To understand the role of time within the scope of 20th century ontology, after the fundamental works of E. Husserl, M. Heidegger, P. Ricoeur, and E. Levinas, means to develop simultaneously the ontology of time. My aim is to demonstrate that in a definite sense the postmodern onto-logy is chrono-logy. The argument proceeds (and this constitutes its essential novelty) within the 'multidimensional space' involving not only the synchronic stratum of current conceptuality in its internal logical relationships, but also the diachronic axis of conceptual genesis. I apply different strategies of analysis in order to emphasize that the concept of the human Self, the concept of being, and the concept of time are inseparably linked with one another. To this triad I add one more link of a theological nature, viz. the relationship between God and the human mind as it has been developed in Orthodox apophatic theology and during the Scholastic controversies concerning the problem of visio Dei.

L. Nathan Oaklander is one of the leading philosophers of time defending the tenseless or B-Theory of time. He has remained at the forefront of this field since the early 1980s and today he is arguably the most formidable opponent of the tensed or A-theory of time. Much of the direction of the debate in this field for the past twenty years or so, especially in regards to the new tenseless theory of time, has been influenced by Oaklander's work. This book presents a carefully argued defense of the tenseless theory of time. The topics discussed include: the ontology of A- and B-theories of time; presentism; the open future theory; the A/B theory; defending the B-theory of time; temporal experience; temporal semantics; and time, identity, responsibility, and freedom.

The sixteen papers collected in this volume are expanded and revised versions of talks delivered at the Second International Conference on the Ontology of Spacetime, organized by the International Society for the Advanced Study of Spacetime (John Earman, President) at Concordia University (Montreal) from 9 to 11 June 2006. Most chapters are devoted to subjects directly relating to the ontology of spacetime. The book starts with four papers that discuss the ontological status of spacetime and the processes occurring in it from a point of view that is first of all conceptual and philosophical. The focus then slightly shifts in the five papers that follow, to considerations more directly involving technical considerations from relativity theory. After this, Time, Becoming and Change take centre stage in the next five papers. The book ends with two excursions into relatively uncharted territory: a consideration of the status of Kaluza-Klein theory, and an investigation of possible relations between the nature of spacetime and condensed matter physics, respectively. - Space and time in present-day physics and philosophy - Relatively low level of technicality, easily accessible - Introduction from scratch of the debates surrounding time - Broad spectrum of approaches, coherently represented

This book contains selected papers from the First International Conference on the Ontology of Spacetime. Its fourteen chapters address two main questions: first, what is the current status of the substantivalism/relationalism debate, and second, what about the prospects of presentism and becoming within present-day physics and its philosophy? The overall tenor of the four chapters of the book's first part is that the prospects of spacetime substantivalism are bleak, although different possible positions remain with respect to the ontological status of spacetime. Part II and Part III of the book are devoted to presentism, eternalism, and becoming, from two different perspectives. In the six chapters of Part II it is argued, in different ways, that relativity theory does not have essential consequences for these issues. It certainly is true that the structure of time is different, according to relativity theory, from the one in classical theory. But that does not mean that a decision is forced between presentism and eternalism, or that becoming has proved to be an impossible concept. It may even be asked whether presentism and eternalism really offer different ontological perspectives at all. The writers of the last four chapters, in Part III, disagree. They argue that relativity theory is incompatible with becoming and presentism. Several of them come up with proposals to go beyond relativity, in order to restore the prospects of presentism.· Space and time in present-day physics and philosophy · Introduction from scratch of the debates surrounding time · Broad spectrum of approaches, coherently represented

This book brings together, in a novel way, an account of the structure of time with an account of our language and thought about time. Joshua Mozersky argues that it is possible to reconcile the human experience of time, which is centred on the present, with the objective conception of time, according to which all moments are intrinsically alike. He defends a temporally centreless ontology along with a tenseless semantics that is compatible with - and indeed helps to explain the need for - tensed language and thought. This theory of time also, it is argued, helps to elucidate the nature of change and temporal passage, neither of which need be denied nor relegated to the realm of subjective experience only. The book addresses a variety of topics including whether the past and future are real; whether temporal passage is a genuine phenomenon or merely a subjective illusion; how the asymmetry of time is to be understood; the nature of representation; how something can change its properties yet retain its identity; and whether objects are three-dimensional or four-dimensional. It is a wide-ranging examination of recent issues in metaphysics, philosophy of language and the philosophy of science and presents a compelling picture of the relationship of human beings to the spatiotemporal world.

Reinhardt Grossmann is one of the most sophisticated, knowledgeable and original contemporary metaphysicians. Although he was a student of Bergmann, he influenced the development of Bergmann's metaphysics considerably. No philosopher other than Grossmann defends perception to that degree against the persistent skeptical arguments. He characterizes his epistemological positions as radical empiricism and radical realism. By realism Grossmann mainly means the view that the material things we perceive exist. It is thus also an ontological position and closely related to his empiricism. Grossmann's empiricism is radical insofar as he claims that entities of all categories are perceptible, even numbers and universals. Grossmann's universal realism advocates a theory of abstract categories against the current naturalism. He distinguishes between the world and the physical universe. The latter is the domain of science; the former is the subject of ontology.

In this volume, Brakel raises questions about conventions in the study of mind in three disciplines—psychoanalysis, philosophy of mind, and experimental philosophy. She illuminates new understandings of the mind through interdisciplinary challenges to views long-accepted. Here she proposes a view of psychoanalysis as a treatment that owes its successes largely to its biological nature—biological in its capacity to best approximate the extinction of problems arising owing to aversive conditioning. She also discusses whether or not "the mental" can have any real ontological standing, arguing that a form of reductive physicalism can be sufficient ontologically, but that epistemological considerations require a branch of non-reductive physicalism. She then notes the positive implications of this view for psychiatry and psychoanalysis, Finally, she investigates the role of "consistency" in method and content, toward which experimental philosophers strive. In essence, Brakel articulates the different sets of challenges pertaining to: a) ancient dilemmas such as the mind/body problem; b) longstanding debates about the nature of therapeutic action in psychoanalysis; and c) new core questions arising in the relatively young discipline of experimental philosophy.

Can Christian theology overcome its long-standing supersessionism without diluting its Trinitarian faith? Can Christian faith remain genuinely Christian when it fails to recognize the covenantal significance of the Jews? In his later career, leading Trinitarian theologian Robert Jenson's theology moves in a post-supersessionistic direction. That said, the conceptual nexus between his Trinitarian theology and his post-supersessionism is not always patent on the surface of his texts. In this book, Lee traces the post-supersessionistic development of Jenson's Trinitarian theology and uncovers the reasons why Jenson's Trinitarian theology sets out to embrace the existence of the Jews. This book seeks to show that Jenson's revisionary--historicized, "carnalized," hermeneutical, and eschatological--Trinitarian ontology allows for genuine confession of the eternal triune God as the God of Israel, and that it thereby lays a firm basis for a properly Christian post-supersessionism.

Ontology has been a subject of many studies carried out in artificial intelligence (AI) and information system communities. Ontology has become an important component of the semantic web, covering a variety of knowledge domains. Although building domain ontologies still remains a big challenge with regard to its designing and implementation, there are still many areas that need to create ontologies. Information Science (IS) is one of these areas that need a unified ontology model to facilitate information access among the heterogeneous data resources and share a common understanding of the domain knowledge. Recently, the development of domain ontologies has become increasingly important for knowledge level interoperation and information integration. They provide functional features for AI and knowledge representation. Domain Ontology is a central foundation of growth for the semantic web that provides a general knowledge for correspondence and communication among heterogeneous systems. Particularly with a rise of ontology in the artificial intelligence (AI) domain, it can be seen as an almost inevitable development in computer science and AI in general.

A pioneering investigation into the nature of emotions, bringing together important questions in ontology, metaphysics, and philosophy of mind. Leading scholars explore a neglected aspect of the philosophy of emotion, paving the way for new advances in research. This book will be important for those working in the field of emotions.