The Political Economy of Investment Arbitration asks how political institutions and actors in the host state of an investment contribute to the emergence of investor-state disputes. Combining insights from international relations and political economy, it considers two opposing explanations for investor-state disputes: shifting state preferences toward FDI, or the lack of state capacity to maintain an investment-friendly environment. This book's overarching conclusion is that democratic institutions in host states contribute to the emergence of investor-state disputes. Phillips Williams argues that at the heart of many investor-state disputes are highly politicized distributional conflicts involving a range of domestic interest groups. Indeed, it is often pressure from these groups, whether through voting, protests or lobbying, which motivates states to take the policy decisions that are subsequently subject to investors' legal challenges. Thus, this monograph demonstrates that in the face of the potentially high costs posed by investment arbitration, governments continue to take measures which may harm investors in order to pursue specific policy goals. More importantly, these disputes are not only the result of corruption or weak rule of law, but of measures which are taken at the behest of broader interest groups and relate to clear public policy concerns. This has important implications of our normative assessment of the regime and is highly relevant to current debates in both international law and international political economy about the relationship between investment treaties and domestic politics.

Investment treaties are some of the most controversial but least understood instruments of global economic governance. Public interest in international investment arbitration is growing and some developed and developing countries are beginning to revisit their investment treaty policies. The Political Economy of the Investment Treaty Regime synthesises and advances the growing literature on this subject by integrating legal, economic, and political perspectives. Based on an analysis of the substantive and procedural rights conferred by investment treaties, it asks four basic questions. What are the costs and benefits of investment treaties for investors, states, and other stakeholders? Why did developed and developing countries sign the treaties? Why should private arbitrators be allowed to review public regulations passed by states? And what is the relationship between the investment treaty regime and the broader regime complex that governs international investment? Through a concise, but comprehensive, analysis, this book fills in some of the many "blind spots" of academics from different disciplines, and is the first port of call for lawyers, investors, policy-makers, and stakeholders trying to make sense of these critical instruments governing investor-state relations.

Investment treaties are some of the most controversial but least understood instruments of global economic governance. Public interest in international investment arbitration is growing and some developed and developing countries are beginning to revisit their investment treaty policies. The Political Economy of the Investment Treaty Regime synthesises and advances the growing literature on this subject by integrating legal, economic, and political perspectives. Based on an analysis of the substantive and procedural rights conferred by investment treaties, it asks four basic questions. What are the costs and benefits of investment treaties for investors, states, and other stakeholders? Why did developed and developing countries sign the treaties? Why should private arbitrators be allowed to review public regulations passed by states? And what is the relationship between the investment treaty regime and the broader regime complex that governs international investment? Through a concise, but comprehensive, analysis, this book fills in some of the many "blind spots" of academics from different disciplines, and is the first port of call for lawyers, investors, policy-makers, and stakeholders trying to make sense of these critical instruments governing investor-state relations.

The Political Economy of Investment Arbitration asks how political institutions and actors in the host state of an investment contribute to the emergence of investor-state disputes. Combining insights from international relations and political economy, it considers two opposing explanations for investor-state disputes: shifting state preferences toward FDI, or the lack of state capacity to maintain an investment-friendly environment. This book's overarching conclusion is that democratic institutions in host states contribute to the emergence of investor-state disputes. Phillips Williams argues that at the heart of many investor-state disputes are highly politicized distributional conflicts involving a range of domestic interest groups. Indeed, it is often pressure from these groups, whether through voting, protests or lobbying, which motivates states to take the policy decisions that are subsequently subject to investors' legal challenges. Thus, this monograph demonstrates that in the face of the potentially high costs posed by investment arbitration, governments continue to take measures which may harm investors in order to pursue specific policy goals. More importantly, these disputes are not only the result of corruption or weak rule of law, but of measures which are taken at the behest of broader interest groups and relate to clear public policy concerns. This has important implications of our normative assessment of the regime and is highly relevant to current debates in both international law and international political economy about the relationship between investment treaties and domestic politics.

Benefiting from a truly Pan-American perspective, these essays evaluate the economics and politics of the new patterns of North-South integration in the particular context of the Americas, questioning if regional and bilateral trade agreements like NAFTA, CAFTA or the FTAA are appropriate mechanisms to promote economic development.

The idea for this volume was conceived by Frederick Praeger, founder of Westview Press, who asked Roland Vaubel if he would put together a collection of chapters on the public choice approach to the study of international organizations. Vaubel felt it would be useful to have a coeditor from the United States, and Thomas D. Willett enthusiastically agreed to take on these duties.

A rigorous and empirically-based analysis of the legitimacy challenges facing investment arbitration and the potential for reforms to remedy critique.

This accessible, comprehensive and pertinent Handbook will be of interest to academics, researchers and students working in the fields of international politics, in particular political economy and foreign policy, and the economics of trade.¾ Practitio