The Political Thought of Justice Antonin Scalia explores the similarities in political and constitutional thought between Justice Antonin Scalia and Alexander Hamilton and concludes that Hamilton holds the key to understanding Justice Scalia's past, present, and future decisions. From the fundamental premises of human nature to federalism, James B. Staab uses comparisons between the two men to find the underlying judicial philosophy that connects Justice Scalia's manifold decisions.

Many hoped or feared that Antonin Scalia’s appointment to the Supreme Court in 1986 would guarantee a conservative counter-revolution that would reverse the liberal jurisprudence of the Supreme Court under Chief Justice Earl Warren and which was continued to some extent under the Burger Court though the influence of Justice William Brennan. In addition, President Reagan described Scalia’s nomination as part of a project to remake the role of the Court, promote an interpretive approach of originalism, and shift authority and discretion to the States. Yet by the time of his death in 2016 it was unclear to what extent Scalia had effected the legal, institutional, or political revolutions that had been anticipated. While the Court did move to the right doctrinally, and reversed or modified many Vinson-Warren-Burger precedents, Scalia’s influence on constitutional jurisprudence turned out to be far less than it could have been, and his ability to persuade other Justices to adopt his legal views—both substantively and methodologically—was less than many mainstream media accounts recognize. Scalia’s institutional and political legacies are similarly complex: he was neither as transformative a figure as some of his allies might have hoped nor so unimportant as some of his detractors might have wished. The fact that his death and the controversy surrounding his replacement is so intense speaks to the fragile legacy that Scalia really has had on the Supreme Court after 30 years. This book will assess Scalia’s legacy in an edited volume that assembles leading legal and political science scholars who will evaluate his impact across a range of jurisprudential, institutional, and political issues.

"In this work of intellectual history, the author identifies four transformations in federal goverrnment that followed the New Deal: the rise of the administrative state, the erosion of federalism, the ascendance of the modern presidency, and the development of modern judicial review. He then considers how schools of conservative thought (traditionalists, neoconservatives, libertarians, Straussians) responded to each transformation"--

Adherents of originalism often present it as a theory that constrains legal decision-making in a clear and objective manner that is based on the text and original meaning of the Constitution, in contrast to the supposedly subjective and “activist” jurisprudence of those who promote a living Constitution. But originalists have not had the same views on constitutional issues, calling into question the theory of originalism. Limits of Constraint examines the originalist jurisprudence of Hugo Black, Antonin Scalia, and Clarence Thomas, showing that three of the Court’s originalists have arrived at different conclusions in many constitutional areas. While the starkest contrast is between Justice Black and Justices Scalia and Thomas, even the latter two justices have disagreed on several key issues, including executive power and the administrative state. James Staab shows that originalism in actual practice does not deliver on its promise of an objective jurisprudence free of personal philosophy and discretion. Rather than rehash theoretical debates about the merits of originalism, Limits of Constraint examines originalism in operation by focusing on the judicial opinions of three prominent Supreme Court originalists: Hugo Black, Antonin Scalia, and Clarence Thomas. If the analysis of this book is correct—that is, the results reached by Justices Black, Scalia, and Thomas are divergent across a wide array of constitutional areas—then originalism promises more than it can deliver. One of the fundamental claims made by originalists is that their theory of constitutional interpretation limits judicial discretion, but originalism does not constrain judicial behavior as much as its defenders claim.

Antonin Scalia and American Constitutionalism is an in-depth study of Justice Antonin Scalia's jurisprudence, his work on the Supreme Court, and his significance in the history of American constitutionalism. After tracing Scalia's rise to Associate Justice and his subsequent emergence as a hero of the Republican Party and the political right, this book reviews and criticizes his general jurisprudential theory, arguing that he failed to produce either the objective method he claimed or the correct constitutional results he promised. Focusing on his judicial performance over his thirty years on the Court, it examines his decisions and opinions on virtually all of the constitutional issues he addressed from the fundamentals of structure (federalism, separation of powers, and the Article III judicial power) to specific interpretations of most major constitutional provisions involving governmental powers and the rights of individuals under the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment. This book argues that Scalia applied his jurisprudential theories in inconsistent and contradictory ways and often ignored, distorted, or abandoned the interpretive methods he proclaimed to reach the results he sought, results that were aligned with and supported by the post-Reagan Republican coalition. Scalia was far more consistent in enforcing such ideologically compatible results than he was in following his proclaimed jurisprudential theories. Finally, assessing Scalia's historical significance, Antonin Scalia and American Constitutionalism argues that his jurisprudence and career are particularly illuminating because they exemplify--contrary to his persistent claims--three paramount characteristics of American constitutionalism: the inherent inadequacy of originalism and other formal interpretive methodologies to produce consistent and correct answers to controverted constitutional questions; the close relationship that exists, particularly so in Scalia's case, between constitutional theories and interpretations on one hand and substantive political goals and values on the other; and the unavoidably living nature of American constitutionalism itself. All in all, Scalia stands as a towering figure of irony because his judicial career deconstructed the central claims of his own jurisprudence.

The most comprehensive study of Justice Scalia's politics and jurisprudence yet published, Justice Antonin Scalia and the Conservative Revival joins a vital discussion on contemporary American conservatism and the use of the law to restrain or undermine the New Deal state.

America’s first treasury secretary and one of the three authors of the Federalist Papers, Alexander Hamilton stands as one of the nation’s important early statesmen. Michael P. Federici places this Founding Father among the country’s original political philosophers as well. Hamilton remains something of an enigma. Conservatives and liberals both claim him, and in his writings one can find material to support the positions of either camp. Taking a balanced and objective approach, Federici sorts through the written and historical record to reveal Hamilton’s philosophy as the synthetic product of a well-read and pragmatic figure whose intellectual genealogy drew on Classical thinkers such as Cicero and Plutarch, Christian theologians, and Enlightenment philosophers, including Hume and Montesquieu. In evaluating the thought of this republican and would-be empire builder, Federici explains that the apparent contradictions found in the Federalist Papers and other examples of Hamilton’s writings reflect both his practical engagement with debates over the French Revolution, capital expansion, commercialism, and other large issues of his time, and his search for a balance between central authority and federalism in the embryonic American government. This book challenges the view of Hamilton as a monarchist and shows him instead to be a strong advocate of American constitutionalism. Devoted to the whole of Hamilton’s political writing, this accessible and teachable analysis makes clear the enormous influence Hamilton had on the development of American political and economic institutions and policies.

In this revised third edition of a classic in American jurisprudence, G. Edward White updates his series of portraits of the most famous appellate judges in American history from John Marshall to Oliver W. Holmes to Warren E. Burger, with a new chapter on the Rehnquist Court. White traces the development of the American judicial tradition through biographical sketches of the careers and contributions of these renowned judges. In this updated edition, he argues that the Rehnquist Court's approach to constitutional interpretation may have ushered in a new stage in the American judicial tradition. The update also includes a new preface and revised bibliographic note.

Justice Scalia was an important and divisive force in the United States, and his recent death has prompted widespread interest in his legal opinions. The unique point of view presented in this book, written by a personal friend, will attract considerable attention, from both scholars of politics and the general public.