For many, small firms are everyday realities of the economy and visible in every high-street and industrial estate. Their existence and importance is unquestionable. Such beliefs are understandable, but the authors of this new book would suggest they are misguided. The Political Economy of the Small Firm challenges the assumptions regarding small firms that pervade society and political representation. Small firms are not organised into a homogenous sector that has a clear constituency or political influence. In fact, the small firm is shown to be an inconstant political construct that is discursively ethereal and vulnerable to political exploitation. Fusing theories from political science, management and linguistics, Dannreuther and Perren assert that the idea of the small firm is an important discursive resource used by political actors to legitimise their actions, influence their citizens and help sustain regimes of accumulation. On top of this, the authors also empirically test their claims against 200 years of UK parliamentary debate, from the Industrial Revolution to the Blair government. The political construction of the small firm is shown not only to provide rhetorical mechanisms to maintain periods of capitalist accumulation, but also to increase the relative autonomy of the state and to centralise power to elite politicians. For a period of 150 years up to the 1970s, the small firm was an unexplored presence, below the political radar and resonant with poor working standards and extreme forms of competition. During the so-called Fordist period from the 1930s, the small firm was seen as the dirty, out-dated, contrast to the clean, modern future represented by mass production and corporations. The perceived failure of Fordism led to the invention of the small firm and its presentation as an ideal political construct. By fabricating assertions of what small firms are and what they want, frequently out of conjecture, the authors of this book show how political elites have been able to advocate radical reformist agendas since the 1970s in the name of a phantom constituency.

Machine generated contents note: 1. Introduction; 2. Theoretical reinterpretation of the small welfare state in South Korea; 3. The emergence of the small welfare state under the authoritarian developmental state (1961-1987); 4. Democratization and limited welfare state development under the conservative rule (1987-1997); 5. Economic crisis, power shift, and welfare politics under the Kim Dae Jung government (1997-2002); 6. Economic Unionism and the limits of the Korean welfare state under the Roh Moo Hyun government (2003-2007); 7. Wind of welfare and tax politics under the returned conservative rule; 8. Conclusion

This book addresses the policy questions surrounding the challenge of transforming eastern European economies from their planned, administrative past to vibrant market-based entities. Jozef van Brabant considers in turn, the wider set of challenges facing these economies - stabilization, privatization, liberalization, institution building, and developing and maintaining the sociopolitical consensus - before examining the evolving role of the state. Using concrete examples from the eastern European countries throughout, including the Czech Republic and Bulgaria, this work systematically examines, in a society-wide context, the initial conditions of transformation, the policy tasks ahead and the manner in which policies have been pursued.

For the millions of citizens in the Arab World who came together in 2010-2011 to discover their common yearning for dignity and liberty, the real revolutions only began after the wave of protests. Understanding the Political Economy of the Arab Uprisings reassess the interests, potential and constraints of various socio-political players and their importance in the building of a constructive environment for democratic progress in the Middle East. Initiated by the Cairo-based Economic Research Forum and edited by Ishac Diwan, this invaluable volume features contributions by Middle East academics across the world. They examine the reasons behind the uprisings, how democratic transitions transpire, the role of Arab capitalism in the crises, and how the experiences of other countries such as Indonesia, Turkey and Iran, can forecast where these uprisings may lead the Middle East in the years to come.

'The captivating nature of these contributions to political economy - which were all published between 1976 and 1996, but mostly in the last decade - is a clear reflection of Sir Alan's authoritative standing both as an academic economist and a government economic advisor. . . . the book addresses a wide range of philosophical questions and practical policy issues, thus offering plenty of stimulating material for both the theoretical and applied economist, as well as other social scientists.' - M. Teresa Lunati, The Economic Journal '. . . many of the papers are worth reading, and each paper has a useful introduction explaining the context in which it was written. The best part of the book is the selection of papers in the last part, especially his [Alan Peacock's] discussions of the regulation of broadcasting. There is much for an economist to learn from these papers: the role economists can play in public policy debates, the inner workings of committees, the role of information control in policy decisions.' - William Sjostrom, Kyklos The Political Economy of Economic Freedom brings together a timely selection of Sir Alan Peacock's views on economic freedom, its philosophy, its influence on the critique of economic policy and the problems encountered in expanding it.

The Political Economy of International Commodity Cartels examines how international commodity cartels in the 1930s were impacted not only by commercial rivalry, but also by international trade political and diplomatic concerns. This work presents the rise and decline of the European Timber Exporters’ Convention (ETEC) and analyses how firms navigated through the cartel game under increasing international competition, pressures from the national governments, and the interventionist endeavours of the League of Nations. Cartels are often associated with, in the standard economic interpretation, business collusion. However, in using vast archive sources and historical methodology, the chapters in this book shed light onto how international relations shaped cartels. The rise of British protectionism, the emergence of the Soviet Union as an industrial power, and the economic rapprochement of the League of Nations in the early 1930s created a wave of political and diplomatic challenges in the timber trading countries and affected cartelisation. Timber firms in the biggest producer countries—Finland and Sweden—were uninterested in international cartel collaboration, but under pressure joined the ETEC nevertheless. This book makes a strong contribution to the fields of business history and cartel studies. It is an essential read for economic historians interested in how political pressure shaped international cartels and how cartels became avenues of diplomacy.

Trust and cooperation are at the heart of the two most important approaches to comparative politics - rational choice and political culture. Yet we know little about trust's relationship to political institutions. This book sets out a rationalist theory of how institutions - and in particular informal institutions - can affect trust without reducing it to fully determine expectations. It then shows how this theory can be applied to comparative political economy, and in particular to explaining inter-firm cooperation in industrial districts, geographical areas of intense small firm collaboration. The book compares trust and cooperation in two prominent districts in the literature, one in Emilia Romagna, Italy, and the other in Baden-Württemberg, Germany. It also sets out and applies a theory of how national informal institutions may change as a result of changes in global markets, and shows how similar mechanisms may explain persistent distrust too among Sicilian Mafiosi.

Originally published in 1989, this book was the first comprehensive and analytical account of the Italian small firm economy to appear in English. Dealing principally with the area of central and north-east Italy where small business flourishes, the book relates to the concentration of such companies to the concept of ‘industrial districts’ developed by Alfred Marshall, and provides both a theoretical and statistical basis for Italy in the latter part of the twentieth century. The success of Italian manufacturing is explained in terms of political and social factors as well as economic and technical ones and the working practices within the technology companies discussed.

The Political Economy is ideally suited as a supplementary text for courses in American government and politics, policy studies, business-government relations, and economic issues and policy making. It integrates selections from the very finest new and classical works of political and economic analysis, by distinguished scholars, into a comprehensive overview of the American political system.

Italy is a country of recent decline and long-standing idiosyncratic traits. A rich society served by an advanced manufacturing economy, where the rule of law is weak and political accountability low, it has long been in downward spiral alimented by corruption and clientelism. From this spiral has emerged an equilibrium as consistent as it is inefficient, that raises serious obstacles to economic and democratic development. The Political Economy of Italy's Decline explains the causes of Italy's downward trajectory, and explains how the country can shift to a fairer and more efficient system. Analysing both political economic literature and the history of Italy from 1861 onwards, The Political Economy of Italy's Decline argues that the deeper roots of the decline lie in the political economy of growth. It places emphasis on the country's convergence to the productivity frontier and the evolution of its social order and institutions to illuminate the origins and evolution of the current constraints to growth, using institutional economics and Schumpeterian growth theory to support its findings. It analyses two alternative reactions to the insufficient provision of public goods: an opportunistic one – employing tax evasion, corruption, or clientelism as means to appropriate private goods –- and one based on enforcing political accountability. From the perspective of ordinary citizens and firms such social dilemmas can typically be modelled as coordination games, which have multiple equilibria. Self-interested rationality can thus lead to a spiral, in which several mutually reinforcing vicious circles lead society onto an inefficient equilibrium characterized by low political accountability and weak rule of law. The Political Economy of Italy's Decline follows the gradual setting in of this spiral as it identifys the deeper causes of Italy's decline.