subjects. The final part contains essays by leading political economists on the theoretical foundations of the field.

Political economy - the original name for economics in its entirety - has in recent years witnessed a semantic broadening to include some of the preoccupations of classical economics. This intriguing collection of contributed work is concerned mainly with developments in the neo-classical tradition and examines the role played by rational choice in the decision-making processes of firms and the State. With contributions from leading scholars including Tony Addison, Bruno Frey and Alan Rugman, this book is an important addition to the field of Political Economy and should become essential reading for all economists as well as policy makers.

This book examines the dynamics shaping the economic process of economic liberalisation in Indonesia since the mid-1980's. Much writing on the process of economic liberalisation in developing countries views economic liberalisation as the victory of economic rationality over political and social interests. In contrast, this book argues that economic liberalisation should not be understood in these terms, but rather in the way that political social interests shape processes of economic reform in both a positive and negative sense. Specifically, Rosser argues that economic liberalisation needs to be understood in terms of the extent to which economic crises shift the balance of power and influence within society away from coalitions opposed to reform and towards those in favour of reform. In the Indonesian context, the main coalitions that need to be examined in this respect are the politico-bureaucrats and the conglomerates who have generally opposed reform and mobile capitalists who have generally supported reform. Based on extensive original research, and providing much new material, the book considers the politics of economic policy-making in Indonesia in a range of sectors including the capital market, intellectual property law, the banking industry, and the trade and investment sectors. Analysing why the nature of economic policy in Indonesia has varied over time, this study argues that there is nothing inevitable about a transition to a fully-fledged liberal market order in Indonesia, and outlines possible future scenarios for the country's political economy.

This title was first published in 2001. An analysis of the political economy of Mexico's financial reform. It is organized in three parts. The first part - chapters one to four - develops the framework, both historical and institutional. The first chapter outlines the theoretical discussion on state autonomy and develops a simple analytical framework to study public policy decisions. The subsequent three chapters address three main themes: external dependency of domestic states on international capital, political change under President Carlos Salinas and financial policy in Mexico. The second part presents the analysis of three main institutional changes to the financial system - development banking reform, commercial banking privatisation and autonomy of the central bank. Each specific case study shows how the reforms conformed to the ideas of the dominant consensus on economic policy and how they delivered an inefficient incentive structure. The third part - chapter eight - brings together all the elements to explain Mexico's 1994 financial crisis.

Mainstream economics was founded on many strong assumptions. Institutions and politics were treated as irrelevant, government as exogenous, social norms as epiphenomena. As an initial gambit this was fine. But as the horizons of economic inquiry have broadened, these assumptions have become hindrances rather than aids. If we want to understand why some economies succeed and some fail, why some governments are effective and others not, why some communities prosper while others stagnate, it is essential to view economics as embedded in politics and society. Prelude to Political Economy is a study of this embeddedness; it argues for an 'inclusive' approach to institutions and the state. Modern economics recognizes that individuals' pursuit of their own selfish ends can result in socially suboptimal outcomes - the Prisoner's Dilemma being the stark example. It has been suggested that what we need in such an eventuality is 'third-party' intervention, which can take the form of imposing punishment on players. Kaushik Basu objects to this method of wishing third parties out of thin air. He argues that if a third party that could impose its will on others were available, then it should have been modeled as a player to start with. The adoption of such an inclusive approach has implications for our conception of the state and the law. It means that the law cannot be construed as a factor that changes the game that citizens play. It is instead simply a set of beliefs of citizens; and, as such, it is similar to social norms. What the law does for an economy, so can social norms. The book discusses how the nature of policy advice and our conception of state power are affected by this altered view of the state and the law. As corollaries, the book addresses a variety of important social and philosophical questions, such as whether the state should guarantee freedom of speech, whether determinism is compatible with free will, and whether the free market can lead to coercion.

Gamani Corea, b. 1925, Sri Lankan economist; contributed articles.

In this examination of the political economy of economic policy determination and evolution in developing countries, Anne Krueger provides concrete insights into the interaction of economic and political variables that determine the success or failure of such policies an understanding that is essential if economists are to provide realistic technical assistance in the formulation of economic policy reform programs. The debt crisis of the 1980s accompanied an era of slow economic growth. Developing countries had widely divergent experiences. Some, like the East Asian countries, weathered the recession to resume and even accelerate growth and to lower their debt-servicing ratios. Others, like those in Africa and Latin America, fell into slow or even negative growth, were unable to tighten their debt burden, and experienced declines in per capita income. Krueger analyzes the interaction of politics and economics in experience with slow growth and debt crisis in terms of three major themes. The first is that politically determined policies have economic consequences that can and do change the political equilibrium that generated those policies. Second, the analysis of the political economy of economic policy determination in developed countries can only be undertaken on the basis of assumptions about the nature of government. These two themes, which have been taken up in current economics and political science literature, imply yet a third and less frequently noted proposition that neither economic policies or governments can be looked at as enduring phenomena. Both the nature of the government and the economic policies can be changed according to the political and economic responses one sets off in the other, resulting in various types of "policy cycles" that need to be better understood.