Partisan conflict between the White House and Congress is now a dominant feature of national politics in the United States. What the Constitution sought to institute—a system of checks and balances—divided government has taken to extremes: institutional divisions so deep that national challenges like balancing the federal budget or effectively regulating the nation's savings and loans have become insurmountable. In original essays written especially for this volume, eight of the leading scholars in American government address the causes and consequences of divided party control. Their essays, written with a student audience in mind, take up such timely questions as: Why do voters consistently elect Republican presidents and Democratic congresses? How does divided control shape national policy on crucial issues such as the declaration of war? How have presidents adapted their leadership strategies to the circumstance of divided government? And, how has Congress responded in the way it writes laws and oversees departmental performance? These issues and a host of others are addressed in this compact yet comprehensive volume. The distinguished lineup of contributors promises to make this book "must" reading for both novice and serious students of elections, Congress, and the presidency.

Can presidents hope to be effective in policy making when Congress is ruled by the other party? Political scientist Richard Conley brings to this crucial discussion a fresh perspective. He argues persuasively that the conditions of divided government have changed in recent years, and he applies a rigorous methodology that allows the testing of a number of important assumptions about party control of the legislative process and the role of the president. Conley demonstrates that recent administrations have faced a very different playing field than those in the earlier post-war years because of such critical developments in electoral politics as decreasing presidential coattails and the lack of presidential popularity in opposition members’ districts. Moreover, he identifies several changes in the institutional setting in Congress that have affected both the legislative success rates of presidents’ programs and the strategies presidents pursue. These institutional factors include more assertive legislative majorities, changes in leadership structure, and increased party cohesion in voting. Conley uses both case studies and sophisticated time-series regression analyses to examine the floor success of presidential initiatives, the strategies presidents use in working with the legislature, and the use of veto power to achieve presidential aims. Scholars of the presidency and those interested in the larger American political process will find in this book both food for thought and a model of analytic sophistication.

Once again delivering their comprehensive—and accessible—analysis of the presidency, Pika and Maltese bring their trusted core text completely up-to-date. Never losing sight of the historical foundations of the office, the authors maintain a delicate balance as they examine the presidency through a modern lens.

Divided government occurs when the executive fails to enjoy majority support in at least one working house of the legislature. To date, the study of divided government has focused almost exclusively on the United States. However, divided government occurs much more widely. It occurs in other presidential systems. Moreover, it is also the equivalent of minority government in parliamentary regimes and cohabitation in French-style semi-presidential systems. This book examines the frequency, causes and management of divided government in comparative context, identifying the similarities and differences between the various experiences of this increasingly frequent form of government. The countries studied include Denmark, Ecuador, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Mexico, Poland, and the US.

This book develops an integrated approach to understanding the American economy and national elections. Economic policy is generally seen as the result of a compromise between the President and Congress. Because Democrats and Republicans usually maintain polarized preferences on policy, middle-of-the-road voters seek to balance the President by reinforcing in Congress the party not holding the White House. This balancing leads, always, to relatively moderate policies and, frequently, to divided government. The authors first outline the rational partisan business cycle, where Republican administrations begin with recession, and Democratic administrations with expansions, and next the midterm cycle, where the President's party loses votes in the mid-term congressional election. The book argues that both cycles are the result of uncertainty about the outcome of presidential elections. Other topics covered include retrospective voting on the economy, coat-tails, and incumbency advantage. A final chapter shows how the analysis sheds light on the economies and political processes of other industrial democracies.

As the relationship between the executive and legislative branches of the federal government becomes increasingly hostile, more Americans are wondering whether national politics can be described as gridlock or good government. This provocative and insightful collection of original essays provides answers by exploring the complicated nature and multiple implications of divided government in the United States. The distinguished contributors analyze the consequences of the 1992 and 1994 elections and argue that discussions of divided government are too narrowly focused on the issue of partisan division of governmental institutions. Divided Government convincingly shows how political scientists have downplayed the significance of Constitutional rules, legislative policy disaggregation, and the decline of party organization. They conclude that divided government, in its broader institutional context, will continue regardless of which parties control the different branches.

Never losing sight of the historical foundations of the office of President of the United States, the authors maintain a delicate balance as they examine the presidency through a modern lens.

This book explores how policy ideas are spread—or diffused—in an age in which policymaking has become increasingly complex and specialized. Using the concept of enterprise zones as a case study in policy diffusion, Karen Mossberger compares the process of their adoption in Virginia, Indiana, Michigan, New York, and Massachusetts over a twelve-year period. Enterprise zones were first proposed by the Reagan administration as a supply-side effort to reenergize inner cities, and they were eventually embraced by liberals and conservatives alike. They are a compelling example of a policy idea that spread and evolved rapidly. Mossberger describes the information networks and decisionmaking processes in the five states, assessing whether enterprise zones spread opportunistically, as a mere fad, or whether well-informed deliberation preceded their adoption.

Using a combination of existing and original research, this new text provides a simple explanation for the low turnout in American elections: rather than creating an environment conducive to participation, the institutional arrangements that govern structure participation, representation, and actual governance in the United States create an environment that discourages widespread participation. To explore this argument, the author examines the origins and development of registration laws, single-member districts, such as the Electoral College, and the separation of powers and the impact these institutions have on turnout levels in American national elections. To this end, the text employs a narrative discussing the impact of institutions on turnout in the United States and across nations, supported with extensive yet accessible data analysis. Hill not only provides students with explanations for the low turnout characteristic of American elections, but also demonstrates the powerful impact of institutions on political life.

The Politics of Presidential Impeachment takes a distinctive and fresh look at the impeachment provision of the US Constitution. Instead of studying it from a legal-constitutional perspective, the authors use a social science approach incorporating extensive case studies and quantitative analysis. Focusing on four presidents who faced impeachment processes—Andrew Johnson, Richard Nixon, Ronald Reagan, and Bill Clinton—they examine the conditions under which presidential impeachment is likely to occur and argue that partisanship and the evolving relationship between Congress and the president determine its effectiveness as an institutional constraint. They find that, in our contemporary political context, the propensity of Congress to utilize the impeachment tool is more likely, but given the state of heightened partisanship, impeachment is less likely to result in removal of a president. The authors conclude that impeachment is no longer a credible threat and thus no longer an effective tool in the arsenal of checks and balances. The book also offers a postscript that discusses the impeachment of President Donald J. Trump.