When a president’s governing philosophy is out of step with the dominant ideology of the culture, his options for leadership are much different FROM those of a leader more in sync with the times. Such opposition leaders face distinctive challenges and opportunities for effectiveness. They should be judged by different standards, argues political scientist David Crockett. Crockett has analyzed presidents from Whig times through the Clinton presidency to develop a model for understanding presidential success and the strategies that are appropriate to the circumstances. Focusing on the terms of TWELVE opposition presidents, Crockett details the approaches they have taken to maximize their own goals and maintain political power. He illustrates vividly how these leaders must balance personal and partisan success and he lays out the relationship between personality or character and the larger political context. All opposition presidents face roughly the same type of leadership situation governing in an era in which they do not control the power to define politics but Crockett’s broad historical perspective demonstrates that they do not all handle this situation in the same way. Studying the presidency in such a political context enables Crockett to break free of the one-size-fits-all model of presidential leadership. Leadership strategies are contingent and context-bound, and the wise president understands the constraints history places on his leadership. In the case of opposition presidents, history demonstrates that pursuing a path of moderation is far healthier than launching a frontal assault on the governing party. It is healthier for the president and his party and healthier for the political system as a whole. Breaking free of the standard focus on post-World War II presidencies, this historically rich, analytically sophisticated, and extremely readable volume offers challenging understandings of presidential effectiveness. Students of American politics will join scholars of the presidency in welcoming its innovative and tightly argued perspectives.

Some presidents enter office with an uphill climb in front of them: their political party represents a different governing philosophy than the dominant strain of the day. These, David A. Crockett says, are "opposition presidents." If they are, in a sense, out of step with their times, how do they ever get elected in the first place? In Running against the Grain: How Opposition Presidents Win the White House, Crockett employs historical comparisons to draw conclusions about what it takes for these candidates to win the office. He focuses on seven presidents in twelve elections: William Henry Harrison (1840) and Zachary Taylor (1848), Grover Cleveland (1884 and 1892) and Woodrow Wilson (1912 and 1916), Dwight Eisenhower (1952 and 1956) and Richard Nixon (1968 and 1972), and Bill Clinton (1992 and 1996). Crockett draws on the work of Stephen Skowronek and others in the tradition of American political development to establish the periodization for his study. Through a comparative analysis of victorious opposition candidates, Crockett finds explanations that transcend specific campaigns or even specific eras. He contends that, because the way one acquires the office may have an effect on the practice of leadership in the office, "running against the grain" has implications far beyond Election Day.

This book is likely to rank as the standard source on the Hoover Presidency for years to come.

Choice Outstanding Title H. R. Haldeman, President Nixon's former chief of staff, is said to have boasted: "Every president needs a son of a bitch, and I'm Nixon's. I'm his buffer and I'm his bastard. I get done what he wants done and I take the heat instead of him." Richard Ellis explores the widely discussed but poorly understood phenomenon of presidential "lightning rods"--cabinet officials who "take the heat" instead of their bosses. Whether by intent or circumstance, these officials divert criticism and blame away from their presidents. The phenomenon is so common that it's assumed to be an essential item in every president's managerial toolbox. But, Ellis argues, such assumptions can oversimplify our understanding of this tool. Ellis advises against indiscriminate use of the lightning rod metaphor. Such labeling can hide as much as it reveals about presidential administration and policymaking at the cabinet level. The metaphor often misleads by suggesting strategic intent on the president's part while obscuring the calculations and objectives of presidential adversaries and the lightning rods themselves. Ellis also illuminates the opportunities and difficulties that various presidential posts--especially secretaries of state, chiefs of staff, and vice presidents--have offered for deflecting blame from our presidents. His study offers numerous detailed and instructive examples from the administrations of Truman (Dean Acheson); Eisenhower (Richard Nixon, John Foster Dulles, Herbert Brownell, and Ezra Taft Benson); LBJ (Hubert Humphrey); Ford (Henry Kissinger); and Reagan (James Watt). These examples, Ellis suggests, should guide our understanding of the relationship between lightning rods and presidential leadership, policymaking, and ratings. Blame avoidance, he warns, does have its limitations and may even backfire at times. Nevertheless, President Clinton and his successors may need to rely on such tools. The presidency, Ellis points out, finds itself the object of increasingly intense partisan debate and microscopic scrutiny by a wary press. Lightning rods can deflect such heat and help the president test policies, gauge public opinion, and protect his political power and public image. Ellis's book is an essential primer for helping us understand this process.