Although many modern philosophers of law describe custom as merely a minor source of law, formal law is actually only one source of the legal customs that govern us. Many laws grow out of custom, and one measure of a law's success is by its creation of an enduring legal custom. Yet custom and customary law have long been neglected topics in unsettled jurisprudential debate. Smaller concerns, such as whether customs can be legitimized by practice or by stipulation, stipulated by an authority or by general consent, or dictated by law or vice versa, lead to broader questions of law and custom as alternative or mutually exclusive modes of social regulation, and whether rational reflection in general ought to replace sub-rational prejudice. Can legal rules function without customary usage, and does custom even matter in society? The Philosophy of Customary Law brings greater theoretical clarity to the often murky topic of custom by showing that custom must be analyzed into two more logically basic concepts: convention and habit. James Bernard Murphy explores the nature and significance of custom and customary law, and how conventions relate to habits in the four classic theories of Aristotle, Francisco Suarez, Jeremy Bentham, and James C. Carter. He establishes that customs are conventional habits and habitual conventions, and allows us to better grasp the many roles that custom plays in a legal system by offering a new foundation of understanding for these concepts.

Although many modern philosophers of law describe custom as merely a minor source of law, formal law is actually only one source of the legal customs that govern us. Many laws grow out of custom, and one measure of a law's success is by its creation of an enduring legal custom. Yet custom and customary law have long been neglected topics in unsettled jurisprudential debate. Smaller concerns, such as whether customs can be legitimized by practice or by stipulation, stipulated by an authority or by general consent, or dictated by law or vice versa, lead to broader questions of law and custom as alternative or mutually exclusive modes of social regulation, and whether rational reflection in general ought to replace sub-rational prejudice. Can legal rules function without customary usage, and does custom even matter in society? The Philosophy of Customary Law brings greater theoretical clarity to the often murky topic of custom by showing that custom must be analyzed into two more logically basic concepts: convention and habit. James Bernard Murphy explores the nature and significance of custom and customary law, and how conventions relate to habits in the four classic theories of Aristotle, Francisco Suarez, Jeremy Bentham, and James C. Carter. He establishes that customs are conventional habits and habitual conventions, and allows us to better grasp the many roles that custom plays in a legal system by offering a new foundation of understanding for these concepts.

Some legal rules are not laid down by a legislator but grow instead from informal social practices. In contract law, for example, the customs of merchants are used by courts to interpret the provisions of business contracts; in tort law, customs of best practice are used by courts to define professional responsibility. Nowhere are customary rules of law more prominent than in international law. The customs defining the obligations of each State to other States and, to some extent, to its own citizens, are often treated as legally binding. However, unlike natural law and positive law, customary law has received very little scholarly analysis. To remedy this neglect, a distinguished group of philosophers, historians and lawyers has been assembled to assess the nature and significance of customary law. The book offers fresh insights on this neglected and misunderstood form of law.

This text contains 29 cutting-edge essays by philosophers and lawyers which address the central philosophical questions about international law. Its overarching theme is the moral and political values that should guide and shape the assessment and development of international law and institutions.

TO VOLUMES 9 AND 10 OF THE TREATISE I am happy to present here the third batch of volumes for the Treatise project: This is the batch consisting of Volumes 9 and 10, namely, A History of the P- losophy of Law in the Civil Law World, 1600–1900, edited by Damiano Canale, Paolo Grossi, and Hasso Hofmann, and The Philosophers’ Philosophy of Law from the Seventeenth Century to Our Days, by Patrick Riley. Three v- umes will follow: Two are devoted to the philosophy of law in the 20th c- tury, and the third one will be the index for the entire Treatise, which will 1 therefore ultimately comprise thirteen volumes. This Volume 9 runs parallel to Volume 8, A History of the Philosophy of Law in the Common Law World, 1600–1900, by Michael Lobban, published in 2007. Volume 10, for its part, takes up where Volume 6 left off: which appeared under the title A History of the Philosophy of Law from the Ancient Greeks to the Scholastics (edited by Fred Miller Jr. in association with Carrie-Ann Biondi, likewise published in 2007), and which is mainly a history of the p- losophers’ philosophy of law (let us refer to this philosophy as A).

Democratic legal systems have recently been subject to rapid and multi-directional processes of change. There are numerous sociological, technological, ideological, or purely political processes which result in law’s amendment and transformation. This book argues that this legal change is best understood from a political philosophy perspective. This can be used as an interpretative device to understand the ongoing processes of change as well as their outcomes such as new laws, judicial interpretations, or constitutional amendments. The work has three main objectives: to provide deeper understanding of the problems of legal change within the diversity of Western political and legal thought; to examine the development of the processes of change in terms of their normative and prudential acceptability; to interpret actual processes of change with a view to the general theoretical and normative background. The book is divided into three parts: Part I sets the scene and is focused on the general issues important for understanding and evaluating legal change from the perspective of political philosophy; Part II focuses on the spectrum of politico-philosophical justifications present in the political culture of democratic states; Part III offers selected case studies to specify and apply the philosophical ideas in the previous parts. The book will be a valuable resource for students and scholars of law and jurisprudence, including comparative legal studies and human rights law, political theory, and philosophy.

The concept of customary international law, although differently formulated, is already present in early modern European debates on natural law and the law of nations. However, no scholarly monograph has, until now, addressed the relationship between custom and the European natural law and ius gentium tradition. This book tells that neglected story, and offers a solid conceptual framework to contextualize and understand the 'problematic of custom', namely how to identify its normative content. Natural law doctrines, and the different ways in which they help construct human reason, provided custom with such normative content. This normative content consists of a set of fundamental moral values that help identify the status of custom as either a fundamental feature or an original source of ius gentium. This book explores what cultural values and practices facilitated the emergence of custom and rendered it into as a source of the law of nations, and how they did so. Two crucial issues form the core of the book's analysis. Firstly, it qualifies the nature of the interrelation between natural law and ius gentium, explaining why it matters in relation to our understanding of the idea of custom. Second, the book claims that the process of custom formation as a source of law calls into question the role of the authority of history. The interpretation of the past through this approach can thus be described as one of 'invention'.

Law, as we know it, with its rules and rituals, its procedures and professionals, has not been around forever. It came into being, it emerged, at different places and different times. Sources which allow us to observe the processes of law's beginnings have survived in some cases. In this book, scholars from various disciplines-linguists, lawyers, historians, anthropologists-present their findings concerning the earliest legal systems of a great variety of peoples and civilizations, from Mesopotamia and Ancient India to Greece and Rome, from the early Germanic, Celtic and Slavic nations, but also from other parts of the world. The general picture is complemented by an investigation into the Indo-European roots of a number of ancient legal systems, contributions from the point of view of legal philosophy and theory, and an overview of the insights gained.

This is the first comprehensive treatment in any language of the history of customary law in Hungary, from the thirteenth to the twentieth centuries. Hungary's customary law was described by Stephen Werboczy in 1517 in the extensive law code known as the Tripartitum. As Werboczy explained, Hungarian law derived from the interplay of Romano-canonical law, statute, written instruments, and court judgments. It was also responsive, however, to popular conceptions of the law's content and application, as communicated through the lay membership of the kingdom's courts. Publication of the Tripartitum was intended to make the law more certain by fixing it in writing. Nevertheless, its text was customized by actual use, in the same way as the statute laws of the kingdom were adjusted as a consequence of court practice and of errors in their transmission. The reputation attaching to the Tripartitum and Hungary's insulation from the Roman Law Reception meant that the Tripartitum continued to retain authority until well into the nineteenth century. Attempts to replace it foundered and it was the principal text on which the courts and the schools relied, not only in Habsburg Hungary but also in Transylvania. Courts, nevertheless, continued to modify its provisions in the interests of rendering judgments that they deemed either to be right or in conformity with developing practices. Even after the establishment of a parliamentary form of government in the nineteenth century, a strong customary element attached to Hungarian law, which was amplified by the association of customary law with national traditions. The consequence was that Hungary maintained aspects of a customary law regime until the Communist period.