From Lexington and Gettysburg to Normandy and Iraq, the wars of the United States have defined the nation. But after the guns fall silent, the army searches the lessons of past conflicts in order to prepare for the next clash of arms. In the echo of battle, the army develops the strategies, weapons, doctrine, and commanders that it hopes will guarantee a future victory. In the face of radically new ways of waging war, Brian Linn surveys the past assumptions--and errors--that underlie the army's many visions of warfare up to the present day. He explores the army's forgotten heritage of deterrence, its long experience with counter-guerrilla operations, and its successive efforts to transform itself. Distinguishing three martial traditions--each with its own concept of warfare, its own strategic views, and its own excuses for failure--he locates the visionaries who prepared the army for its battlefield triumphs and the reactionaries whose mistakes contributed to its defeats. Discussing commanders as diverse as Dwight D. Eisenhower, George S. Patton, and Colin Powell, and technologies from coastal artillery to the Abrams tank, he shows how leadership and weaponry have continually altered the army's approach to conflict. And he demonstrates the army's habit of preparing for wars that seldom occur, while ignoring those it must actually fight. Based on exhaustive research and interviews, The Echo of Battle provides an unprecedented reinterpretation of how the U.S. Army has waged war in the past and how it is meeting the new challenges of tomorrow.

Organizational learning is an area of study that focuses on models and theories about the way an organization learns and adapts. This volume investigates how various global and regional intergovernmental organizations, states and national bureaucracies, as well as nongovernmental organizations, exploit experience and knowledge to change their understanding of the world, their policies and their behaviours. Drawing upon and synthesizing organizational, social and individual-level learning theories, the cases explicate various learning processes, learning by illicit actors, and deterrents to organizational learning. The twelve case studies of this volume consider organizational learning associated with multiple issue areas including the United States embargo against Cuba, food security in the European Union, the Russian energy sector, Colombian drug trafficking, terrorist groups, the Catholic Church, and foreign aid agencies. Based entirely on original research, the volume is relevant to international relations, comparative politics, organizational sociology and policy studies.

This book offers an accessible introduction to the U.S. military as an institution and provides insights into the military’s structure and norms. Designed for undergraduate students, the book offers an interdisciplinary overview of America’s armed forces through three critical lenses. First, it introduces the military’s constitutional and historical context. Second, it presents concise factual information chosen for its relevance to the military’s structures, procedures, norms, and varied activities. Finally, it intersperses these facts with debates, theories, and questions to spark student interest, class discussion, and further research. The text is written for the beginner but covers complex topics such as force structure and the defense budget. With contributions informed by both scholarly approaches and long military careers, the book will prepare students for further studies in international relations, civil-military relations, or U.S. foreign policy. It also encourages critical thinking, elucidating an institution that undergraduates and other civilians too often perceive as both baffling and above reproach. This book will be of much interest to students of the U.S. military, civil-military relations, U.S. politics, and public policy.

How nonstate military strategies overturn traditional perspectives on warfare Since September 11th, 2001, armed nonstate actors have received increased attention and discussion from scholars, policymakers, and the military. Underlying debates about nonstate warfare and how it should be countered is one crucial assumption: that state and nonstate actors fight very differently. In Nonstate Warfare, Stephen Biddle upturns this distinction, arguing that there is actually nothing intrinsic separating state or nonstate military behavior. Through an in-depth look at nonstate military conduct, Biddle shows that many nonstate armies now fight more "conventionally" than many state armies, and that the internal politics of nonstate actors—their institutional maturity and wartime stakes rather than their material weapons or equipment—determines tactics and strategies. Biddle frames nonstate and state methods along a continuum, spanning Fabian-style irregular warfare to Napoleonic-style warfare involving massed armies, and he presents a systematic theory to explain any given nonstate actor’s position on this spectrum. Showing that most warfare for at least a century has kept to the blended middle of the spectrum, Biddle argues that material and tribal culture explanations for nonstate warfare methods do not adequately explain observed patterns of warmaking. Investigating a range of historical examples from Lebanon and Iraq to Somalia, Croatia, and the Vietcong, Biddle demonstrates that viewing state and nonstate warfighting as mutually exclusive can lead to errors in policy and scholarship. A comprehensive account of combat methods and military rationale, Nonstate Warfare offers a new understanding for wartime military behavior.

This history of American armored warfare through the twentieth century “boasts some of the best available analysis of mobile war as practiced by the US" (Publishers Weekly). Camp Colt to Desert Storm is the only complete history of US armed forces from the advent of the tank in battle during World War I to the campaign to drive Iraq out of Kuwait in 1991. With comprehensive analysis, it traces the development of doctrine for operations at the tactical and operational levels of war and assesses how this fighting doctrine translates into the development of equipment. Beginning with the Army’s first tank school, Camp Colt in Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, this volume examines how armored warfare effected and was influenced by the evolution of twentieth-century combat. The tank revolutionized the battlefield in World War II. In the years since, developments such as nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, computer assisted firing, and satellite navigation have continued to transform armored warfare’s role in combat.